Boddicker v. Esurance Inc.

• Citation: 770 F.Supp.2d 1016
• Decision Date: 02 March 2011
• Docket Number: No. CIV. 09–4027–KES.,CIV. 09–4027–KES.
• Parties: Ryan BODDICKER, Plaintiff,v.ESURANCE INC., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of South Dakota

770 F.Supp.2d 1016

Ryan BODDICKER, Plaintiff,

v.ESURANCE INC., Defendant.

No. CIV. 09–4027–KES.

United States District Court, D. South Dakota, Southern Division.

March 2, 2011.

Pamela R. Bollweg, Ronald A. Parsons, Jr., Shannon Falon, Johnson, Heidepriem & Abdallah, LLP, Sioux Falls, SD, for Plaintiff.George R. Wood, Littler Mendelson, P.C., Minneapolis, MN, Sandra K. Hoglund–Hanson, Davenport, Evans, Hurwitz & Smith, Sioux Falls, SD, for Defendant.

ORDER

KAREN E. SCHREIER, Chief Judge.

Plaintiff, Ryan Boddicker, filed suit against defendant, Esurance Inc., ¹ for violations of the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA), and the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA). The court granted Esurance's motion for summary judgment in part, including on Boddicker's COBRA claim. Boddicker now moves to reconsider and vacate the grant of summary judgment on the COBRA claim. Esurance resists. The motion is granted.

BACKGROUND

The facts, viewed in the light most favorable to Esurance, the nonmoving party, are as follows:

Boddicker, a military veteran, worked at Esurance in Sioux Falls, South Dakota. The military recalled him to active duty in February of 2005. While on active duty, he experienced a traumatic event that caused him to suffer panic attacks. After finishing his tour of duty, Boddicker returned to Esurance as a sales agent in March of 2006. He continued to experience panic attacks and needed leave from work. He applied for and received intermittent FMLA leave from Esurance in April of 2007. In August of 2007, Boddicker informed Esurance that he suffered from Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and needed lengthier FMLA leave to deal with that disorder. In October of 2007, Boddicker took extended FMLA leave. Boddicker resigned from Esurance on November 5, 2007.

While on active duty, Boddicker maintained a post office box in Sioux Falls as his address. Esurance uses a third party, Ceridian Benefits Services, Inc., to maintain its employees' personal information, including their addresses. The post office box was listed as Boddicker's permanent address in Ceridian's records. In July or August of 2007, Boddicker changed his address to 4500 East 36th Street, Sioux Falls, and he no longer maintained his post office box address. Boddicker did not update the Ceridian system with his new street address.

After Boddicker resigned from Esurance, Esurance sent a notice to Boddicker through the Ceridian system to the post office box address that he could continue his healthcare benefits under COBRA. Boddicker did not receive this notice. After Boddicker commenced this litigation, Esurance again sent a COBRA notice to Boddicker in March of 2009. In May of 2008, Boddicker received a 30 percent veteran's disability rating and, due to this rating, qualified for full veterans' benefits.

Esurance moved for summary judgment and the court granted summary judgment on Boddicker's COBRA claim after concluding that Ceridian was the COBRA plan administrator for Esurance's employee benefits plan. Boddicker now moves for reconsideration and alleges that he has new evidence that Esurance is its own COBRA plan administrator.

DISCUSSION

I. Rule 60(b) MotionA. Standard of Review

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), “the court may relieve a party or its legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding.” The court may grant Rule 60(b) relief if, among other avenues, one of the following four situations occurs: “(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party; ... (6) any other reason that justifies relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(1)-(3), (6). A Rule 60(b) motion must be made within a reasonable time. Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(c).

In moving for reconsideration under Rule 60(b), Boddicker “respectfully suggests that this relief is appropriate under any of [the] four grounds” stated above. Docket 77 at 4. After reviewing the evidence, the court finds that Boddicker's motion is properly made under Rule 60(b)(3), which allows a court to reconsider an order if the opposing party committed fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct.

“Rule 60(b) is ‘not a vehicle for simple reargument on the merits.’ ” Arnold v. Wood, 238 F.3d 992, 998 (8th Cir.2001) (quoting Broadway v. Norris, 193 F.3d 987, 990 (8th Cir.1999)). Instead, the moving party must show exceptional circumstances. Id. (citing Brooks v. Ferguson–Florissant Sch. Dist., 113 F.3d 903, 904 (8th Cir.1997)).

