Bodin v. Gulf Oil Corp.

• Decision Date: 21 July 1988
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. B-86-1169-CA.
• Citation: 707 F. Supp. 875
• Parties: Debra BODIN, Astor Morgan, David Dyson, Clomare Trahan v. GULF OIL CORPORATION, Sun Oil Company, Texaco Inc. Exxon USA, Inc.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Texas

707 F. Supp. 875

Debra BODIN, Astor Morgan, David Dyson, Clomare Trahan v. GULF OIL CORPORATION, Sun Oil Company, Texaco Inc. Exxon USA, Inc.

Civ. A. No. B-86-1169-CA.

United States District Court, E.D. Texas, Beaumont Division.

July 21, 1988.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Tim Hatton, Xenia, Ohio, for plaintiffs.

William N. Blanton, III, Michael C. Smith, Houston, Tex., Morris Harrell, Michael Powell, Cynthia Keely Tims, Karen O'Connor, Dallas, Tex., for defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

COBB, District Judge.

This suit is a wrongful conversion action filed by the heirs of James Dyson against Chevron U.S.A., Inc., Sun Exploration and Production Company, and Exxon USA, Inc. Plaintiffs contend they are the rightful owners of a tract of land now located in Orange County, Texas, known as the James Dyson League, Abstract 8, being 4428 acres of land, in Jefferson County, Texas. Such land later was included in Orange County, Texas, when that county was organized in 1852. Plaintiffs demand "that the defendants ... be required to account to plaintiffs for minerals removed from the property ... and that the defendants ... be assessed for and required to pay plaintiffs damages for their unlawful extraction of minerals from the property." Plaintiffs' Complaint at 2.

All three defendants have moved for summary judgment on the ground that plaintiffs cannot establish the requisite possessory interest in the extracted minerals to support their conversion claims. Alternatively, defendants Chevron and Exxon have moved for summary judgment on the ground that plaintiffs' conversion claims are barred by the two-year statute of limitations, 16.003(a), TEX.CIV.PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. (Vernon 1986).

I. PLAINTIFFS' POSSESSORY INTEREST

Although oil and gas beneath the surface of the land are considered part of the realty, once removed from the soil they become personalty. Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. West, 508 S.W.2d 812, 817 (Tex. 1974) ("once severed from the realty, gas and oil, like other minerals, become personal property"); W.B. Johnson Drilling Co. v. Lacy, 336 S.W.2d 230, 233 (Tex.Civ.App. — Eastland 1960, no writ) ("a conversion of the sale of the proceeds of oil, or a conversion of the oil itself after it was produced and severed from the land would be a conversion of personal property, not a conversion of realty"); Pan American Petroleum Corp. v. Orr, 319 F.2d 612, 613 (5th Cir.1963) (Texas two-year statute of limitations governing actions for conversion of personal property held applicable to action to recover the value of oil and gas severed from the land). See also, 55 Tex.Jur.3d, Oil & Gas, § 8 (1987). Plaintiffs seek remuneration for the value of oil and gas extracted from Abstract No. 8. Therefore, plaintiffs' claims are governed by principles of conversion.

Conversion is an unauthorized and wrongful exercise of dominion and control over another's personal property, to the exclusion of, or inconsistent with the rights of the owner. Catania v. Garage De Le Paix, Inc., 542 S.W.2d 239, 241 (Tex.Civ. App. — Tyler 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.), and authorities cited therein. It is essential that the plaintiff establish some interest in the property as of the time of the alleged conversion, such as title or otherwise some right to possession. Id. at 241. A plaintiff who has not shown title or some other right to possession of the property allegedly converted may not maintain a suit in conversion. Id. at 242.

To show their superior possessory interest in the extracted minerals, plaintiffs pleaded the following chain of title to Abstract No. 8:

1. That in 1835, James Dyson was granted by Mexico title to ... Abstract No. 8, James Dyson Survey located in Orange County, Texas.

2. That James Dyson died testate in 1883, leaving his wife Katherine as his sole heir at law.

3. That plaintiff's sic are descendants and heirs of James Dyson....

4. That at the time of James Dyson's death he was still lawfully seized of the property described ... above.

Plaintiff's Complaint at 2.

Defendants contend that plaintiffs cannot show any possessory interest in the extracted minerals because James Dyson conveyed Abstract No. 8 out of his estate by executing three deeds, two in 1837, and one in 1845. Therefore, defendants assert that Abstract No. 8 was not part of his estate when he died, and did not pass to his wife or heirs as plaintiffs claim.

The defendants have come forward and produced fully certified, recorded and authenticated copies of the three deeds in support of their motion. See, pages 878 and 879, infra.

In response to defendants' summary judgment proof, plaintiffs initially attacked the validity of the deeds on four levels, arguing that (1) the deeds are not authentic; (2) the deeds were executed under duress; (3) the conveyances violated a condition subsequent of the original Mexican land grant; and (4) the conveyances violated principles of community property law because James Dyson's wife did not sign all three deeds.

