Board of Trustees of Mercer County Community College v. Sypek

• Decision Date: 20 May 1977
• Citation: 151 N.J.Super. 1,376 A.2d 240
• Parties: BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF MERCER COUNTY COMMUNITY COLLEGE, a body corporate of the State of New Jersey, and, Board of Education of the Vocational Schools in the County of Mercer, Plaintiffs, v. Arthur R. SYPEK, Sr., County Executive of the County of Mercer, and Albert E.Driver, Eugene V. Howard, Gilbert W. Lugossy, Barbara H. Sigmund, Paul J.Sollami, Joseph E. Tighue and John S. Watson, members of the Board of ChosenFreeholders ofthe County of Mercer, Defendants. Amici Curiae: Council of County Colleges, and, New Jersey EducationAssociation, Mercer County Community College Faculty Association, Mercer CountyVocational Education Association, and the Association of New Jersey CollegeFaculties.
• Court: New Jersey Superior Court

Page 1

151 N.J.Super. 1

376 A.2d 240

BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF MERCER COUNTY COMMUNITY COLLEGE, a body

corporate of the State of New Jersey, and, Board

of Education of the Vocational Schools

in the County of Mercer, Plaintiffs, v. Arthur R. SYPEK, Sr., County Executive of the County of

Mercer, and Albert E.Driver, Eugene V. Howard, Gilbert W.

Lugossy, Barbara H. Sigmund, Paul J.Sollami, Joseph E.

Tighue and John S. Watson, members of the Board of

ChosenFreeholders ofthe County of Mercer, Defendants.

Amici Curiae: Council of County Colleges, and, New Jersey

EducationAssociation, Mercer County Community College

Faculty Association, Mercer CountyVocational Education

Association, and the Association of New Jersey CollegeFaculties.

Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division.

May 20, 1977.

Smith, Stratton, Wise & Heher by Garrett M. Heher, Trenton, for plaintiff Bd. of Trustees of Mercer County College.

William C. Baggitt, III, Princeton, for plaintiff Bd. of Ed. of the Vocational Schools in Mercer County.

Harvey L. Stern, Mercer County Counsel, Trenton, for defendants Arthur R. Sypek, Sr., Albert E. Driver, Eugene V. Howard, Gilbert W. Lugossy, Barbara H. Sigmund, Paul J. Sollami, Joseph E. Tighue and John S. Watson.

Kessler, Tutek & Gottlieb by Myron H. Gottlieb, Bordentown, for amici curiae Council of County Colleges.

Ruhlman & Butrym by Cassel R. Ruhlman, Jr., Trenton, for amici curiae N.J. Ed. Ass'n, Mercer County Community College Faculty Ass'n, Mercer County Vocational Ed. Ass'n, and the Ass'n of N.J. College Faculties.

SCHOCH, A. J. S. C.

This action in lieu of prerogative writs was instituted by the Board of Trustees of Mercer County Community College (MCCC) against the County Executive of Mercer County and the members of the Board of Chosen Freeholders of that County (Board) seeking injunctive relief against defendants, restraining them from exercising any authority over plaintiff by enforcing the provisions of the Administrative Code adopted by the Board, and for a judgment declaring that plaintiff is a unit of government unaffected by the adoption by Mercer County of the Optional County Charter Law, N.J.S.A. 40:41A-1 et seq. After an answer was filed by defendants, the following organizations were granted leave to appear as amici curiae : New Jersey Education Association, Mercer County Faculty Association, Mercer County Vocational Educational Association, Association of New Jersey County College Faculties, and Council of County Colleges.

The Board of Education of the Mercer County Vocational Schools (Vo-Tech) joined in the action as an additional plaintiff seeking the same relief as that of MCCC.

There is no dispute about the factual background, and it can be simply stated. Plaintiff MCCC was established in 1966 pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:64A-1 et seq., and plaintiff Vo-Tech was organized in 1968 under N.J.S.A. 18A:54-1 et seq. In September 1972 the New Jersey Legislature adopted the Optional County Charter Law, N.J.S.A. 40:41A-1 et seq. In accordance with that act, a charter study commission was formed in Mercer County; sometime thereafter a formal report was submitted by that commission recommending the County Executive Plan under the Charter Act. Subsequently, the voters of Mercer County adopted this plan and, as a result, in April 1976 an ordinance was passed on first reading, effective May 1, 1976, adopting an Administrative Code pursuant to the County Executive Plan. This ordinance contains provisions which substantially alter both the existing structure of the two plaintiffs and the relationship between those plaintiffs and the county. The Code provides for considerable administrative control by the county; the board of school estimate is abolished, and the total effect of the implementation of this Code is to reduce plaintiffs from their autonomous status to that of county agencies and to place complete control in the hands of the Board.

