Boden v. Johnson
Citation | 47 S.W.2d 155,226 Mo.App. 787 |
Parties | GEORGE BODEN, GUARDIAN, ETC., RESPONDENT, v. JOSEPHINE B. JOHNSON, APPELLANT |
Decision Date | 01 February 1932 |
Court | Kansas Court of Appeals |
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Jackson County.--Hon. Brown Harris Judge.
AFFIRMED.
Judgment affirmed.
Thos E. Deacy and Jacobs & Henderson for respondent.
McAllister Humphrey, Pew & Broaddus for appellant.
--This is an appeal from a final decree and judgment of the circuit court of Jackson county, Missouri, at Kansas City. The cause was before us on a former appeal which we dismissed because premature. Our opinion therein is reported in 23 S.W.2d 186, and contains a full and complete statement of facts of the case.
Plaintiff filed his "amended bill in equity" on June 20, 1928, stating he is the duly qualified and acting guardian of the estate of Frederick G. Boden, minor, and that he brings this action for and in behalf of said minor. That Frederick G. Boden is the owner of an undivided one-half interest in certain described real estate; that said property is now in the hands of defendant, who, for three years past has collected the rents thereon and has failed and refused to account to said minor for his interest therein; that demand for an accounting has been made and refused. The bill prays that defendant be required to make an accounting of the income collected and received and of the income which she has allowed Earl Johnson (her husband by a second marriage) to collect and retain, and that plaintiff, as guardian, have and recover from defendant such sum as the court might determine was the interest of the minor, Frederick G. Boden, in the income collected, received and retained by defendant or the said Earl Johnson; that defendant be removed as trustee for said Frederick G. and Loretto Boden, and a new trustee be appointed in her place; that a receiver be appointed to take charge of and manage said property, and for such other and further relief as to the court may seem just and proper.
The answer of defendant states that by the terms of a contract entered into between her and plaintiff on October 6, 1921, it was expressly agreed that defendant should not be required to account for any income or moneys received according to the terms of said contract and that no action for an accounting should be brought against her.
The cause came on for trial on September 19, 1928, and thereafter an interlocutory order was entered requiring defendant to make an accounting. It was from this decree and judgment the former appeal was taken, with result above indicated.
Thereafter, and on May 2, 1930, the cause came on for further hearing, both parties being present in person and by attorneys. It was agreed defendant had not complied with the order of the court as to paying any part of the income from the property to plaintiff. Counsel for defendant suggested:
"The question is whether or not she has anything left over . . . after taking care of the daughter and paying the upkeep of the property; and as I understand it now, he is to make a showing--although I am going to raise the point at the end of it of the fact that this bill doesn't state any equity--that if the plaintiff has any cause of action in a suit at law for breach of the contract we are ready to go ahead and make a showing to the court on the merits of the case."
The court then proceeded to hear evidence relative to amounts received from the rental of the property and expenditures thereof which it is unnecessary to set out in detail here. It was shown that the boy, Frederick, left his mother's home soon after her remarriage, and thereafter lived with his father. On the first hearing, there was no showing as to the amount of income received by defendant, and no accounting thereof was made. At that hearing it was shown that since her second marriage, defendant and her husband, Johnson, had collected the rents from said property and had deposited and maintained their funds in a joint bank account. We find the evidence at the second trial sufficiently substantial to support the decree of the court hereinafter set out. Defendant testified from books and accounts kept by her and her husband, referring occasionally to rentals from the real estate in question as "the children's money." At the close of the evidence, the following occurred:
Thereafter, on May 5, 1930, the court entered the following decree and judgment:
Defendant's motion for a new trial was overruled and she appeals.
While there are ten alleged errors enumerated in the motion for a new trial, they are fully covered in the points and authorities under five subheadings which will be discussed in order.
The first point urged in support of the appeal is that plaintiff's bill does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action at law or in equity, and the court erred in not dismissing the suit. It is insisted that in its final analysis, this is an action by a minor to compel its parent to support it, because the bill alleges said "Josephine B. Boden should have the use of the income from said real estate until the 29th of October, 1936," and that the income belonged to her and to no one else. It is argued that although defendant did contract and agree to support the younger Boden out of that income, she would be in the same position as a father upon whom the law fixes the primary duty to support his child; yet the law of the State is that a minor child has no right of action in equity against its father to compel him to maintain and educate it during its minority. [Citing Huke v. Huke, 44 Mo.App. 308; Worthington v. Worthington, 212 Mo.App. 216, 253 S.W. 443; Glaze v. Hart, 36 S.W.2d 684, 686.] That this is the law is conceded by plaintiff but it is said plaintiff's action is not an attempt to compel the mother to support a minor child, but is to compel ...
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