Boardman v. Serv. Emps. Int'l Union

Decision Date28 February 2020
Docket NumberCase No. 18 C 2728
Citation441 F.Supp.3d 655
Parties Christine BOARDMAN and Terri Barnett, Plaintiffs, v. SERVICE EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION a/k/a SEIU, Service Employees International Union No. 73 a/k/a SEIU Local 73, Mary Kay Henry, Individually and as President of SEIU, and Eliseo Medina and Dian Palmer, Individually and as Co-Trustees of SEIU Local 73, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

Mark Steven Schaffner, Law Offices of Mark Schaffner, P.C., Chicago, IL, for Plaintiffs.

Abigail V. Carter, Leon Dayan, Pro Hac Vice, Bredhoff & Kaiser PLLC, Washington, DC, Barry M. Bennett, George A. Luscombe, III, Dowd, Bloch, Bennett, Cervone, Auerbach & Yokich, Chicago, IL, for Defendants

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

REBECCA R. PALLMEYER, United States District Judge

Plaintiffs Christine Boardman and Terri Barnett are former elected officers of Service Employees International Union No. 73 ("Local 73"), a local labor union and one of the defendants in this action. Local 73 is affiliated with Service Employees International Union ("SEIU"), another defendant in this action. On August 3, 2016, SEIU took control of Local 73 by placing it into trusteeship. The same day, Local 73's co-trusteesDefendants Dian Palmer and Eliseo Medina—removed Boardman and Barnett from their elected positions. Boardman lost her union membership as a result. Palmer and Medina gave Barnett a staff position in Local 73 but eventually fired her, at which point she also lost her union membership. Plaintiffs assert claims relating to these events against SEIU; Mary Kay Henry, the president of SEIU; Palmer; Medina; and Local 73. Plaintiffs allege, first, that Henry and SEIU improperly placed Local 73 into trusteeship in violation of Title III of the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act ("LMRDA"), which governs when and how a labor organization can impose a trusteeship on a subordinate organization. See 29 U.S.C. § 461 et seq. Plaintiffs allege, further, that by terminating their elected positions and rescinding their membership rights, as well as through other actions, Defendants violated their free speech and due process rights under Title I, Sections 101(a)(2) and 101(a)(5) of the LMRDA. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 411(a)(2), (a)(5). Boardman also asserts a claim for retaliation. The trusteeship was in effect when Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit, but it ended in November 2018 after Local 73 elected and installed new officers.

Before the court is Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. For the following reasons, Defendants' motion is granted in part and denied in part.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The court takes the following facts from Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint [42], except where otherwise noted.

SEIU "is a labor union representing workers in health care, public services and property related services in the United States and Canada." (Second Am. Compl. ¶ 3.) It is headquartered in Washington, D.C. and conducts business throughout the United States, including in counties within this judicial district. (Id. ) Local 73 is a local union that is affiliated with SEIU and has approximately 26,000 members. (Id. ¶ 4.) It "has jurisdiction to represent public employees and some private employees throughout Illinois and northwest Indiana," and has its main offices in Chicago, Illinois. (Id. )

A. Boardman

Christine Boardman was the elected president of Local 73 from November 2000 to August 3, 2016. (Id. ¶ 11.) During that time, she was also a member in good standing of Local 73. (Id. ¶ 13.) "On numerous occasions prior to August 2016," Boardman was a vocal opponent of Defendant Henry, the president of SEIU. (Id. ¶ 20.) Boardman "believ[ed] [that Henry] did not represent the interests of" Local 73 or the "members that had placed Boardman in office." (Id. ) Boardman publicly "refus[ed] to support [Henry] for election as president of SEIU" and "dissent[ed] from [her] effort to have the union" publicly "endorse a chosen candidate" for President of the United States. (Id. ) Boardman also engaged in "[p]ublic communications challenging the administration of SEIU and its policies and practices, including political endorsements." (Id. ¶ 45.)1

According to the Local 73 Constitution, the secretary-treasurer of Local 73 is elected and "perform[s] the duties of the [Local 73] President in his/her absence." (See Local 73 Const., Ex. B to Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss [47-2], at art. VI, § 1, art. X, § 4.)2 At some point during her presidency, Boardman learned that Local 73's secretary-treasurer, Matthew Brandon, had engaged in "malfeasance" that was "contrary to the members' economic and labor movement interests." (Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 15-16.)3 Plaintiffs do not describe the "malfeasance," but allege that "Brandon's actions were intended to subvert the procedures of the local union and to take over the local union in violation of [its] democratic procedures." (Id. ¶ 15.) On July 1, 2016, in accordance with procedures set forth in the SEIU and Local 73 Constitutions and Bylaws, Boardman suspended Brandon for 30 days, filed charges against him, and asked Henry to "assume original jurisdiction of the charge[s]." (Id. ¶¶ 15-16.) Plaintiffs do not specify what charges Boardman filed against Brandon.