The major issue in this case is whether plaintiffs are separate political subdivisions of the State, governed by Title 18A and not subject to the Charter Act, or whether the Charter Act brings these plaintiffs within the jurisdiction and control of the county.

There are several sections of the Charter Act which must be considered, interpreted and applied in order to resolve this issue.

40:41A-25. Government of county after adoption of optional plan

Upon adoption by the registered voters of any county of any of the optional forms of government set forth in this act, the county shall thereafter be governed by the plan adopted by the provisions of this law applicable to all optional plans, and by all general laws, subject to the transitional provisions in article 7 of this act.

40:41A-26. General law

For the purposes of this act, a "general law" shall be deemed to be such law or part thereof, heretofore or hereafter enacted, that:

a. Is not inconsistent with this act; and

b. Is by its terms applicable to or available to all counties, or;

c. Is applicable to all counties or to any category or class of counties, and deals with one or more of the following subjects: the administration of the judicial system, education, elections, health, county public authorities, taxation, and finance, and welfare.

Nothing in this act shall be construed to prevent counties from abolishing or consolidating agencies the existence of which has heretofore been mandated by State statute providing that such abolition or consolidation shall not alter the obligation of the county to continue providing the services previously provided by such abolished or consolidated agency.

The intent of this act is to enable a county that has adopted a charter pursuant to this act to cause any duty that has been mandated to it by the Legislature to be performed in the most efficient and expeditious manner, and, absent a clear legislative declaration to the contrary, without regard to organizational, structural or personnel provisions contained in the legislation mandating such duty.

40:41A-27. County powers generally

Any county that has adopted a charter pursuant to this act may, subject to the provisions of such charter, general law and the State Constitution:

a. Organize and regulate its internal affairs; create, alter and abolish offices, positions and employments and define the functions, powers and duties thereof; establish qualifications for persons holding offices, positions and employments; and provide for the manner of their appointment and removal and for their term, tenure and compensation.

40:41A-28. Municipal powers

Nothing in this act shall be construed to impair or diminish or infringe on the powers and duties of municipalities and other units of government under the general law of this State. It is the intent of this act only to permit municipalities and other units of government to employ services and facilities of the county for more effective, efficient, and adequate provision of services if and when such units may deem it desirable to do so. Municipalities are and shall remain the broad repository of local police power in terms of the right and power to legislate for the general health, safety and welfare of their residents.

40:41A-30. General powers

The grant of powers under this act is intended to be as broad as is consistent with the Constitution of New Jersey and with general law relating to local government. The grant of powers shall be construed as liberally as possible in regard to the county's right to reorganize its own form of government, to reorganize its structure and to alter or abolish its agencies, subject to the general mandate of performing services, whether they be performed by the agency previously established or by a new agency or another department of county government.

Plaintiffs contend that the intent of this act was limited to giving counties greater power over their own internal structure, further arguing that they are not part of the "internal structure" and are not "agencies" but rather "other units of government" and consequently excluded from operation of this law. They rely particularly on the case of Atlantic Community College v. Civil Service Comm'n, 59 N.J. 102, 279 A.2d 820 (1971), which considered the issue of whether nonprofessional employees of county community colleges were subject to the Civil Service Law. It was urged on behalf of defendant that county colleges are agencies of their county governments and therefore the employees must be accorded civil service protection if the county had adopted it for other employees. In considering that contention the court said:

We are not persuaded that county colleges are agencies of county government. Rather, we believe that they are separate political subdivisions which serve a separate purpose and operate apart from the governing bodies of the counties in which they are situated. Examination of the statutory scheme is demonstrative of this conclusion. (at 107, 279 A.2d at 823)

There follows a review of the various sections of N.J.S.A. 18A:64A-1 et seq., and then appears the following language:

It seems clear to us that the legislative intent as manifested in N.J.S.A. 18A:64A-1 et seq., and the operative effect of that act is that county colleges exist apart from, and independent in their internal affairs of the local county government. (at 109, 279 A.2d at 824)

Based on this language the plaintiffs conclude that the phrase

nothing in this act shall be construed to prevent counties from abolishing or consolidating agencies the existence of which has heretofore been mandated by State statute * * * (N.J.S. 40:41A-26)

does not apply to them but that they are "other units of government" referred to in § 28

* * * nothing in this Act shall be construed to impair or diminish or infringe on the powers and duties of municipalities and other units of government under the general law of this State. (Emphasis supplied)

Plaintiffs advance the further argument that the Charter Act and Title 18A...