Boddie v. State of Connecticut

• Decision Date: 17 July 1968
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 12513.
• Citation: 286 F. Supp. 968
• Parties: Gladys BODDIE, Bertha Barker, Ann De Nicola, Maryann Dozier, Betty Ann Perez, Catherine Strain, Mary Wierzbicki, Mamie Williams, Mary Yeaton, and all other persons similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. The STATE OF CONNECTICUT; Edward Horwitz, Clerk of the Superior Court of Connecticut for New Haven County; Judge Joseph S. Longo, Superior Court of Connecticut; Justice John P. Cotter, Court Administrator, Supreme Court of Connecticut, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut

286 F. Supp. 968

Gladys BODDIE, Bertha Barker, Ann De Nicola, Maryann Dozier, Betty Ann Perez, Catherine Strain, Mary Wierzbicki, Mamie Williams, Mary Yeaton, and all other persons similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. The STATE OF CONNECTICUT; Edward Horwitz, Clerk of the Superior Court of Connecticut for New Haven County; Judge Joseph S. Longo, Superior Court of Connecticut; Justice John P. Cotter, Court Administrator, Supreme Court of Connecticut, Defendants.

Civ. No. 12513.

United States District Court D. Connecticut.

July 17, 1968.

Arthur B. LaFrance and Joseph M. Shortall, New Haven Legal Assistance Assn., Inc., New Haven, Conn., for plaintiffs.

Jack Greenberg, Leroy D. Clark and Philip G. Schrag, New York City, for plaintiffs.

Samuel W. Bowlby, New Haven, Conn., for New Haven Civil Liberties Counsel, amicus curiae.

Robert K. Killian, Atty. Gen., State of Connecticut, Raymond J. Cannon, and Edward J. Peters, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Hartford, Conn., for defendants.

Before SMITH, Circuit Judge, and BLUMENFELD and CLARIE, District Judges.

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON MOTION TO DISMISS

J. JOSEPH SMITH, Circuit Judge.

This case presents the question whether a state denies the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment when it requires indigent persons seeking divorce to pay filing fees and costs which they are unable to pay before allowing them the access to the state courts which is necessary to obtaining a divorce.

The plaintiffs have brought this class action on behalf of those women in the State of Connecticut receiving welfare assistance from the State who wish to obtain divorce, but are allegedly barred from doing so by reason of their inability to pay the court fees and costs incident to a divorce proceeding. They seek a declaratory judgment that C.G.S.A. § 52-259 (as amended by Sec. 3, Public Act #628, 1967 Legislature), requiring payment of court fees, is unconstitutional as applied to the class they represent, and an injunction requiring the defendants to permit these plaintiffs (and other members of the class in future proceedings) to proceed with their divorce actions without payment of any fees and costs, and requiring the defendants to effect all necessary service and notice incident to the divorce actions without cost to the plaintiffs.

Plaintiffs rely upon 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and 1988 for a cause of action, upon 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) for this court's jurisdiction, and upon 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202 for the remedy of declaratory judgment and further relief based upon any declaratory judgment which might issue. Since plaintiffs seek an injunction restraining the enforcement of a State statute, a three-judge District Court has been convened. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281, 2284.

The named defendants are the State of Connecticut; Edward Horwitz, Clerk of the Superior Court for New Haven County; Hon. Joseph S. Longo, a Judge of the Superior Court; and Hon. John P. Cotter, a Justice of the Connecticut Supreme Court and the Chief Court Administrator of Connecticut's judicial system. The plaintiffs allege in their complaint that on March 13, 1968 they applied to the Superior Court for New Haven County, asking that they be permitted to prosecute divorce proceedings without payment of filing or service fees, and submitting financial affidavits; that on March 14 the defendant Horwitz rejected the applications and accompanying papers on the ground that he could not accept them until an entry fee had been paid; and on April 2 the defendants Longo and Cotter declined to grant the applications or allow the papers to be filed. It is further alleged that court costs and expenses incident to a divorce proceeding are normally in excess of sixty dollars, the entry fee being forty-five dollars and the cost of service being ten to fifteen dollars by sheriff and one hundred dollars or more by publication, and that the plaintiffs are unable to pay the fees and costs. It is claimed that the State of Connecticut is denying the plaintiffs the equal protection of the laws by barring them from seeking a divorce because of their indigency, and is denying them due process of law by infringing their right to "petition the Government for a redress of grievances", U.S.Const. Am. I.

