Boardman v. Burlingame

• Decision Date: 01 February 1938
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: BOARDMAN v. BURLINGAME et al.

197 A. 761

123 Conn. 646

BOARDMAN v. BURLINGAME et al.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

February 1, 1938

[Copyrighted Material Omitted]

Appeal from Superior Court, Hartford County; Ernest A. Inglis and Carl Foster, Judges.

Action by Catherine A. Boardman against Charles Burlingame and others for an alleged fraudulent confinement of plaintiff at the Hartford Retreat, an institution conducted for care of persons suffering from diseases of the mind, wherein defendants filed a demurrer which was overruled. From a verdict and judgment for plaintiff, defendants appeal.

Error and new trial ordered.

Lucius F. Robinson, Jr., Thomas L. Archibald, and James M. Carlisle, all of Hartford, for appellants.

William S. Locke and Roger W. Davis, both of Hartford, for appellee.

Argued before AVERY, BROWN, BALDWIN, JENNINGS, and CORNELL, JJ.

JENNINGS, Judge.

The plaintiff sued the defendants for wrongfully detaining her in the Hartford Retreat, an institution organized and conducted for the care of persons suffering from diseases of the mind, and obtained a verdict from the jury. The defendants appeal from the denial of their motion to set aside the verdict and also from the judgment, alleging error in overruling their demurrer to the complaint and in the charge to the jury.

According to the complaint, dated May 21, 1936, the defendants are, respectively, the president and directors of the Hartford Retreat and C. Charles Burlingame, their resident physician in chief, in full charge of their institution and of the patients. On July 7, 1932, the plaintiff, pursuant to a certificate improperly issued by a physician that she was in need of treatment in a hospital for mental diseases, was violently seized at her home and forcibly carried against her will into an automobile and delivered to the defendants, although the defendants knew that she was neither clearly and violently insane nor was suddenly in need of care and treatment in a hospital for the insane. The defendants refused to allow the plaintiff, upon her request, to escape, but assigned her to a room, gave her a number and subjected her to the routine, discipline, and surveillance characteristic of such institutions. On frequent occasions thereafter, the plaintiff sought to be released from the Retreat, but by false and fraudulent representations, deceit, and duress she was induced to remain until December 19, 1932, when she was discharged. The false and fraudulent representations were to the effect that unless the plaintiff signed a written consent to remain, she would be committed by the court of probate for the balance of her life. It was further alleged that the fact that she would be discharged if she gave ten days' written notice was concealed from her for the purpose of keeping her at the Retreat against her will. She claimed that as a result of her confinement she suffered in person and property.

To this complaint the defendants demurred on the ground that the cause of action therein stated was barred by either section 6015, section 6016, or section 6011 of the General Statutes, Revision of 1930. It was agreed that the amendments of 1935 do not apply, and that the question might be raised by demurrer. Sharkey v. Skilton, 83 Conn. 503, 510, 77 A. 950. The plaintiff claimed that section 6006 controlled. These statutes (except section 6016, which was not insisted on) are printed in the footnote.^[1] Counsel have displayed skill and ingenuity in analyzing these statutes and their scope. The situation actually before this court is, however, comparatively simple. The plaintiff admits that, unless her complaint comes within the provisions of section 6006, her suit is too late. It is with that section, therefore, that we are chiefly concerned.

The history and meaning of these statutes was fully discussed in the cases of Miner v. McNamara, 82 Conn. 578, 74 A. 933, and Tuohey v. Martinjak, 119 Conn. 500, 177 A. 721. Without repeating that discussion here, it there appears that, of the present statutes, section 6011 and section 6006 are the direct descendants of those in force when procedure was governed by common-law pleading. Thus, in the Miner Case, 82 Conn. 578, at page 580, 74 A. 933, 934, we said: ‘ For many years prior to the adoption of the practice act * * * one provision of our statutes had limited the time for the commencement of actions of trespass on the case to six years next after the right of action should accrue, while another had provided that no action of trespass * * * should be brought but within three years. * * * The revisers in preparing the Revision of 1888 were apparently of the opinion that, since the practice act had abolished the distinctions between the forms of action theretofore recognized, it would be wise to dispense with the use in these statutes of the terms ‘ actions of trespass on the case,’ ‘ actions upon the case,’ and ‘ actions of trespass,’ and substitute therefor definitional language of equivalent purport.' The intention of the Legislature to include all common-law actions of trespass in section 6011 and actions of trespass on the case in section 6006 was not carried out with entire success, as is indicated later in the opinion in the Miner Case. Tests based on the common-law forms of action are therefore of little use, and we must look to the language of the statute to determine its meaning.

