ORDER
Petitioner, an inmate of the Florida penal system, is proceeding in this case on a pro se Amended Petition (Doc. #23) for writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner challenges his June 5, 2007 state court (Duval County) conviction for conspiracy to traffic in cocaine, for which he received a thirty-year sentence with a fifteen- year minimum mandatory term. The Amended Petition raises nine grounds for relief. Respondents have responded. See Response to Amended Petition for Habeas Corpus (Doc. #28) (Response).1 Petitioner has replied. See Petitioner's Request for Leave to Reply/Traverse to Response (Doc. #31) (Reply). Thus, this case is ripe for review.2
"In deciding whether to grant an evidentiary hearing, a federal court must consider whether such a hearing could enable an applicant to prove the petition's factual allegations, which, if true, would entitle the applicant to federal habeas relief." Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474 (2007) (citation omitted). "It follows that if the record refutes the applicant's factual allegations or otherwise precludes habeas relief, a district court is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing." Id. The pertinent facts of this case are fully developed in the record before the Court. Because this Court can "adequately assess [Petitioner's] claim[s] without further factual development," Turner v. Crosby, 339 F.3d 1247, 1275 (11th Cir. 2003), an evidentiary hearing will not be conducted.
Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub.L. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (hereinafter AEDPA), this Court's review "is 'greatly circumscribed and highly deferential to the state courts.' Crawford v. Head, 311 F.3d 1288, 1295 (11th Cir. 2002)." Stewart v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., 476 F.3d 1193, 1208 (11th Cir. 2007).
Under AEDPA, when a state court has adjudicated the petitioner's claim on the merits,[3] a federal court may not grant habeas relief unless the state court's decision was "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the UnitedStates," 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), or "was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding," id. § 2254(d)(2). A state court's factual findings are presumed correct unless rebutted by clear and convincing evidence.[4] Id. § 2254(e)(1); Ferrell v. Hall, 640 F.3d 1199, 1223 (11th Cir. 2011).
AEDPA "imposes a highly deferential standard for evaluating state court rulings" and "demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt." Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 130 S.Ct. 1855, 1862, 176 L.Ed.2d 678 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). "A state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as fairminded jurists could disagree on the correctness of the state court's decision." Harrington v. Richter, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 131 S.Ct. 770, 786, 178 L.Ed.2d 624 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). "It bears repeating that even a strong case for relief does not mean the state court's contrary conclusion was unreasonable." Id. (citing Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75, 123 S.Ct. 1166, 155 L.Ed.2d 144 (2003)). The Supreme Court has repeatedly instructed lower federal courts that an unreasonable application of law requires more than mere error or even clear error. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 18, 124 S.Ct. 7, 157 L.Ed.2d 263 (2003); Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 75 ("The gloss of clear error fails to give proper deference to state courts by conflating error (even clear error) with unreasonableness."); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 410, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) ("[A]n unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law.").
Bishop v. Warden, GDCP, 726 F.3d 1243, 1253-54 (11th Cir. 2013).
IV. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Petitioner raises several ineffective assistance of counsel claims. To prevail on these claims, Petitioner "must meet both the deficient performance and prejudice prongs ofStrickland." Wong v. Belmontes, 558 U.S. 15, 16 (2009) (per curiam) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)).
To establish deficient performance, a person challenging a conviction must show that "counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness." 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052. A court considering a claim of ineffective assistance must apply a "strong presumption" that counsel's representation was within the "wide range" of reasonable professional assistance. Id., at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052. The challenger's burden is to show "that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment." Id., at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052.
With respect to prejudice, a challenger must demonstrate "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id., at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. It is not enough "to show that the errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding." Id., at 693, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Counsel's errors must be "so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable." Id., at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052.
Harrington v. Richter, 131 S.Ct. 770, 787-88 (2011). Since both prongs of the two-part Strickland test must be satisfied to show a Sixth Amendment violation, "a court need not address the performance prong if the petitioner cannot meet the prejudice prong, and vice-versa." Ward v. Hall, 592 F.3d 1144, 1163 (11th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted).
A state court's adjudication of an ineffectiveness claim is accorded great deference.
The question "is not whether a federal court believes the state court's determination" under the Strickland standard "was incorrect but whether that determination was unreasonable - a substantially higher threshold." Schriro, supra, at 473, 127 S.Ct. 1933. And, because the Strickland standard is a general standard, a state court has even more latitude to reasonablydetermine that a defendant has not satisfied that standard. See Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664, 124 S.Ct. 2140, 158 L.Ed.2d 938 (2004) ("[E]valuating whether a rule application was unreasonable requires considering the rule's specificity. The more general the rule, the more leeway courts have in reaching outcomes in case-by-case determinations").
Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123 (2009). Thus, the standards created by Strickland and § 2254(d) are both highly deferential, "and when the two apply in tandem, review is 'doubly' so[.]" Harrington, 131 S.Ct. at 788 (quoting Knowles, 556 U.S. at 123).
V. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
Petitioner contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to dismiss the information charging Petitioner with conspiracy to traffic in cocaine on the basis that the Office of Statewide Prosecution (OSP) lacked jurisdiction to bring charges against Petitioner. Amended Petition at 5-8. Petitioner raised this ineffectiveness claim in state court in a motion for post-conviction relief filed pursuant to Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850 (3.850 motion). After identifying Strickland as the controlling legal authority, the circuit court adjudicated this claim as follows:
In his first ground, the Defendant alleges counsel was ineffective by failing to file a motion to dismiss the Information based upon the Office of Statewide Prosecution's ("OSP") lack of jurisdiction. Pursuant to the Florida Constitution, the O[SP] has "concurrent jurisdiction with the state attorneys to prosecute violations of criminal laws occurring or having occurred, in two or more judicial circuits as part of a related transaction, or when any such offense is affecting or has affected two or more judicial circuits as provided by general law." Art. IV, § 4(b), Fla. Const. Further, section 16.56(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2006) provides that the O[SP] may only prosecute certain enumerated offenses, and only when "such offense is occurring, or has occurred, intwo or more judicial circuits as part of a related transaction, or when any such offense is connected with an organized criminal conspiracy affecting two or more judicial circuits."
In the instant case, the Defendant was charged by the O[SP] in the Information with Conspiracy to Traffic in Cocaine, 400 Grams or More (Count 1), and Trafficking in Cocaine, 400 Grams or More (Count 3). (Exhibit "C.")[5] The Information alleges that both offenses took place in Duval County, Florida, but it also concludes with the following jurisdictional statement:
AND SAID OFFENSES OCCURRED IN TWO OR MORE JUDICIAL CIRCUITS IN THE STATE OF FLORIDA AS PART OF A RELATED TRANSACTION OR SAID OFFENSES WERE CONNECTED WITH AN ORGANIZED CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY AFFECTING TWO OR MORE JUDICIAL CIRCUITS IN THE STATE OF FLORIDA.
(Exhibit "C.")
As a general rule, the jurisdiction of the O[SP] will be determined from the face of the Information. Winter v. State, 781 So.2d 1111, 1116 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001) (citing Zanger v. State, 548 So.2d 746, 748 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989)). However, "[t]he OSP need not allege in particular counts that the crimes occurred in or affected two or more judicial circuits." Winter, 781 So. 2d at 1116. In Winter, the court went on to hold that a general allegation similar to the one in the instant case was sufficient to show jurisdiction on the face of the information. Id. However, on rehearing the court clarified that a defendant may still...
