Boardman v. Mansfield

• Decision Date: 10 April 1907
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: BOARDMAN et al. v. MANSFIELD et al.

66 A. 169

79 Conn. 634

BOARDMAN et al.

v. MANSFIELD et al.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

April 10, 1907.

Case Reserved from Superior Court, New Haven County; John M. Thayer, Judge.

Suit by William J. Boardman and others, as executors of the estate of William W. Boardman, deceased, against Burton Mansfield and others, as executors of the estate of Lucy H. Boardman, deceased, to determine conflicting claims to funds held by a trustee under William W. Boardman's will. On reservation from superior court. Judgment advised for plaintiffs.

William W. Boardman, a resident of New Haven, made and executed his will, drafted by himself, on March 19, 1870. He died August 27, 1871, leaving that instrument as his last will and a large estate comprised of both real and personal property. He also left a widow, Lucy H. Boardman, who survived until March 29, 1906. Item third of said will reads as follows: "Item Third. I further give and devise to my executors hereinafter named, and the survivor of them, in trust, for the use and benefit of my dear wife, Lucy, during her natural life, two hundred thousand dollars, to be taken from such part or parts of the property as I may own at my decease, not hereinbefore devised to her, as she, the said Lucy, may desire and select, at the appraisal in the inventory, the dividends, rents and profits to go to and belong to my beloved wife, to her sole and separate use during her natural life, with reversion over after her death to the uses and appointments set forth in my last will and in the codicils thereto, if any. My intention and object was and is to make abundant provision for the support and comfort of my dear wife by the three preceding items, in lieu of dower or share in my real or personal estate." Said widow and a nephew, William J. Boardman, were named in the will as executors, and both qualified and acted as both executors and trustees as long as Mrs. Boardman lived. William J. Boardman is now the surviving executor and trustee. December 29, 1871, the widow, acting under said provision of the will, selected stocks and bonds from the estate of her husband to the appraised value of $200,000, and made return to the court of probate. The investments of the fund thereafter changed from time to time, but always remained in dividend-paying or interest-bearing securities. The corporations whose stocks were included in the fund issued at various times new stock which the stockholders were privileged to take pro rata upon terms prescribed. The rights to take new stock which thus accrued to the fund were in some instances sold and the proceeds added to it, and in other instances exercised and the new stock carried to it. Mrs. Boardman during her life received the net proceeds of all cash dividends and interest payable to the fund. At her death its market value had increased to $327,683.07. During Mrs. Boardman's life, she unsuccessfully asserted to her co-trustee her right to benefits from the fund beyond those conceded to her, and these claims are made the basis of the present proceeding. The nature of them and the other facts contained in the complaint which are involved in their determination are sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Henry Stoddard and Boardman Wright, for plaintiffs. Burton Mansfield and James E. Wheeler, for defendants.