In the final summary judgment hearing, plaintiffs abandoned all four of these arguments. The court considers such abandonment proper for the following reasons:

First, plaintiffs were unable to produce any evidence to undermine the defendants' proof of authenticity. Thus, the defendants carried their burden of production and persuasion, showing that the deeds were authentic.

Second, the only evidence of duress came from James Dyson's will, executed in 1880, wherein he states in part:

At this time, I feel my fate to be the same as my two beloved, murdered brothers. Having their property stolen from them after a long and courageous battle to maintain their God-given right to their land. I pray that I not suffer a similar fate, though at this time I do fear for my life.

James Dyson Will at 2.

Plaintiffs have come forward with no evidence to link James Dyson's fear expressed in 1880 which would have any bearing on the three deeds he executed at least thirty-five years before he wrote his will. Such proof is insufficient to undermine the validity of the three deeds as a matter of law; no reasonable mind could conclude that the Dyson 1880 will shows that the three prior deeds were executed under duress.

Third, as to the alleged violation of the Mexican land grant condition, it has long been established that the power to enforce such condition lies with the sovereign, the State of Texas. Hancock v. McKinney, 7 Tex. 384 (1851); Johnson v. Smith, 21 Tex. 722 (1858); Flores v. Hovel, 125 S.W. 606 (Tex.Civ.App. — 1910, no writ).

Finally, plaintiffs readily concede that Katherine Dyson signed the November 6, 1837, Runnels deed, which conveyed the lower half of Abstract No. 8. The Runnels deed referred to the prior Whiting conveyance, and thus ratified the Whiting deed. Together, the Whiting and Runnels deeds show that James Dyson divested himself of title to all of Abstract No. 8 before he died. The community property arguments are thus of no avail to plaintiffs.

The plaintiffs have failed to generate any genuine issue of fact as to the validity of the 1837 and 1845 conveyances. Therefore, the court holds the defendants have met their burden as movants and conclusively shown by summary judgment proof that:

1. James Dyson executed a deed on November 1, 1837, which conveyed the northern half of Abstract No. 8 to Samuel Whiting.

2. On November 6, 1837, James Dyson conveyed the southern half of Abstract No. 8 to H.D. Runnels.

3. On February 5, 1845, James Dyson reconveyed all of Abstract No. 8 to a E.D. LeGrande.

Being unable to produce to the court summary judgment evidence sufficient to undermine defendants' proof that Dyson had disposed of all of his interest in the Dyson League by 1845 at the latest, plaintiffs attempted to show that James Dyson reacquired title to Abstract No. 8 before he died. Plaintiffs advanced three theories of reacquisition: (1) Redemption, (2) adverse possession, and (3) presumed grant.

A. REDEMPTION

Plaintiffs contend that James Dyson redeemed Abstract No. 8 by paying back-taxes on the property. The court rejects plaintiffs' redemption theory.

It is the law in Texas that the paying of back taxes only clears the tax lien for the rightful owner. Hardy v. Brown, 46 S.W. 385, 386 (Tex.Civ.App. — 1898, writ ref'd); Jackson v. Maddox, 117 S.W. 185 (Tex.Civ.App.—1909, no writ). Paying the back taxes does not vest one with title. See also, McGuire v. Bond, 271 S.W.2d 508, 511 (Tex.Civ.App. — El Paso 1954, writ. ref'd n.r.e.). Thus, even if the court assumes that James Dyson did pay back taxes on the property, and "redeemed the property," plaintiffs would still have to show that he was the rightful owner of the property. Thus, plaintiffs' redemption argument begs the question. Redemption in and of itself does not prove ownership. Redemption statutes in Texas are liberally construed so that anyone with a connection with the property, for example, a previous grantor or grantee, has the authority to redeem the property. See Jackson, supra. The redemption statutes do not give the previous grantor or grantee the power to reacquire title to the property; they simply put such party in a position to clear the tax lien and claim the property to the extent that he can otherwise show that he is the rightful owner. If later litigation reveals that he is not the rightful owner, then he is only entitled to be compensated for the money that he paid in redeeming the property. Meador Bros. v. Hines, 165 S.W. 915, 922 (Tex.Civ.App. — Amarillo 1914, writ ref'd). Plaintiffs have failed to produce evidence of a genuine factual issue under a theory of redemption.

B. ADVERSE POSSESSION

Texas has recognized title by limitation statutes since 1836. The statutes in effect during the mid to late 1800s are found in Vol. I — Paschal, A Digest of the Laws of Texas, pp. 765-772 (1875) and II, Sayles' Annotated Civil Statutes of the State of Texas, pp. 1231-1245 (1897).¹

In order to obtain title by limitations, it is...