Boards of Trustees of Ohio Laborers v. West End

• Decision Date: 24 September 2009
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 2:08-CV-730.
• Citation: 664 F.Supp.2d 850
• Parties: BOARDS OF TRUSTEES OF OHIO LABORERS' FRINGE BENEFIT PROGRAMS, Plaintiffs, v. WEST END LAND DEVELOPMENT, INC., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio

664 F.Supp.2d 850

BOARDS OF TRUSTEES OF OHIO LABORERS' FRINGE BENEFIT PROGRAMS, Plaintiffs, v. WEST END LAND DEVELOPMENT, INC., Defendant.

Civil Action No. 2:08-CV-730.

United States District Court, S.D. Ohio, Eastern Division.

September 24, 2009.

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Steven Louis Ball, Ball & Tanoury, Columbus, OH, for Plaintiffs.

Timothy D. Wood, Anastasia Joy Wade, Christopher J. Carney, Brouse & McDowell, Cleveland, OH, for Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

NORAH McCANN KING, United States Magistrate Judge.

This matter is before the Court on the motions of defendant West End Land Development, Inc. ("West End") for leave to file a third-party complaint. West End Land Development, Inc.'s Motion for Leave to File Third-Party Complaint, Doc. No. 12 ("West End's Motion"), and West End Land Development, Inc.'s Amended Motion to File Third-Party Complaint Instanter, Doc. No. 16 ("West End's Amended Motion"). For the reasons set forth below, West End's Motion and West End's Amended Motion are DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND

On July 28, 2008, plaintiffs, fiduciaries of three employee benefit trusts, filed the instant action, asserting claims under 29 U.S.C. §§ 185, 1132 in connection with West End's alleged failure to make contributions to certain employee benefits plans. Complaint, Doc. No. 1. On December 29, 2008, West End moved for leave to file a third-party complaint against Laborers' District Council of Ohio, AFL-CIO and Local Union # 860 ("Local 860") based on "fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation regarding the scope of the collective bargaining agreement." West End's Motion, pp. 1-2.

Before plaintiffs responded to West End's Motion, West End filed another motion, seeking to add an additional party, Laborers' District Council of Ohio, AFL-CIO, Local Union # 758 ("Local 758"), to the third-party complaint. West End's Amended Motion, p. 1. West End argues that Local 860 and Local 758 are liable to West End in the event that the Court determines that West End was obligated to make fringe benefit contributions for all individuals who worked on West End's projects. Id. at 1-3; West End Land Development, Inc.'s First Amended Third-Party Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Monetary Relief, ¶¶ 14-15, attached to West End's Amended Motion ("Proposed First Am. Third Party Comp.").

West End alleges that, in January or February 2007, West End entered into a collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") with Local 860 and Local 758 (collectively, "the unions"), which required, among other things, that West End pay fringe benefits. West End's Motion, pp. 1-2; West End's Amended Motion, pp. 1-2; Proposed First Am. Third Party Comp., ¶¶ 6, 8.

West End also alleges that, before signing the agreement, agents of the unions represented to West End that the agreement would cover only union members working on public works projects and would not include non-union laborers, supervisors, or private work projects that West End acquired. Proposed First Am. Third Party Comp., ¶ 7. West End further alleges that, after December 2007, it ceased making payments to plaintiffs for fringe benefits. Id. at ¶¶ 9-10. West End contends that permitting it "to file a third-party complaint with claims for liability dependent on the outcome of the [plaintiffs'] claim would conserve judicial resources by allowing a final determination of all of the parties' rights and liabilities in a single suit." West End's Amended Motion, p. 3.

Plaintiffs oppose West End's requests for leave to file a third-party complaint, arguing that the issues sought to be raised by West End in its third-party complaint involve interpretation of a CBA and are therefore preempted by § 8(d) of the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d), and § 301(a) of the Labor-Management Relations Act ("LMRA"), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). Plaintiffs' Memorandum Contra Defendant's Motion for Leave to File Third-Party Complaint, Instanter, pp. 1-2, Doc. No. 19 ("Memo.Contra"). Plaintiffs also contend that, in any event, documentary evidence contradicts West End's current position that it believed that all private residential agreements were excluded from covered under the CBA. Id. at 2-3.

West End filed its reply, denying that its claims are preempted and arguing that it should be permitted to file its third-party complaint because it has been afforded no opportunity to invoke the NLRB's jurisdiction. West End Land Development, Inc.'s Reply in Support of Its Amended Motion for Leave to File Third-Party Complaint Instanter, pp. 2-5, Doc. No. 20 ("Reply"); Exhibits A, B and C, attached to Reply. On April 24, 2009, this Court ordered plaintiffs to respond to the arguments raised for the first time in the Reply; West End was also provided the opportunity to file a supplemental reply. Order, Doc. No. 21. The parties filed their supplemental memoranda. Plaintiffs' Supplemental Reply Memorandum, Doc. No. 24 ("Plaintiffs' Supp. Memo."); Defendant's Response to Plaintiffs' Supplemental Reply Memorandum, Doc. No. 27 ("West End's Supp. Memo."). This matter is now ripe for resolution.