We agree with the plaintiff that the basic act which gave rise to her cause of action-what the English writers call the ‘ causa causans,’ as distinguished from the ‘ causa sine qua non’ (Stroud's Dictionary, 2d Ed., Latham v. Johnson & Nephew, Ltd., L.R.1913, 1 K.B.D. 398, 413)-consisted in the making of the representations alleged. See, also, for a discussion of causation, Lombardi v. Wallad, 98 Conn. 510, 120 A. 291; Mahoney v. Beatman, 110 Conn. 184, 147 A. 762, 66 A.L.R. 1121; Sullivan v. Creed, 1904, 2 Irish Law Rep. 317. For the purpose of testing the demurrer, the further allegation that these representations were false and fraudulent is admitted to be true. The complete tortious act was therefore the procuring of the plaintiff's signature to the consents to remain by false and fraudulent representations. The ultimate question on this phase of the case is, Was this tort unaccompanied by force, and were the injuries consequential within the terms of section 6006?

An illustration from the facts of the case will make the answer plain. Under the emergency commitment the plaintiff could be legally detained for thirty days. General Statutes, § 1732. If she had been detained against her will thereafter, the tort would have been accompanied with force and the offense would have been that form of trespass known as false imprisonment. It is alleged that before the expiration of the thirty days the plaintiff was persuaded by fraud and deceit to sign a voluntary commitment under General Statutes, § 1739. As stated in the memorandum on the demurrer: ‘ No force as against this plaintiff is alleged. It is not an action for false imprisonment in the strict sense of the word because the plaintiff was not restrained by force nor the threat of force. She was prevailed upon to remain in the retreat by fraud and deceit. For that reason section 6011 of the General Statutes does not apply. On the other hand, inasmuch as the wrong complained of is fraud and deceit and the damages alleged are such as flow from that indirectly the case comes squarely within section 6006. It is a cause of action for a tort without force where the damages are consequential.’

The ruling on the demurrer was correct.

The finding shows that the plaintiff offered evidence and claimed to have proved the allegations of her complaint summarized above. The claims of proof of the defendants denied that any improper methods were used in procuring the consent to remain and asserted that the Retreat was a charitable institution. The defendants filed a request to charge as follows: ‘ It appears that the defendant The Hartford Retreat is a charitable corporation and as such is exempt from any torts which might have been committed by its employees. There being no evidence that The Hartford Retreat was negligent in the selection of its employees, I direct that you find a verdict for The Hartford Retreat.’ The court did not so charge, but said: ‘ If you find that The Hartford Retreat is a charitable corporation without capital stock, as claimed by the defendants, such fact does not affect the essential issues of the case.’

The plaintiff's assignments of error relate principally to the claims of proof of the defendants on this point. Examination of the evidence certified in connection with these assignments shows that either there was evidence definitely supporting these claims or the claims were proper inferences from evidence offered. ‘ The finding in a jury case is not a determination of facts as such, but only a statement in narrative form of the evidence which the party offered, and his claims of proof.’ Tuckel v. Hartford, 118 Conn. 334, 335, 172 A. 222, 224. In so far as these assignments attempt to put claims of proof into the finding of the defendants, they are subject to the fundamental difficulty that, though a party may offer evidence of a fact, it does not necessarily follow that he claims to have proved it. If the plaintiff wanted these deductions in the finding, she should have put them in her own claims of proof. The evidence offered by the defendants was available to her for that purpose. Leitzes v. Caulkins Auto Co., 123 Conn. 459, 196 A. 145. There is nothing in the record to support these assignments of error.

‘ A charitable corporation like the defendant, whatever may be the principle that controls its liability for corporate neglect in the performance of a...