Boca Ciega Hotel, Inc. v. Bouchard Transp. Co., Inc.

• Decision Date: 17 April 1995
• Docket Number: 94-2398,Nos. 94-2294,s. 94-2294
• Parties: , 63 USLW 2662, 25 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,956 BOCA CIEGA HOTEL, INC., a Florida corporation; Barry G. Jones, d/b/a All Suites Motel; Brenda Louise Jones, d/b/a All Suites Motel; John Jones, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. BOUCHARD TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, INC., Maritrans Operating Partners L.P., Tug Captain Fred Bouchard Corporation, a New York corporation, Barge B 155 Corp., a New York corporation, Jose Salamanca, Captain; Pepito G. Amora, Thomas A. Baggett, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

Page 235

51 F.3d 235

40 ERC 2049, 63 USLW 2662, 25 Envtl.

L. Rep. 20,956

BOCA CIEGA HOTEL, INC., a Florida corporation; Barry G Jones, d/b/a All Suites Motel; Brenda Louise Jones, d/b/a All Suites Motel; John Jones, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. BOUCHARD TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, INC., Maritrans Operating Partners L.P., Tug Captain Fred Bouchard Corporation, a New York corporation, Barge B 155 Corp., a New York corporation Jose Salamanca, Captain; Pepito G. Amora, Thomas A Baggett, Defendants-Appellees.

Nos. 94-2294, 94-2398.

United States Court of Appeals Eleventh Circuit.

April 17, 1995.

As Amended April 26, 1995.

Dominick Joseph Graziano, Tampa, FL, Ralph O. Anderson, Hicks, Anderson & Blum, P.A., Miami, FL, for appellants.

Carl R. Nelson, Fowler, White, Gillen, Boggs, Villareal & Banker, P.A., Nathaniel G.W. Peiper, Lau, Lane, Pieper & Asti, P.A., Tampa, FL, Robert B. Parrish, Taylor, Moseley & Joyner, P.A., Jacksonville, FL, for appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida.

Before BLACK and BARKETT, Circuit Judges, and RONEY, Senior Circuit Judge.

BLACK, Circuit Judge:

In this case we must decide whether the claims presentation procedure of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA or Act), 33 U.S.C.A. Secs. 2701-2761 (West Supp.1994), constitutes a mandatory condition precedent to the filing of private lawsuits under the Act. We conclude that it does and affirm. ¹

I. BACKGROUND

On August 10, 1993, four vessels collided in Tampa Bay, spilling thousands of gallons of oil and other oil pollutants in the process. ² Pursuant to OPA, ³ the Coast Guard designated Appellees Bouchard Transportation (Bouchard), as owner and operator of the vessel "Tug Captain Fred Bouchard" and barge "B. 155," and Maritrans Operating Partners (Maritrans), as owner and operator of the vessel "Seafarer" and barge "Ocean 255," (collectively, Appellees) as the "responsible parties" for the spill. ⁴ The Appellants brought this action individually and on behalf of several plaintiff classes to recover business, property, and tourist damages sustained as a result of the spill. The complaint alleged liability under OPA's citizen suit provisions and various Florida statutory and common-law theories.

Appellees Bouchard and Maritrans moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. According to Appellees, federal subject matter jurisdiction did not exist because Appellants had failed to comply with OPA's claims presentation procedure. Conforming to OPA, ⁵ Bouchard and Maritrans had organized a claims clearinghouse to identify, process, and settle claims arising from the spill. Appellees took the position that resort to this claims presentation process is a mandatory condition precedent to any OPA lawsuit, and that Appellants' failure to present their claims rendered them unripe for judicial resolution. Appellees also disputed the existence of federal diversity jurisdiction because several of the named plaintiffs shared Florida citizenship with defendant Thomas Baggett.

In responding to Appellees' motions, Appellants never claimed that they satisfied OPA's claims presentation requirement. ⁶ Instead, they maintained that the claims presentation requirement only applies to actions seeking to recover from the OPA-created cleanup fund (Fund), ⁷ not to actions brought directly against the responsible parties. Appellants also argued that the district court possessed diversity jurisdiction over their state law claims.

In February 1994, the district court ruled in favor of Appellees and granted their motions to dismiss. Boca Ciega Hotel, Inc. v. Bouchard Transp. Co., 844 F.Supp. 1512 (M.D.Fla.1994). This appeal follows.

II. DISCUSSION

The only issue before us is whether the district court correctly found that compliance with OPA's claims presentation requirement is a mandatory condition precedent to the existence of jurisdiction over private actions brought under the Act. ⁸

A. Standard of Review

Statutory interpretation is a question of law over which we exercise de novo review. Barnett Bank of Marion County, N.A. v. Gallagher, 43 F.3d 631, 633 (11th Cir.1995).

