Boden v. Anaconda Minerals Co.

• Decision Date: 05 February 1990
• Docket Number: No. C2-85-1307.,C2-85-1307.
• Citation: 757 F. Supp. 848
• Parties: Laura BODEN, et al., Plaintiffs, v. ANACONDA MINERALS CO., et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio

757 F. Supp. 848

Laura BODEN, et al., Plaintiffs, v. ANACONDA MINERALS CO., et al., Defendants.

No. C2-85-1307.

United States District Court, S.D. Ohio, E.D.

February 5, 1990.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Mary Josephine Kilroy, Columbus, Ohio, for plaintiffs.

Catherine Adams, Columbus, Ohio, for defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

GEORGE C. SMITH, District Judge.

This case is before the Court upon the motion of defendant, Anaconda Minerals Company, et al. (hereinafter "Anaconda") for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Said motion was filed herein on April 29, 1988. Plaintiff seeks relief under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, along with pendent state law claims. After review of the pleadings filed in this case, defendant's motion is granted in part and denied in part.

FACTS

This Title VII case, with pendent state law claims, was originally brought against two management level employees at Anaconda Minerals, along with other corporate and individually named defendants. ANATEC was in the business of developing and selling computerized systems which controlled manufacturing processes. ANATEC was a wholly-owned subsidiary of Atlantic Richfield Company ("ARCO"). Anaconda Minerals Co. was a division of ARCO that oversaw the operation of ANATEC. Defendant Weideman was the President of ANATEC. Defendant Martiniski was the Employee Relations Representative. Defendant Hussey was the Productions Manager. Two other original individually named defendants were dismissed.

Plaintiff Boden is a female Mexican-American. Plaintiff Midkiff is a white male. Laura Boden is no longer a party to this motion, inasmuch as her claims against these parties have been resolved by settlement. Clayton Midkiff was originally hired by Copeland & Roland in 1978 as a Manufacturing Manager in Columbus, Ohio. Midkiff was subsequently transferred to Los Angeles and was working for the company known as IC Engineering. Both IC Engineering and Copeland & Roland were merged into ANATEC. Midkiff was then transferred back to Ohio in 1983, working in the customer services area.

Midkiff alleges that his discharge was the direct result of his advocacy of equal employment opportunities at ANATEC, to wit: he specifically was an advocate in the Laura Boden situation advocating against alleged disparate treatment toward based upon her sex and race. According to the plaintiff, he likewise was an advocate on numerous occasions for other equal employment opportunities and the disparate practices being used by ANATEC. Midkiff also desired to have ANATEC set up a separate and distinct Customer Service Department for which defendant claims he voiced his desire to manage.

Plaintiff's discharge was the direct result of a conversation that he had with a individual employee of ANATEC named Carol Sagun. According to the defendants, plaintiff after learning that there was not going to be separate Customer Service Department made threatening statements to Sagun about his intentions and displeasure toward other ANATEC employees. Sagun reported this conversation to Ken Meagher and therefrom the processes were starting leading to plaintiff's termination. Thereafter, other individuals at ANATEC were made aware of the reason(s) for plaintiff's termination. Plaintiff claims his discharge was the result of his advocacy for better employment practices at ANATEC, therefore a violation of Title VII. Defendants' claim that his discharge was for his threats made to ANATEC employees.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

In considering this motion, the Court is mindful that the standard for summary judgment "mirrors the standard for a directed verdict under Rule 50(a), which is that the trial judge must direct a verdict if, under the governing law, there can be but one reasonable conclusion as to the verdict." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986), citing: Brady v. Southern Ry. Co., 320 U.S. 476, 479-480, 64 S.Ct. 232, 234-235, 88 L.Ed. 239 (1943). Thus, the Supreme Court concluded in Anderson that a judge considering a motion for summary judgment must "ask himself not whether he thinks the evidence unmistakably favors one side or the other but whether a fair minded jury could return a verdict for the plaintiff on the evidence presented." 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. at 2512.

Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides in pertinent part:

The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

In essence, the inquiry is whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law. 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. at 2512.

Such an inquiry necessarily implicates the evidentiary standard of proof that would apply at the trial on the merits. As a result, the Court must view the evidence presented through the prism of the substantive evidentiary burden. Rule 56(e) therefore requires that the nonmoving party go beyond the pleadings and by her own affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (Emphasis Added). The plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Id. at 322, 106 S.Ct. at 2552. Thus, the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of a plaintiff's claim is insufficient — there must be evidence upon which a jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff. Having discussed the Rule 56 standard of review, the Court now turns to the merits.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

Defendants' first ground for summary judgment addresses the area of jurisdiction. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a 90 day time frame for filing a civil claim after receipt of the right-to-sue letter. Defendant argue that since plaintiff's right-to-sue letter was not attached to the complaint, jurisdiction is lacking. Plaintiff counters by arguing, that while upon the filing of the claim in this court, he had not to that date received his right-to-sue letter, he nonetheless did receive his letter thereafter and did attached a copy to his memorandum contra plaintiffs motion to dismiss. Therefore, plaintiff contends that he has met any jurisdictional requirement set out by § 2000e-5(f)(1).

The Sixth Circuit has held that a plaintiff must establish as a prerequisite to suit that he has: (1) filed a timely charge of employment discrimination with the EEOC, (2) received and acted upon the Commission's statutory notice of the right-to-sue. Parsons v. Yellow Freight Systems, Inc., 741 F.2d 871 (6th Cir.1984); citing: McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 798, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1822, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). In Parsons they state:

It is apparent form the allegations of the Complaint ... that the plaintiff has failed to properly invoke the Court's jurisdiction over the within Title VII action. As previously indicated, the plaintiff has not alleged, and is, from all appearances, simply unable to allege: (i) that the claims comprising the instant action have been made the subject of a timely charge with the EEOC, or (ii) that the plaintiff has secured from the Commission the requisite right-to-sue notice. In view of these circumstances, which quite clearly suggest the plaintiff has failed to resort to the administrative remedies which are favored under the Act ... Id. at 873. (Emphasis Added).

Plaintiff has offered in response, the case of Pinkard v. Pullman-Standard, A Division of Pullman, Inc. 678 F.2d 1211 (5th Cir.1982). Pinkard held that jurisdiction was achieved by a plaintiff who filed a civil claim before receiving his right-to-sue letter. That Court held that receiving the right-to-sue letter was a condition precedent, not a jurisdiction prerequisite. Id. Utilizing the Supreme Court case of Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 102 S.Ct. 1127, 71 L.Ed.2d 234 (1982), the Pinkard court found that any receipt of the Commission's letter was a condition precedent subject to equitable modification. Id. at 1217. Therefore, they held that the receipt of the right-to-sue letter subsequent to the commencement of the Title VII action, but while the action remained pending, satisfied the precondition necessary for a Title VII claim to be brought. Id. at 1219.

This Court agrees with the 5th Circuit, as well as the District Court for the Western District of Michigan in Bradford v. General Telephone Co. of Michigan, 618 F.Supp. 390 (D.C.Mich.1985), both holding that receipt of the right-to-sue letter is not jurisdictional, but a condition precedent to filing a Title VII claim. The purpose of receiving the Commission's notice is to ensure that the plaintiff has complied with the administrative remedies available before seeking court intervention. Even in Parsons, the Court's concern was that the evidence before it was void as to whether or not plaintiff had complied with the Title VII prerequisites of administrative action before filing a claim in court. Those concerns are not found here, inasmuch as plaintiff has received his right-to-sue letter, and by said receipt, it is obvious that he did in fact comply with the requirements of first filing an EEOC claim. The Zipes decision can be interpreted in no other way than to allow for equitable modification as to the receipt of the Commission's letter, as long as the...