The defendants have moved to dismiss the complaint upon the following grounds: (1) the complaint does not draw into question the constitutionality of any state statute, and therefore it was improper to convene a three-judge court (although the motion papers do not request that the three-judge court be dismissed, we assume that it is that, and not dismissal of the complaint, which defendants request on the basis of this argument); (2) the notice provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2284(2) have not been complied with; (3) the State of Connecticut may not be sued, and the individual defendants are immune from suit as judicial officers acting in a judicial capacity; and (4) failure to state a cause of action.

The first three issues raised by the defendants can be disposed of briefly.

(1) Defendants argue that since the general constitutionality of the Connecticut statute (C.G.S.A. § 52-259, as amended) is not questioned, plaintiffs only attacking the statute as it applies to indigents, there should be no three-judge panel in this case. They rely upon the language in Benoit v. Gardner, 351 F.2d 846, 848 (1 Cir. 1965), stating that no three-judge court is required where an injunction is sought on the ground that a valid statute is being executed in an unconstitutional manner. The argument misconceives the issue. Where an injunction is sought against enforcement of a state statute in a manner unquestionably expressive of the legislative intent, a three-judge court is required, even if the statute might be perfectly constitutional in some of its intended applications. As the Supreme Court succinctly put it in Phillips v. United States, 312 U.S. 246, 251, 61 S.Ct. 480, 483, 85 L.Ed. 800 (1941), "The crux of the business is procedural protection against an improvident state-wide doom by a federal court of a state's legislative policy." See also Evergreen Review, Inc. v. Cahn, 230 F. Supp. 498, 502 (E.D.N.Y.1964); and Poindexter v. Louisiana Financial Assistance Commission, 258 F.Supp. 158, 165 (E.D.La.1966). There is no question but that the Connecticut legislature intends the statute to apply to indigents as well as non-indigents; indeed, that is the thrust of the defendants' argument on the merits. The defendants have no discretion in the enforcement of the statute —as they point out, there is no statutory provision for the waiver of entry fees in a divorce action.

(2) 28 U.S.C. § 2284(2) provides, in relevant part: "If the action involves the enforcement, operation or execution of State statutes or State administrative orders, at least five days notice of the hearing shall be given to the governor and attorney general of the State." We find no merit in the argument in defendants' brief that this requirement has not been complied with, since the defendants were served, the attorney general entered an appearance, defendants' brief was filed fourteen days in advance of the hearing on the motion to dismiss, and no hearing has yet been set on the application for injunction.

(3) Plaintiffs concede that the State of Connecticut is not a proper party to this action. At the hearing on the motion the complaint was therefore dismissed as to the State. See, e. g., Serrano v. People of State of California, 361 F.2d 474 (9 Cir. 1966).

The argument that the individual defendants are immune from suit as judicial officers of the State of Connecticut acting in their judicial capacities is not sound. The defendant Horwitz is not a judicial officer. As to defendants Longo and Cotter, it is clear, of course, that judges are immune from liability for damages for actions taken in the exercise of the judicial function. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-554, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967). The rationale of the rule is that a judge should not have to fear litigation by those unsatisfied with his treatment of their cases. Although there is language in some of the cases stating the rule as one of absolute immunity from suit, we have found no cases applying the rule where it would absolutely bar an action for an injunction or mandamus against proposed actions beyond the powers of a judge.

Moreover, these defendants are acting in an administrative capacity in barring the plaintiffs from bringing their divorce actions without the payment of fees and costs. In short, they are entrusted with administration of the statute, a function quite different from the judicial function, exercised for example by Judge Healey of the Connecticut Superior Court in Davis v. Davis (unpublished opinion, in the file in this case), denying an application to proceed in forma pauperis in a divorce action upon a full consideration of the merits of the applicants' arguments.

If the defendants' argument were correct, a state could immunize any unconstitutional policy against the injunctive power of the federal courts by entrusting its administration to an officer of its judicial branch. The proper defendant in a case such as this one is the state's agent in the implementation of the allegedly unconstitutional policy; and the defendants do not allege that any officer of the State of Connecticut other than themselves is entrusted with administration of the statute. Cf. Dorsey v. State Athletic Commission, 168 F.Supp. 149, 151 (E.D.La.1958), aff'd per curiam, 359 U.S. 533, 79 S.Ct. 1137, 3 L.Ed.2d 1028. See also Robichaud v. Ronan, 351 F.2d 533, 536-537 (9 Cir. 1965). The individual defendants are not immune from this suit.

(4) This brings us to the heart of the matter. May a state limit access to its civil courts and particularly in this instance, to its divorce courts, by the requirement of a filing fee or other fees which effectively bar persons on relief from commencing actions...