Boatwright v. State Indus. Acc. Commission

• Decision Date: 29 June 1966
• Citation: 416 P.2d 328,244 Or. 140
• Parties: Clifford BOATWRIGHT, Appellant, v. STATE INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT COMMISSION of the State of Oregon, Respondent.
• Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Page 328

416 P.2d 328

244 Or. 140

Clifford BOATWRIGHT, Appellant, v. STATE INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT COMMISSION of the State of Oregon Respondent.

Supreme Court of Oregon, Department 1.

Argued and Submitted May 5, 1966.

Decided June 29, 1966.

Garry Kahn, Portland, for appellant. With him on the brief were Pozzi, Levin & Wilson, Portland.

Earl M. Preston, Asst. Atty. Gen., Eugene, for respondent. With him on the brief were Robert Y. Thornton, Atty. Gen., and Wallace Carpenter, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salem.

Before McALLISTER, C.J., and PERRY, DENECKE, SCHWAB and HAMMOND, JJ.

DENECKE, Justice.

Plaintiff suffered an industrial accident in September, 1964, and began receiving benefits under the Workmen's Compensation Act. In December, 1964, he commenced serving a prison term for the commission of a felony. In February, 1965, the State Industrial Accident Commission closed his claim. Plaintiff petitioned for a rehearing; the Commission reopened the claim and in April, 1965, granted plaintiff a permanent partial disability award and closed his claim. In May, 1965, plaintiff appealed from the Commission's award to the circuit court. The Commission moved to dismiss upon the ground that the plaintiff had no legal capacity to sue. Appended to the motion were documents evidencing that the plaintiff was confined in the penitentiary pursuant to a sentence for a felony conviction. The trial court granted the motion.

ORS 137.240 provides: '(1) Conviction of a felony: (a) Suspends all the civil and political rights of the persons so convicted.' This has been the law of Oregon since the state's inception. General Laws of Oregon (Deady 1845--1864) (Crim.Code), § 701, p. 575.

Statutes similar to that of Oregon generally have been construed to suspend the prisoner's right to commence an action. Green v. State, 278 N.Y. 15, 14 N.E.2d 833 (1938); cases cited in 48 Yale L.J. 913, n 9 (1939). We have intimated that this is true under the Oregon statute, but have not directly so held. Grasser v. Jones, 102 Or. 214, 201 P. 1069, 18 A.L.R. 529 (1921). However, other legislation is conclusive evidence that the legislature intended the above-quoted legislation to suspend a prisoner's right to maintain an action.

ORS 12.160 provides:

'If, at the time the cause of action accrues, any person entitled to bring an action mentioned in ORS 12.010 to 12.050 or 12.070 to 12.260 is:

'(1) Within the age of 21 years,

'(2) Insane, or

'(3) Imprisoned on a criminal charge, or in execution under the sentence of a court for a term less than his natural life,

the time of such disability shall not be a part of the time limited for the commencement of the action; * * *.' (The ORS sections are those stating the limitation periods for the various kinds of actions.)

This statute was also contained in Oregon's original code. General Laws of Oregon (Deady 1845--1864) (Civ.Code), § 17, p. 143. It clearly indicates the legislators' belief that a prisoner could not maintain an action. It does not toll the limitation period for filing appeals from the Industrial Accident Commission to the circuit court.

We hold that the plaintiff had no legal capacity to maintain the action.

The plaintiff points out that in 1963 the legislature provided Workmen's Compensation benefits for prisoners injured while working, including a right of appeal to the circuit court from the Commission's order ORS 655.505--655.550. However, the legislation does not include prisoners injured before they became prisoners.

In the past, a problem similar to the present one arose concerning the time within which a mentally incapable person must file a claim for Workmen's Compensation benefits. In Lough v. State Industrial Acc. Com., 104 Or. 313, 207 P. 354 (1922), we held...