II. STANDARD

Rule 14(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "[a] defending party may, as third-party plaintiff, serve a summons and complaint on a nonparty who is or may be liable to it for all or part of the claim against it." Fed.R.Civ.P. 14(a)(1). The third-party plaintiff must obtain leave of Court if more than 10 days after service of the original answer has lapsed. Id.

Third-party practice under Rule 14(a) "is available only against persons who are or may be liable to defendant for part or all of plaintiff's claim; it cannot be used as a way of combining all controversies having a common relationship in one action." Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Cronenwett, 162 F.Supp.2d 889, 899 (S.D.Ohio 2001) (citing 6 Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice & Procedure, Civil 2d § 1442 at 295 (1990)). A third-party defendant can be properly impleaded into an action only if that party is subject to derivative liability.

III. DISCUSSION

As discussed supra, plaintiffs contend that West End's claims are preempted by § 301(a) of the LMRA and § 8(d) of the NLRA. In considering the issue of preemption, the Court will first address the question of complete preemption under § 301. See, e.g., Alongi v. Ford Motor Co., 386 F.3d 716, 724 (6th Cir.2004). Cf. Burklow v. Baskin-Robbins USA, Co., 274 F.Supp.2d 899, 905-08 (W.D.Ky.2003).

A. Section 301(a) of the LMRA

1. Standard

Section 301(a) of the LMRA "provides that the federal district courts have plenary jurisdiction, without regard to citizenship or amount in controversy, over `suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees.'" Alongi, 386 F.3d at 724 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 185(a)). According to the United States Supreme Court, § 301 requires federal preemption of state law claims for breach of collective bargaining agreements. Id. (citing Beneficial Nat. Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 7, 123 S.Ct. 2058, 156 L.Ed.2d 1 (2003)). See also In re General Motors Corp., 3 F.3d 980, 983 (6th Cir.1993) (citing Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 77 S.Ct. 912, 1 L.Ed.2d 972 (1957)). More specifically, "Section 301 governs claims founded directly on rights created by collective bargaining agreements, and also claims substantially dependent on analysis of a collective bargaining agreement." Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 394, 107 S.Ct. 2425, 96 L.Ed.2d 318 (1987) (quoting Electrical Workers v. Hechler, 481 U.S. 851, 859, n. 3, 107 S.Ct. 2161, 95 L.Ed.2d 791 (1987)). See also Alongi, 386 F.3d at 724 ("Section 301's sphere of complete pre-emption extends to state law claims that are `substantially dependent on analysis of a collective bargaining agreement,' but it does not reach claims that only `tangentially involve CBA provisions.'") (quoting Fox v. Parker Hannifin Corp., 914 F.2d 795, 799-800 (6th Cir.1990)). Accordingly, "any state law claim that is not independent of rights established by an agreement, and that is `inextricably intertwined' with a determination of the meaning of the terms of an agreement, is preempted by section 301." Northwestern Ohio Admin., Inc. v. Walcher & Fox, Inc., 270 F.3d 1018, 1030 (6th Cir.2001) (quoting Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 402, 108 S.Ct. 1877, 100 L.Ed.2d 410 (1988)).

In determining whether or not § 301 preempts state law claims, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit employs a two-step approach. Alongi, 386 F.3d at 724; DeCoe v. GMC, 32 F.3d 212, 216 (6th Cir.1994) (citing Terwilliger v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 882 F.2d 1033, 1037 (6th Cir.1989)). First, the court determines whether resolution of the state law claim requires interpretation of the terms of the collective bargaining agreement. Id. In making this determination, the court "looks to the essence of the plaintiff's claim, in order to determine whether the plaintiff is attempting to disguise what is essentially a contract claim as a tort." DeCoe, 32 F.3d at 216. "If the plaintiff can prove all of the elements of his claim without the necessity of contract interpretation, then his claim is independent of the labor agreement." Id. Accordingly, "[e]ven if the state law claim requires a court to discuss and evaluate the same facts as it would when interpreting the agreement, so long as the court is not actually interpreting the agreement, there is no preemption." Northwestern Ohio Adm'rs, 270 F.3d at 1030 (citing Lingle, 486 U.S. 399, 108 S.Ct. 1877, 100 L.Ed.2d 410). Second, the court determines whether the claimed right arises from state law or the collective bargaining agreement. Alongi, 386 F.3d at 724; Terwilliger, 882 F.2d at 1038. "If the right both arises from state law and does not require contract interpretation, then there is no preemption. However, if neither or only...