“To prevail on a Rule 60(b)(3) motion, the movant must show, ‘with clear and convincing evidence, that the opposing party engaged in a fraud or misrepresentation that prevented the movant from fully and fairly presenting its case.’ ” United States v. Metro. St. Louis Sewer Dist., 440 F.3d 930, 935 (8th Cir.2006) (quoting Harley v. Zoesch, 413 F.3d 866, 870 (8th Cir.2005)). District courts have wide discretion to grant Rule 60(b) relief and the appellate court only reviews for an abuse of discretion. Arnold, 238 F.3d at 998 (citing Sanders v. Clemco Indus., 862 F.2d 161, 169 (8th Cir.1988)).

B. Analysis

1. Esurance's Initial Representations

In its brief in support of its summary judgment motion, Esurance represented to the court that Ceridian was its COBRA plan administer. See Docket 51 at 25 (“Esurance's COBRA administrator, Ceridian....”); Docket 49, Defendant's Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ¶ 93 (“Ceridian is Esurance's COBRA Administrator.” (citing Deposition of Sandra Hynes at 37–38)); Id. at ¶ 96 (“Once Esurance knows that an employee has terminated his or her employment, it electronically notifies Ceridian, its administrator, which then generates a COBRA notice.” (citing Deposition of Sandra Hynes at 37–38)).

Esurance also discussed the duties of a plan administrator, Docket 51 at 26, repeated that Ceridian was Esurance's “COBRA administrator,” Docket 51 at 4, 5, 24, 25, and described Ceridian's duties as a plan administrator. Docket 51 at 24–27. In a footnote, Esurance summarized its argument: “The Eighth Circuit has made clear that the plan administrator, not the employee's employer, has the duty to provide the COBRA notice required under Section 1166(a)(4). Here, Ceridian administered the COBRA plan.” Docket 51 at 25 n. 15 (citation omitted).

In replying to Boddicker's memorandum in opposition to Esurance's summary judgment motion, Esurance argued that “[t]hese undisputed facts demonstrate that Esurance has met its burden of providing that its administrator sent the notice ‘by means reasonably calculated to reach the recipient.’ ” Docket 64 at 15 (emphasis added) (quoting Crotty v. Dakotacare Admin. Servs., Inc., 455 F.3d 828, 830 (8th Cir.2006)). Boddicker argued that Esurance should have supervised Ceridian. Esurance replied by again highlighting that it was not the plan administrator: “Finally, although Boddicker claims that Esurance—not Ceridian—should be responsible under his COBRA claim, he provides no authority to counter the case law cited by Esurance in its opening brief that the Plan Administrator—not the employer—has the duty to provide the COBRA notice.” Docket 64 at 17 (citation omitted).

It is clear that Esurance intended the court to conclude that Ceridian, and not Esurance, was the plan administrator. In granting summary judgment, the court relied on Esurance's representations that Ceridian was the plan administrator.

2. Boddicker's New Evidence

Boddicker's evidence shows that Esurance is the plan administrator for Esurance's COBRA benefits. In 2007, Esurance filed a Form 5500 with the Department of Treasury, Internal Revenue Service (2007 Form). In the 2007 Form, under § 2a, Esurance stated that the plan sponsor's name and address was Esurance, Inc., 650 Davis Street, San Francisco, CA 94111–1904. Docket 78–2. Under § 3a, where the 2007 Form asks for the “[p]lan administrator's name and address (if same as plan sponsor, enter ‘Same’),” Esurance answered “Same.” Docket 78–2. Sandra P. Hynes, on behalf of Esurance, signed the 2007 Form under penalty of perjury. Docket 78–2. Esurance's 5500 Form for 2008 contains the identical information. See Docket 78–1.

In its memorandum in opposition to Boddicker's motion for reconsideration, Esurance argues that summary judgment is still appropriate but does not refute that the 5500 Forms for 2007 and 2008 state that Esurance is the COBRA plan administrator.

3. Esurance Committed a Misrepresentation or Fraud

In order for the court to find that Esurance committed a misrepresentation or fraud, Boddicker must show by clear and convincing evidence that: (1) Esurance engaged in a fraud or misrepresentation; and (2) the fraud or misrepresentation prevented Boddicker from fully and fairly presenting his case. Metro. Sewer Dist., 440 F.3d at 935.

Esurance's 5500 Forms from 2007 and 2008 state that Esurance, not Ceridian, is Esurance's plan administrator. Esurance neither offers conflicting evidence nor refutes this evidence. Thus, Boddicker has met his burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence that Esurance was the COBRA plan administrator during the period when Boddicker worked for Esurance.

Esurance's misrepresentation or fraud also prevented Boddicker from fully and fairly presenting his case because the court solely relied on Esurance's representation that Ceridian was its COBRA plan administrator when it granted summary judgment in favor of Esurance on the COBRA claim. See Docket 74 at 16–19 (differentiating between the COBRA duties for an employer and its plan administrator and reasoning that, as a matter of law, Esurance had no duty to send out the notice because Ceridian was the plan administrator).

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