Boechler, P.C. v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue
Decision Date | 21 April 2022 |
Docket Number | 20-1472 |
Parties | BOECHLER, P.C., Petitioner v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE |
Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
Melissa Arbus Sherry, Washington, DC, for petitioner.
Jonathan C. Bond, for respondent.
Melissa Arbus Sherry, Counsel of Record, Caroline A. Flynn, Amy Feinberg, Latham & Watkins LLP, Washington, DC, for Petitioner.
Elizabeth B. Prelogar, Solicitor General, Counsel of Record, David A. Hubbert, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Curtis E. Gannona, Deputy Solicitor General, Jonathan C. Bond, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Francesca Ugolini, Joan I. Oppenheimer, Janet A. Bradley, Judith A. Hagley, Attorneys, Department of Justice Washington, DC, for Respondent.
The Internal Revenue Service can seize taxpayer property to collect tax debts. Before it does so, however, the taxpayer is typically entitled to a "collection due process hearing"—a proceeding at which the taxpayer can challenge the levy or offer collection alternatives like payment by installment. That hearing may have a happy (or at least relatively happy) ending from the taxpayer's perspective. But if not, the taxpayer has 30 days to petition the Tax Court for review.
Boechler, P.C., the petitioner in this case, missed the deadline by one day. According to the Commissioner of the IRS, this tardiness extinguished Boechler's opportunity to seek review of the agency's determination. The Commissioner insists that the deadline is jurisdictional, which means that the Tax Court has no authority to consider late-filed petitions. And even if it is not jurisdictional, the Commissioner argues, the Tax Court lacks the power to accept a tardy filing by applying the doctrine of equitable tolling. We disagree with the Commissioner on both scores.
Boechler is a law firm in Fargo, North Dakota. In 2015, the IRS notified Boechler of a discrepancy in its tax filings. When Boechler did not respond, the agency assessed an "intentional disregard" penalty and notified Boechler of its intent to levy—in other words, to seize and sell—Boechler's property to satisfy the penalty. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 6330(a), 6721(a)(2), (e)(2)(A). That got Boechler's attention, and in an effort to prevent the levy, it requested a hearing before the agency's Independent Office of Appeals. § 6330(b). This proceeding—known as a collection due process hearing—generally provides taxpayers with administrative review before the IRS takes their property. § 6330(a)(1). At its hearing, Boechler challenged the penalty, arguing both that there was no discrepancy in its tax filings and that the penalty was excessive.
The Independent Office of Appeals sustained the proposed levy. Under § 6330(d)(1), Boechler had 30 days to petition the Tax Court to review this collection due process determination. But Boechler dropped the ball and filed its petition a day late. The Tax Court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction and the Eighth Circuit affirmed, agreeing that § 6330(d)(1) ’s 30-day filing deadline is jurisdictional and thus cannot be equitably tolled. 967 F.3d 760 (2020). We granted certiorari. 594 U. S. ––––, 142 S.Ct. 55, 210 L.Ed.2d 1023 (2021).
Jurisdictional requirements mark the bounds of a "court's adjudicatory authority." Kontrick v. Ryan , 540 U.S. 443, 455, 124 S.Ct. 906, 157 L.Ed.2d 867 (2004). Yet not all procedural requirements fit that bill. Many simply instruct "parties [to] take certain procedural steps at certain specified times" without conditioning a court's authority to hear the case on compliance with those steps. Henderson v. Shinseki , 562 U.S. 428, 435, 131 S.Ct. 1197, 179 L.Ed.2d 159 (2011). These nonjurisdictional rules "promote the orderly progress of litigation" but do not bear on a court's power. Ibid.
The distinction matters. Jurisdictional requirements cannot be waived or forfeited, must be raised by courts sua sponte , and, as relevant to this case, do not allow for equitable exceptions. Id., at 434–435, 131 S.Ct. 1197 ; Sebelius v. Auburn Regional Medical Center , 568 U.S. 145, 154, 133 S.Ct. 817, 184 L.Ed.2d 627 (2013). Mindful of these consequences, we have endeavored "to bring some discipline" to use of the jurisdictional label. Henderson , 562 U.S., at 435, 131 S.Ct. 1197.