B. The Oil Pollution Act of 1990

1. The Act's Plain Text.

It is axiomatic that the interpretation of a statute must begin, and usually ends, with the text of the statute. Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., --- U.S. ----, ----, 112 S.Ct. 2589, 2594, 120 L.Ed.2d 379 (1992); United States v. Kirkland, 12 F.3d 199, 202 (11th Cir.1994). When interpreting the text, we give undefined terms their plain, ordinary, and most natural meaning. Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, --- U.S. ----, ----, 115 S.Ct. 788, 793, 130 L.Ed.2d 682 (1995); Brown v. Gardner, --- U.S. ----, ----, 115 S.Ct. 552, 555, 130 L.Ed.2d 462 (1994).

The text of OPA's claims presentation provision states:

(a) Presentation

Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section [delineating presentation to the Fund], all claims for removal costs or damages shall be presented first to the responsible party or guarantor....

...

(c) Election

If a claim is presented in accordance with subsection (a) of this section and--

(1) each person to whom the claim is presented denies all liability for the claim, or

(2) the claim is not settled by any person by payment within 90 days after the date upon which (A) the claim was presented, or (B) advertising was begun pursuant to section 2714(b) of this title [delineating the claims clearinghouse procedures], whichever is later,

the claimant may elect to commence an action in court against the responsible party or guarantor or to present the claim to the Fund.

33 U.S.C.A. Sec. 2713 (emphasis supplied). OPA defines a "claim" as "a request, made in writing for a sum certain, for compensation for damages or removal costs resulting from an incident." 33 U.S.C.A. Sec. 2701(3). "Damages" are "specified in section 2702(b) of this title." 33 U.S.C.A. Sec. 2701(5). Section 2702(b)'s definition of damages clearly includes the relief sought by Appellants in this case. See 33 U.S.C.A. Sec. 2702(b)(2)(B), (D), and (E).

Appellants do not claim that the language of Sec. 2713 is ambiguous. Nor could they. Appellants' complaint constitutes a "claim" as OPA defines that term. Section 2713 is very clear that "all claims ... shall be presented first to the responsible party...." Congressional use of the word "shall" in Sec. 2713(a) is naturally read to place a mandatory condition on all claims. See Mallard v. United States Dist. Court for the Southern Dist. of Iowa, 490 U.S. 296, 300-02, 109 S.Ct. 1814, 1818, 104 L.Ed.2d 318 (1989). In contrast, no reading of Sec. 2713(a)'s language suggests that Congress intended to limit its applicability to claims against the Fund.

The language of Sec. 2713(c)'s election of remedies provision bolsters our interpretation of Sec. 2713(a). Section 2713(c) allows a claimant ⁹ whose "claim is presented in accordance with subsection (a)" to "elect to commence an action in court against the responsible party ... or to present the claim to the Fund." 33 U.S.C.A. Sec. 2713(c) (emphasis supplied). The natural reading of Sec. 2713(c) is that claimants like Appellants, filing "in court against the responsible part[ies]," as well as claimants seeking recovery from the Fund, must present their claims in accordance with Sec. 2713(a), supporting our conclusion that Sec. 2713(a) applies to all claims. In contrast, accepting Appellants' interpretation of Sec. 2713(a) would make parts of Sec. 2713(c) superfluous or nonsensical, a result to be avoided when interpreting statutes. See Ratzlaf v. United States, --- U.S. ----, ----, 114 S.Ct. 655, 659, 126 L.Ed.2d 615 (1994).

2. The Act's Structure and Purpose.

Despite the clarity of OPA's plain language, Appellants argue that limiting the claims presentation requirement to claims against the Fund is more consistent with the overall structure and purpose of the Act. While discovery of the plain meaning of an unambiguous statute will almost always end our inquiry, in rare and exceptional circumstances, we may decline to follow the plain meaning of a statute because overwhelming extrinsic evidence demonstrates a legislative intent contrary to the text's plain meaning. Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493 U.S. 20, 28-30, 110 S.Ct. 304, 310, 107 L.Ed.2d 237 (1989); Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 73-75, 105 S.Ct. 479, 482, 83 L.Ed.2d 472 (1984); Kirkland, 12 F.3d at 202. We therefore turn to Appellants' contention that the structure and purpose of OPA so clearly contradicts the plain meaning of the claims presentation provision that we should limit that provision to claims against the Fund.

Appellants' reliance on the "overall purpose" of OPA--which they claim is "to expand the liability of responsible parties"--is misplaced. Courts have long recognized that statutes, especially large, complex statutes like OPA, are the result of innumerable compromises between competing interests reflecting many competing purposes and goals. Therefore, "vague notions" about a statute's overall purpose cannot be allowed "to overcome the words of its text regarding the specific issue under consideration." Mertens v. Hewitt Associates, --- U.S. ----, ----, 113 S.Ct. 2063, 2071, 124 L.Ed.2d 161 (1993) (emphasis in original). In short, "[w]e will not attempt to adjust the balance between ... competing goals that the text adopted by Congress has struck." Id. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 2072.

Moreover, Appellants present nothing from OPA's text and little from its legislative history to convince us that expanded liability was the only, or even primary, goal of the Act. On the contrary, passages from the legislative history support Appellees' claim that one goal of the claims presentation provision was to temper the Act's increased liability with a congressional desire to encourage settlement and avoid litigation. See, e.g., H.R.Rep. No. 242, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 66 (1989); 135...