Boatman v. Fortenberry, Case No.: 3:17cv29/RV/EMT
| Decision Date | 22 March 2017 |
| Docket Number | Case No.: 3:17cv29/RV/EMT |
| Parties | PAUL CORNELIUS BOATMAN, Plaintiff, v. INVESTIGATOR SHANNAN FORTENBERRY, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Florida |
Plaintiff Paul Cornelius Boatman, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, commenced this action by filing a civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (ECF No. 1). The matter is now before the court on Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint (ECF No. 8).
The case was referred to the undersigned for the issuance of all preliminary orders and any recommendations to the district court regarding dispositive matters. See N.D. Fla. Loc. R. 72.2(C); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), (C); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). After careful consideration of all issues raised by Plaintiff, it is the opinion of the undersigned that this case should be dismissed.
Plaintiff is an inmate of the Florida Department of Corrections ("FDOC") (see ECF No. 8 at 3).1 He alleges that on December 10, 2010, while his wife and 17-year-old stepdaughter were in the hospital emergency room waiting to see a doctor, his stepdaughter went to the restroom, gave birth to a baby, and placed the baby in the trash receptacle (id. at 6). Plaintiff alleges a nurse found the baby (id.). Plaintiff alleges his stepdaughter explained to a doctor that she believed the baby was dead, but upon learning that the baby was alive, she wished to keep him (id.). Plaintiff alleges the doctor gave the baby to his stepdaughter (id.). Plaintiff alleges Defendant Shannon Sowry, a hospital security officer employed by the City of Pensacola Police Department ("PPD"), notified the Florida Department of Children and Families ("DCF") of the incident (id. at 5). Plaintiff alleges Defendant Shannan Fortenberry, a PPD officer, came to the hospital and spoke to Plaintiff's wife and stepdaughter (id.).
Plaintiff alleges on December 13, 2010, Defendant Vanessa Carmona, an officer with the Escambia County Sheriff's Office ("ECSO"), and Defendant Charlotte Macklin, a DCF investigator, came to his stepdaughter's hospital room while Plaintiff and his wife were visiting (ECF No. 8 at 7). Plaintiff alleges Carmona and Macklin questioned his stepdaughter as to the identity of the baby's father, and his stepdaughterresponded that the father was "a boy she met at school" named Charlton Broughton (id.). Plaintiff alleges Carmona and Macklin asked him (Plaintiff) to step outside the room (id.). Plaintiff alleges while he was outside the room, Defendants Carmona and Macklin demanded that his wife and stepdaughter permit them to collect DNA samples from his stepdaughter and the baby, but Plaintiff's wife and stepdaughter refused (id.). Plaintiff alleges Defendants Carmona and Macklin then threatened to obtain a court order requiring his stepdaughter to provide the DNA, and they threatened that if the DNA proved that Plaintiff was the father, the baby would be removed from his stepdaughter's custody and she would never see the baby again (id.).
Plaintiff alleges his stepdaughter was discharged from the hospital into a foster home on December 14, 2010, and the baby was removed from his stepdaughter's custody (ECF No. 8 at 8). Plaintiff alleges on December 17, 2010, his stepdaughter told him that she consented to collection of DNA samples from herself and the baby, because she wanted to see the baby and feared that she would "los[e] her son forever" (id.). Plaintiff alleges Defendant Carmona collected the DNA samples (id.).
Plaintiff alleges on January 18, 2011, Defendant Carmona obtained a warrant for Plaintiff's arrest for sexual battery upon his stepdaughter (ECF No. 8 at 8). Plaintiff alleges he turned himself in to the ECSO and awaited trial (id.). Plaintiff allegesDefendants Fortenberry, Sowry, and Carmona testified at his trial (id. at 9). Plaintiff alleges the jury found him guilty on August 9, 2011 (id.).
Plaintiff alleges on December 28, 2014, after several attempts to obtain discovery materials provided to his defense attorneys in the criminal proceedings, Plaintiff received copies of the discovery material, including the investigative reports of Defendants Fortenberry, Sowry, and Carmona (ECF No. 8 at 9). Plaintiff alleges the reports contained several false, misleading, and deceptive statements, which were essential to the finding of probable cause to support the arrest warrant and his prosecution (id. at 9-11). Plaintiff alleges Defendants "acted with discriminatory intent" by generating false evidence and hiding the "misconduct" and "abusive interrogation" of his stepdaughter by Defendants Carmona and Macklin (id. at 10). Plaintiff alleges the officers procured his stepdaughter's consent (to collect DNA samples) through coercion and duress (id.). Plaintiff additionally alleges Fortenberry, Carmona, and Sowry testified untruthfully at his trial, and they intentionally concealed and destroyed exculpatory evidence, and fabricated and planted harmful evidence, which helped secure his conviction (id. at 11). Plaintiff alleges the officers conspired to violate his due process rights and his civil rights (id.).
Plaintiff claims that Defendants' conduct violated the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as federal criminal statutes, federalstatutes prohibiting disability discrimination, the Federal Tort Claims Act, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (ECF No. 8 at 12-14). Plaintiff also asserts several state law claims (id.).
Plaintiff seeks an injunction requiring the FDOC to release him from custody (ECF No. 8 at 12). He also seeks compensatory and punitive damages against Defendants Fortenberry, Carmona, and Macklin, for emotional distress, physical injury, mental anguish, depression, anxiety, and stress (id. at 12, 14).
The court is statutorily required to review the Second Amended Complaint to determine whether this action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). To survive dismissal at the screening phase, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A claim is plausible on its face where "the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. (citation omitted). Plausibility means "more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. "Where a complaint pleads factsthat are merely consistent with a defendant's liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief." Id. (quotation and citation omitted).
The determination of whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief is "a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (citation omitted). The pleader is not entitled to relief "where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct." Id. (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). The court is "not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation." Id. at 678 (quotation and citation omitted). And "bare assertions" that "amount to nothing more than a formulaic recitation of the elements" of a claim "are conclusory and not entitled to be assumed true." Id. at 681 (quotation and citation omitted). Stated succinctly:
Pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. In civil rights cases, Gonzalez v. Reno, 325 F.3d 1228, 1235 (11th Cir. 2003) (quotation marks and alteration omitted).
Plaintiff brings a Fourth Amendment claim of malicious prosecution. To recover for malicious prosecution under § 1983, a plaintiff must prove: (1) the elements of the common law tort of malicious prosecution, and (2) a violation of the Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures. See Black v. Wigington, 811 F.3d 1259, 1266 (11th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). The elements of the common-law tort of malicious prosecution include: (1) a criminal prosecution instituted or continued by the present defendant; (2) with malice and without probable cause; (3) that terminated in the plaintiff accused's favor; and (4) caused damage to the plaintiff accused. Id. (citation omitted).
Here, Plaintiff's factual allegations fail to satisfy the third element. Plaintiff alleges he was convicted of the sexual battery and is still serving his sentence for that conviction. He thus cannot show that the prosecution terminated in his favor. Accordingly, Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment claim for malicious prosecution should be dismissed with prejudice.
To the extent Plaintiff seeks to assert a Fourth Amendment claim of illegal search and/or seizure based upon Defendants' allegedly using coercion and duress to obtain his stepdaughter's consent to collect DNA samples from herself and the baby, Plaintiff does not have standing to assert such a claim. Under Fourth Amendment law, the standing and search and seizure inquiries "merge into one: whether governmental officials violated any...
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