Board of Trustees of Policemen's Pension Fund of Atlanta v. Christy

• Decision Date: 16 October 1980
• Docket Number: No. 36446,36446
• Citation: 272 S.E.2d 288,246 Ga. 553
• Parties: BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF the POLICEMEN'S PENSION FUND OF ATLANTA et al. v. CHRISTY.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

Page 288

272 S.E.2d 288

246 Ga. 553

BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF the POLICEMEN'S PENSION FUND OF ATLANTA et al. v. CHRISTY.

No. 36446.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Argued Sept. 10, 1980.

Decided Oct. 16, 1980.

Ferrin Y. Mathews, Malcolm J. Hall, Irmina Rivero Owens, Marva Jones Brooks, Atlanta, for appellants.

Walter E. Sumner, Atlanta, amicus curiae.

Robert W. Hassett, Edward T. M. Garland, Atlanta, for appellee.

MARSHALL, Justice.

We granted certiorari in this case, 154 Ga.App. 488, 269 S.E.2d 33, to review the holdings of the Court of Appeals, that the phrase "in line of duty" in the provision for in-line-of-duty disability pensions in the Act establishing the Policemen's Pension Fund of Atlanta (Ga.L.1933, p. 213; as amended) means the same as "arises out of and in the course of employment" under the Georgia Workers' Compensation Act (Code § 114-102), and that the appellee-claimant's injuries were in fact received "in line of duty," as that phrase had been construed.

1. We agree with the Court of Appeals' construction of the phrase "in line of duty," but deem it necessary to address an issue not expressly considered by that court, i. e., the effect of § 23 of the 1933 Act (which has never been expressly repealed), which provides: "This Act shall not be affected (by?) nor shall it affect any of the provisions of any workmen's compensation law or other similar laws."

Since a strict and literal construction of the above provision standing alone would seem to require a result contrary to that reached by the Court of Appeals, we must examine some principles of statutory construction to determine the effect of the entire statute on the issue here involved. Initially, we note that the decisions of the courts of other states are mere opinions, which are not binding upon this court and will be followed only in case this court considers them sound and sees fit to follow them. Thompson v. Eastern Air Lines, 200 Ga. 216, 222, 39 S.E.2d 225 (1946).

"1. The cardinal rule in the construction of legislative enactments is to ascertain the true intention of the General Assembly in the passage of the law. As a general rule, the use of plain and unequivocal language in a legislative enactment obviates any necessity for judicial construction, and indeed forbids an interpretation of the words employed by the General Assembly. 2. An exception to the general rule just stated is presented by the use of words the meaning of which in general acceptation is apparently obvious, and yet the purpose of the legislature would be defeated were the words employed construed literally. Courts may construe the language employed in the act in connection with the context, and ascertain the legislative intent as derived from the old law, the evil, and the remedy, and will not defeat the intention and purpose of the General Assembly by giving effect to words which would render the purpose of the General Assembly in the passage of the enactment futile, unenforceable, or ineffectual. 3. In the construction of a statute a court may decline to give a legislative act such construction as will attribute to the General Assembly an intention to pass an act which is not reasonable, or as will defeat the purpose of the proposed legislation. In the exercise of this power a court may avoid a portion of the enactment and preserve the remainder." Gazan v. Heery, 183 Ga. 30, 187 S.E. 371 (1936). "In the construction of a statute the legislative intent must be determined from a consideration of it as a whole ... The construction of language and words used in one part of the statute must be in the light of the legislative intent as found in the statute as a whole ... Where there is an apparent conflict between different sections of the same statute, the duty of a court is to reconcile them, if possible, so as to make them consistent and harmonious with one another ... If they cannot be so reconciled the one which best conforms to the legislative intent must stand ... Where a particular expression in one part of a statute is not so extensive or large in its import as other expressions in the same statute, it must yield to the larger and more extensive expression, where the latter embodies the real intent of the legislature ..." Williams v. Bear's Den, Inc., 214 Ga. 240, 242, 104 S.E.2d 230 (1958) and cits. "In construing statutes subsequent acts of the legislature on the same subject may be considered." Wingfield v. Kutres, 136 Ga. 345, 349, 71 S.E. 474 (1911) and cit. The courts are to be guided by the last expression of the General Assembly on a subject. See cases annotated under Code § 102-102(9), catchwords "Last expression."

Applying these principles to the case at bar, we note that the Act in question has been amended a number of times in order to liberalize it. Ga.L.1957, pp. 3244, 3247, § 7 provided: "This Act, being necessary for the welfare of the State and its inhabitants, shall be liberally construed to effect the purposes hereof." (Emphasis supplied.) The "purposes hereof" are, inter alia, "to furnish a pension to the ... disabled members of the police departments of such cities who are now or may hereafter be in the service of such departments and on the pay-roll of such departments ..." Ga.L.1933, pp. 213, 221, § 20. By the provisions of Ga.L.1964, pp. 3001, 3004, § 1(f), disability incurred in the line of duty was made computable by the same formula as was used for computing the more liberal retirement as of right. Ga.L.1973, pp. 2832, 2835, § 2 liberalized the coverage for disability pensions by reducing the prerequisite period of employment from 10 to five years. Ga.L.1978, pp. 4527, 4530, § 1(F) recognized the interaction between this Act and the Workers' Compensation Act by providing that "pension benefits for disability incurred in the line of duty shall be reduced by the portion of compensation benefits payable under...