Bobertz v. Bd. Of Educ. Of Hillside Tp.

• Decision Date: 17 September 1946
• Docket Number: No. 259.,259.
• Citation: 134 N.J.L. 444,48 A.2d 847
• Parties: BOBERTZ v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF HILLSIDE TP., UNION COUNTY.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

134 N.J.L. 444

48 A.2d 847

BOBERTZ

v.BOARD OF EDUCATION OF HILLSIDE TP., UNION COUNTY.

No. 259.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

Sept. 17, 1946.

Proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act by L. Cecilia Bobertz, claimant, opposed by Board of Education of the Township of Hillside, County of Union, State of New Jersey, employer. To review a judgment of the Court of Common Pleas affirming a determination of the Workmen's Compensation Bureau awarding compensation, the employer brings certiorari.

Judgment affirmed.

Milton A. Feller and Peter L. Hughes, Jr., both of Elizabeth, for respondent.

Wilbur A. Stevens, of Newark, for prosecutor.

May term, 1946, before BODINE, PERSKIE, and WACHENFELD, JJ.

WACHENFELD, Justice.

This writ of certiorari brings up a judgment of the Union County Court of Common Pleas in a workmen's compensation case. That Court affirmed the determination of the Bureau, which awarded compensation in accordance with the prayer of the petition.

For approximately eight years the respondent was employed as a teacher by the prosecutor, Hillside Board of Education. In addition to her duties of teaching, she served as faculty advisor for the Junior Girls Reserve Club, which was composed of student members of the school.

Like all other teachers of that school system, she was required to assume and perform extracurricular activities. Opportunity was afforded the teachers to select a particular activity, but upon failure to do so, an activity was assigned to them. Respondent selected this duty, which required her to attend all meetings of the club held at the school or elsewhere. If she refused to perform these extra duties, her rating and standing as a teacher would be adversely affected. It would also be considered in making promotions and fixing salary increases.

The importance of this particular extracurricular work is further indicated by the fact that when these meetings interfered with the teaching of regular classes, the principal of the school took over the classes in order that the teacher could attend the meeting assigned her.

On December 21, 1943, the respondent, as such faculty advisor, attended a meeting and Christmas party of the Junior Girls Reserve Club of Hillside at the Y.W.C.A. in Elizabeth. Upon termination of the party somewhat after 9:30 p. m., she walked to the corner of East Jersey Street and Madison Avenue, which is one-half block from the Y.W.C.A., to her parked car. She unlocked the door opposite the driver's seat, slid over behind the steering wheel, put on the lights, and started the motor. She was then struck on the head from the rear by someone in the back of the car, who immediately ran away. (Although both the Bureau and the Court below found that the unknown assailant seized and took away her handbag, there is no testimony to that effect in the record, and for the purpose of this review that fact will be disregarded.) She ran for help and was then driven in her car to the Elizabeth General Hospital, where she remained for fifteen days. She suffered lacerations and a fractured skull causing 17 1/2% of partial permanent disability.

The question presented is whether or not, after an independent determination by this Court of the facts and law (R.S. 2:81-8, N.J.S.A.), the assault from which the respondent's injury resulted was (a) an accident, (b) arising out of, and (c) in the course of her employment. R.S. 34:15-7 et seq., N.J.S.A. The basic case defining the scope of these terms is Bryant, Adm'x, v. Fissell, 84 N.J.L. 72, 86 A. 458, 460. There the Court held the injury was the result of an ‘accident’ within the purview of the Workmen's Compensation Act, because it ‘is an unlooked-for mishap or untoward event which is not expected or designed.’ The Court also held, ‘And a risk may be incidental to the employment when it is either an ordinary risk directly connected with the employment, or an extraordinary risk which is only indirectly connected with the employment owing to the special nature of the employment.’ Giracelli v. Franklin Cleaners & Dyers, Inc., 132 N.J.L. 590, 42 A.2d 3.

In Geltman v. Reliable Linen & Supply Co., 128 N.J.L. 443, 25 A.2d 894, 896, 139 A.L.R. 1465, the Court held, ‘In fine, there must needs be a causal connection between the accident and the employment or it does not fall within the statutory class. If the danger was one to which the employee was exposed because of the nature of his employment, the accident arose out of the employment. It is in this category if there be a causal relation between the injury and the conditions under which the work is required to be done. The service is then a contributing proximate cause; the injury is traceable to a hazard of the employment. It need not have been foreseen or expected; it suffices if the injury flowed as a rational consequence from a risk connected with the employment.’

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