The SEIU Constitution provides that "[u]pon the International President assuming original jurisdiction," she "may remove the proceedings from the trial body of the Local Union and ... hold a hearing on the charges either personally or before a hearing officer or officers designated by the International President." (Id. ¶ 19 (quoting SEIU Const., Ex. A to Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss [47-1], art. XVII, § 2(f) (emphasis added)).) Henry allegedly did assume original jurisdiction over the charges but "failed to appoint a hearing officer." (Id. ¶ 17.) On July 22, 2016, Boardman "filed amended charges against Brandon to resolve ongoing issues raised by his conduct that posed an obstacle to the best interests of" Local 73 and its members. (Id. ¶ 18.) Plaintiffs do not state what the "ongoing issues" were. Henry "fail[ed] ... to appoint a hearing officer" for the amended charges. (Id. ¶ 19.)

The SEIU Constitution permits SEIU to place a local union into trusteeship in certain circumstances. It provides:

Whenever the International President has reason to believe that, in order to protect the interests of the membership, it is necessary to appoint a Trustee for the purpose of correcting corruption or financial malpractice, assuring the performance of collective bargaining agreements or other duties of a bargaining representative, restoring democratic procedures, or otherwise carrying out the legitimate objects of this International Union, he or she may appoint such Trustee to take charge and control of the affairs of a Local Union or of an affiliated body and such appointment shall have the effect of removing the officers of the Local Union or affiliated body.

(SEIU Const., art. VIII, § 7(a).)

On August 3, 2016, SEIU, "by and through" Henry, placed Local 73 into trusteeship. (Second Am. Compl. ¶ 21.) Henry appointed Defendants Medina and Palmer to act as Local 73's co-trustees. (Id. ¶ 5.) Defendants informed Boardman and Local 73 "that the basis of the trusteeship was to restore order." (Id. ¶ 26.) Plaintiffs imply, but do not expressly allege, that any loss of order was a function of Brandon's misconduct, including his attempt to subvert Local 73's democratic procedures. (See, e.g. , id. ¶ 23 (alleging that because Boardman had filed "charges" against Brandon "to address any alleged disorder in the local," Defendants' claim that Local 73 "had lost order was pretextual and a gross overstatement of issues facing the local union").) Later, Defendants stated that SEIU placed Local 73 into trusteeship for two additional purposes: to "restor[e] [Local 73's] financial stability" and help members negotiate "open contracts." (Id. ¶ 27.)4 Plaintiffs allege that Defendants' stated reasons for imposing the trusteeship were "unsupported" and "pretextual." (Id. ¶¶ 23, 28; see also, e.g. , id. ¶¶ 54, 69, 92.) As discussed herein, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants' actual purpose for imposing the trusteeship was to retaliate against them for their speech, including their opposition to Henry and SEIU. (See id. ¶¶ 45, 83.)

SEIU never filed charges of wrongdoing against Boardman. (Id. ¶ 31.) Nonetheless, on the same day the trusteeship began, Medina and Palmer informed Boardman "that she was terminated as President of" Local 73. (Id. ¶ 24.)5 They also told her that she "could no longer enter the premises" or "have any contact with members." (Id. ) It is undisputed that the SEIU Constitution states that placing a local union into trusteeship "shall have the effect of removing the officers of the Local Union or affiliated body." (SEIU Const., art. VIII, § 7(a).) Plaintiffs allege, however, that "[t]he termination of officers during trusteeship [is] not required and is not the ordinary and usual practice of [Henry] and SEIU." (Second Am. Compl. ¶ 24.)

When Defendants removed Boardman from her position as Local 73 president, they also terminated her membership in Local 73. (See id. ¶ 33.) Specifically, "[i]n or about August 2016," Medina, Palmer, and Local 73 "rejected Boardman's tender of dues as a member." (Id. ) Boardman responded by "submitt[ing] [her] dues in cash at the [Local 73] retirees' meeting," which occurred on an unspecified date. (Id. ¶ 34.) At the meeting, she also "announced her plan to attend" Local 73's "regular member meeting," which "[Local 73] retirees were allowed to attend." (Id. ) Boardman alleges that "she is and remains eligible for retirement status as a past president of" Local 73, and that she "receives a retirement pension and retirement benefits from" Local 73 and SEIU. (Id. ¶¶ 95-96.)

The day after the retirees' meeting, Palmer "personally contacted...

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1 cases
  • Boardman v. Serv. Emps. Int'l Union
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois
    • September 30, 2022
    ...had “enduring legal relevance”-in other words, Plaintiffs' Title I claims relied on whether the trusteeship was properly established. Id. at 668. And taking the alleged as true, the court held that Plaintiffs sufficiently pleaded that Defendants lacked a proper purpose for imposing a truste......

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