PRENTICE, J. (after stating the facts). The trust fund in question has always been comprised of personal estate and of a kind which was either dividend paying or interest bearing. Mrs. Boardman, the life beneficiary, received from time to time during her life the entire net income of the fund accruing from cash dividends upon stocks and the interest upon all other investments. The executors of her will, hereinafter referred to as the "executors," pursuant to its provisions, now assert the right to have from the assets of the trust an amount or amounts in addition to those which she thus received in her lifetime. The market value of the fund upon the termination of the life estate was $127,683.07 in excess of its market value at the time of its creation. The major claim presented by the executors, which is comprehensive of all others, is for this amount. The contention thus made, it will be observed, is that the remainder interest is only entitled to have the fund kept intact to the extent of its original market value, and that the life tenant is entitled, not only to have all else which may have flowed from or accrued to it, but also to have both the existence and amount of its accretions determined upon the basis of market value, and that, too, whether or not there have been changes in its investments. It is manifest that this claim is in direct contradiction of the general principles governing the rights of life tenants and remaindermen in and to trust funds which have been repeatedly affirmed and reaffirmed by this court, and that it cannot be supported unless there is something in the terms of the will creating the trust which takes it out of the operation of those accepted principles. Brinley v. Grou, 50 Conn. 66, 47 Am. Rep. 618; Spooner v. Phillips, 62 Conn. 62, 24 Atl. 524, 16 L. R. A. 461; Mills v. Britton, 64 Conn. 4, 29 Atl. 231, 24 L. R. A. 536; Smith v. Dana, 77 Conn. 543, 60 Atl. 117, 69 L. R. A. 76, 107 Am. St. Rep. 51; Boardman v. Boardman, 78 Conn. 451, 62 Atl. 339; Bulkeley v. Worthington Eccl. Soc., 78 Conn. 526, 63 Atl. 351; Green v. Bissell, 79 Conn. 547, 65 Atl. 1056. This is conceded. Two matters, however, are relied upon as indicating the direction of the testator that the general rule should be departed from in the present case, and that Mrs. Boardman's estate should have what is now claimed in its behalf, to wit, (1) the language of the will giving to her the "dividends, rents, and profits" during her life; and (2) the presumed intent of the testator arising from certain circumstances in the light of which it is claimed that the will should be construed. The words "dividends, rents, and profits," upon which reliance is thus sought to be placed, are no more comprehensive as applied to personalty than would have been "net income" used in their stead. Guthrie v. Wheeler, 51 Conn. 207, 213; Beers v. Narramore, 62 Conn. 13, 23, 22 Atl. 1061; Spooner v. Phillips, 62 Conn. 62, 66, 24 Atl. 524, 16 L. R. A. 461. "Whether the testator makes use of the expression 'dividends,' or 'dividends and profits,' or 'dividends, interest and profits,' or [as in this case] 'interest, dividends, profits and proceeds,' I look upon all of them to come to the same thing, and that this is too nice a circumstance to found any distinction on." Hooper v. Rossiter, 1 McClel. 536.

The argument advanced by the executors in support of the presumed intent which they seek to bring to their aid in the construction of the will is substantially as follows: In 1870, when Mr. Boardman made his will, drafted by himself, a lawyer by profession, although a business man by practice, the courts of this state had not declared the law of this jurisdiction. Decisions, however, had been made in other states, including Pennsylvania, New York, and New Jersey. These decisions in these states had been in consonance with the views now urged by the executors. One of the Pennsylvania decisions rendered shortly before the execution of the will involved the interests of the parties thereto in stock of the New Haven Gas Light Company, of which the testator was president, and of the New York & New Haven Railroad Company, with whose transactions he had been familiar for many years. It must therefore be presumed that he was familiar with these decisions, or with the latter one at least, and it ought to be presumed that he used the language of his will with the purpose of accomplishing the result thus judicially outlined. So it is said that ambiguous phrases in it should be interpreted in accordance with those principles of law which the testator most probably had in mind when he used them. See Harp's Appeal, 28 Pa. 368; Wiltbank's Appeal, 64 Pa. 256, 3 Am. Rep. 585; Clarkson v. Clarkson, 18 Barb. (N. Y.) 646; Simpson v. Moore, 30 Barb. (N. Y.) 637; Van Doren v. Olden, 19 N. J. Eq. 176, 97 Am. Dec. 650.

Before assent were given to this argument, it would be wise to inquire whether any of the decisions referred to had, in fact, gone to the extent necessary to support the present claim, and to examine the foundation of the alleged presumption that the testator knew and acted upon the faith of them, and did not know and act upon the faith of, for example, Minot v. Paine, 99 Mass. 101, 96 Am. Dec. 705, to discover what of substance it possesses. Upon the first inquiry, see Moss' Appeal, 83 Pa. 264, 270, 24 Am. Rep. 164; Smith's Estate, 140 Pa. 344, 21 Atl. 438, 23 Am. St. Rep. 237; Thomson's Estate, 153 Pa. 332, 26 Atl. 652, 653; Graham's Estate, 198 Pa. 216, 47 Atl. 1108; Parker v. Johnson, 37 N. J....