To that end, we treat a procedural requirement as jurisdictional only if Congress "clearly states" that it is. Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp. , 546 U.S. 500, 515, 126 S.Ct. 1235, 163 L.Ed.2d 1097 (2006). Congress need not "incant magic words," Auburn , 568 U.S., at 153, 133 S.Ct. 817, but the "traditional tools of statutory construction must plainly show that Congress imbued a procedural bar with jurisdictional consequences," United States v. Kwai Fun Wong , 575 U.S. 402, 410, 135 S.Ct. 1625, 191 L.Ed.2d 533 (2015). This case therefore turns on whether Congress has clearly stated that § 6330(d)(1) ’s deadline to petition for review of a collection due process determination is jurisdictional.
Section 6330(d)(1) provides:
"The person may, within 30 days of a determination under this section, petition the Tax Court for review of such determination (and the Tax Court shall have jurisdiction with respect to such matter)."
The only jurisdictional language appears in the parenthetical at the end of the sentence. All agree that the parenthetical grants the Tax Court jurisdiction over petitions for review of collection due process determinations. And all agree that the provision imposes a 30-day deadline to file those petitions. The question is whether the provision limits the Tax Court's jurisdiction to petitions filed within that timeframe.
The answer depends on the meaning of "such matter," the phrase marking the bounds of the Tax Court's jurisdiction. Boechler contends that it refers only to the immediately preceding phrase: a "petition [to] the Tax Court for review of such determination."
If so, the filing deadline is independent of the jurisdictional grant. The Commissioner, by contrast, argues that "such matter" refers to the entire first clause of the sentence, sweeping in the deadline and granting jurisdiction only over petitions filed within that time. On this reading, the deadline is jurisdictional.
As we see it, the text does not clearly mandate the jurisdictional reading. It is hard to see how it could, given that "such matter" lacks a clear antecedent. The word "matter" does not appear elsewhere in § 6330(d)(1), and no other " ‘noun or noun phrase’ " serves as the obvious antecedent. A. Scalia & B. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 144 (2012). Both parties cope with this awkward structure by treating "petition" as a noun, even though it appears in the provision as a verb. Maybe the parties are right that the statute asks the single word "petition" to perform double duty. But relying on this grammatical sleight of hand does not exactly help the Commissioner's argument that the text is clear. Moreover, even taking "petition" as a noun, Boechler's interpretation has a small edge. The last-antecedent rule instructs that the correct antecedent is usually "the nearest reasonable" one. Ibid. And Boechler links "such matter" to the phrase immediately preceding the jurisdictional parenthetical, while the Commissioner stretches back one phrase more. This is hardly a slam dunk for Boechler, but it is one reason to prefer its reading—or at least to regard the Commissioner's as not clearly right.
It is also worth noting that the parties’ back-and-forth does not exhaust the universe of plausible ways to read "such matter." For example, "such matter" might refer to "such determination" (which in turn refers to a "determination under this section"). Or "such matter" might refer to the preceding subsection's list of "[m]atters" that may be considered during the collection due process hearing. 26 U.S.C. § 6330(c). Neither possibility ties the Tax Court's jurisdiction to the filing deadline, and that is another point in Boechler's favor. Where multiple plausible interpretations exist—only one of which is jurisdictional—it is difficult to make the case that the jurisdictional reading is clear. See Sossamon v. Texas , 563 U.S. 277, 287, 131 S.Ct. 1651, 179 L.Ed.2d 700 (2011).
Nothing else in the provision's text or structure advances the case for jurisdictional clarity. The deadline, which appears in the first independent clause of the sentence, explains what the taxpayer may do: "The person may, within 30 days of a determination under this section, petition the Tax Court for review of such determination." § 6330(d)(1). The jurisdictional grant, which appears in a parenthetical at the end of the sentence, speaks to what the Tax Court shall do: "(and the Tax Court shall have jurisdiction with respect to such matter)." Ibid. As explained above, this language can be plausibly construed to condition the Tax Court's jurisdiction on a timely filing. But the condition would not be express and would be found in a parenthetical, which is typically used to convey an "aside" or "afterthought." B. Garner, Modern English Usage 1020 (4th ed. 2016).
Finally, the broader statutory context confirms the lack of any clear statement in § 6330(d)(1). Other tax provisions enacted around the same time as § 6330(d)(1) much more clearly link their jurisdictional grants to a filing deadline. See 26 U.S.C. § 6404(g)(1) (1994 ed., Supp. II) (the Tax Court has "jurisdiction over any action ... to determine whether the Secretary's failure to abate interest under this section was an abuse of discretion, ... if such action is brought within 180 days"); § 6015(e)(1)(A) (1994 ed., Supp. IV) ("The individual may petition the Tax Court (and the Tax Court shall have jurisdiction) to determine the appropriate relief available to the individual under this section if such petition is filed during the 90-day period"). These provisions accentuate the lack of comparable clarity in § 6330(d)(1).
The Commissioner's...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Hallmark Research Collective v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue
... ... After ... the Supreme Court decided Boechler, P.C. v ... Commissioner , 142 S.Ct. 1493 (2022), P moved to vacate ... our dismissal ... ...
-
Collective v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue
...was not timely filed. Hallmark filed its response, in which it requested that we defer ruling until the Supreme Court issued its decision in Boechler (in which the Court had granted a for a writ of certiorari). Hallmark argued that the deadline to file a deficiency petition in section 6213(......
-
Honeycutt v. Hondo Coal Co.
... ... (D.C. Cir. 2017) (internal quotations omitted); see also ... McKinney v ... 'jurisdictional,'" Boechler, P.C. v ... Comm'r, 142 S.Ct. 1493, 1500 (2022) ... ...
-
Commonwealth v. Yellen
... ... revenue" resulting from such tax cuts. 42 U.S.C. § ... their own internal taxation policies. See id ... ¶40; see also Lane ... Id. at 24; cf ... Boechler, P.C. v. Comm'r , 142 S.Ct. 1493, 1498 ... (2022) ... ...
-
United States Supreme Court Holds That Bankruptcy Code Section 363(m) Does Not Preclude Appellate Jurisdiction On Asset Sale Orders
...at *4. 16. Id. at *6 (quoting Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U. S. 154, 161 (2010)). 17. Id. at *2 (quoting Boechler v. Comm'r, 142 S.Ct. 1493, 1494 18. Id. (quoting Boechler, 142 S.Ct. at 1497). 19. MOAC, 2023 WL 2992693 at *2 (quoting Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U. S. 428, 435 (2011)......
-
In The Room Where It Happens, It Doesn't Always Happen Exactly Right
...But I was reminded of this drafting issue while discussing with Ms. Carney a recent CDP case, Boechler, P.C. v. Commissioner, 142 S.Ct. 1493 (2022), in which the Supreme Court opened the door for applying equitable doctrines to entertain untimely petitions in extreme cases. In Boechler, the......
-
Federal Courts Mixed on Whether the 90-Day Tax Court Petition Deadline Under Section 6213 is Jurisdictional
...LLC v. Comm’r, 962 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 2020). [2] Sanders v. Comm’r, 160 T.C. No. 16 (June 20, 2023). [3] Boechler, P.C. v. Comm’r, 142 S.Ct. 1493 (2022). [4] Hallmark Research Collective v. Comm’r, 159 T.C. No. 6 (Nov. 29, 2022). [5] Culp v. Comm’r, 2023 US App. Lexis 18287 (3d Cir. July 1......
-
Federal Courts Mixed on Whether the 90-Day Tax Court Petition Deadline Under Section 6213 is Jurisdictional
...LLC v. Comm’r, 962 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 2020). [2] Sanders v. Comm’r, 160 T.C. No. 16 (June 20, 2023). [3] Boechler, P.C. v. Comm’r, 142 S.Ct. 1493 (2022). [4] Hallmark Research Collective v. Comm’r, 159 T.C. No. 6 (Nov. 29, 2022). [5] Culp v. Comm’r, 2023 US App. Lexis 18287 (3d Cir. July 1......
-
Analysis of and reflections on recent cases and rulings.
...appealed the case to the Second Circuit. The court held the case in abeyance pending the Supreme Court's decision in Boechler, PC, 142 S. Ct. 1493 (2022), in which the Court was addressing whether the Sec. 6330(d)(1) deadline was jurisdictional or nonjurisdictional. If the Court held that t......
-
Analysis of and reflections on recent cases and rulings.
...90-day deadline for filing Tax Court petition in deficiency case is jurisdictional Despite the Supreme Court's decision in Boechler, 142 S. Ct. 1493 (2022), holding that the Sec. 6330(d)(1)(a) 30-day deadline to file a petition for review of a Collection Due Process (CDP) hearing was a nonj......