Boehm v. Superior Court

• Decision Date: 05 March 1986
• Citation: 178 Cal.App.3d 494,223 Cal.Rptr. 716
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: Irene BOEHM et al., Petitioners, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of Merced County, Respondent; The COUNTY OF MERCED et al., Real Parties in Interest. F006320.

Page 716

223 Cal.Rptr. 716

178 Cal.App.3d 494

Irene BOEHM et al., Petitioners, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of Merced County, Respondent The COUNTY OF MERCED et al., Real Parties in Interest.

F006320.

Court of Appeal, Fifth District, California.

March 5, 1986.

As Modified on Denial of Rehearing April 4, 1986.

Review Denied May 21, 1986.

Melinda R. Bird and Richard A. Rothschild, Los Angeles, Paul Babwin, Merced, for petitioners

No Appearance for Respondent Superior Court.

William E. Gnass, Co. Counsel, and David R. Ortega, Deputy Co. Counsel, Merced, for real parties in interest.

OPINION

HAMLIN, Associate Justice.

Petitioners Irene Boehm and other Merced County residents who receive general assistance welfare payments (GA) seek mandamus to compel the Superior Court of Merced County to issue a preliminary injunction against the reduction of GA by the Merced County Board of Supervisors (the County) and the Merced County Department of Human Resources (the Department) and to grant petitioners' motion for summary judgment.

The issue presented is whether the County acted arbitrarily and capriciously in reducing GA grants to levels sufficient to provide only minimum subsistence needs for food and shelter (including utilities). We hold that without a study which establishes that the other basic necessities--clothing, transportation and medical care--are otherwise provided to those eligible to receive GA, the GA benefits, as a matter of law, do not conform to the mandate of Welfare and Institutions Code section 17000 ¹ and its companion provisions. We will grant the writ to compel the trial court to issue a preliminary injunction against reduction of the benefits and to grant petitioners' motion for summary adjudication of certain issues.

BACKGROUND

In July 1983 the County reduced GA for indigent county residents from $198 per month for an individual to $175 a month, with proportional reductions for larger family sizes. Petitioners sought to enjoin the reductions. The trial court denied the request.

On appeal, in Boehm v. County of Merced (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 447, 452, 209 Cal.Rptr. 530, this court reversed, holding that the County acted arbitrarily and capriciously by reducing GA without basing that reduction on a study determining the minimum subsistence needs of its indigent residents. However, it was unnecessary to define minimum subsistence because the County did not base its reduction on a study of any minimum subsistence needs.

Following the remand, the Department conducted two studies of minimum subsistence needs. Each study concerned only the minimum need for food and housing (including utilities). The County fixed GA at $175 per month for an individual based on the first study and then raised the level to $185 per month based on the second study.

On August 1, 1985, petitioners sought a preliminary injunction and summary adjudication against this grant reduction. They filed declarations in support of their motion for summary adjudication. The County filed no opposing declarations. Respondent court denied petitioners' request and stated:

"The facts now before us show:

"1. Pursuant to a needs study presented by the Department of Human Resources to the Board of Supervisors on February 15, 1985, the Board unanimously found that $185 per month would meet the subsistence needs of General Relief (hereinafter called GR) recipients.

"2. The study dealt with housing, certain personal and household items, and food only. It did not purport to cover transportation, clothing, or medical expenses. It purported to cover utilities by 'factoring them into the cost of shelter.'

"3. The action taken by the Board of Supervisors February 19, 1985, approved a recommendation of the Department of Human Resources and County Counsel and established '$185 as the minimum subsistence needs in Merced County for one person.' The action did not make specific findings."

Petitioners argue that the trial court abused its discretion in denying an injunction and summary judgment. They request a writ of mandate directing the court to enjoin the County from reducing GA below the 1983 level and to order retroactive payments at the 1983 level, along with cost-of-living increases from the date of reduction. Real parties in interest contend summary judgment was properly denied because there are material issues of fact in controversy.

DISCUSSION

I.

Mandamus is issued "to compel the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins, ..." (Code Civ.Proc., § 1085.) Although mandamus does not generally lie to control the exercise of judicial discretion, the writ will issue "where, under the facts, that discretion can be exercised in only one way." (Babb v. Superior Court (1971) 3 Cal.3d 841, 851, 92 Cal.Rptr. 179, 479 P.2d 379.

The decision to grant a preliminary injunction rests in the sound discretion of the trial court. (It Corp. v. County of Imperial (1983) 35 Cal.3d 63, 69, 196 Cal.Rptr. 715, 672 P.2d 121.) However, the court has "no discretion to act capriciously." (Gosney v. State of California (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 921, 924, 89 Cal.Rptr. 390.) It must exercise its discretion "in favor of the party most likely to be injured." (Ibid.; Riviello v. Journeymen Barbers etc. Union (1948) 88 Cal.App.2d 499, 510, 199 P.2d 400.) If the denial of an injunction would result in great harm to the plaintiff, and the defendants would suffer little harm if it were granted, then it is an abuse of discretion to fail to grant the preliminary injunction. (Ibid.) Trial courts should consider two interrelated questions in deciding whether or not to issue a preliminary injunction: (1) Are the plaintiffs likely to suffer greater injury from a denial of the injunction than the defendants are likely to suffer from its grant? (2) Is there a reasonable probability that the plaintiffs will prevail on the merits? (IT Corp. v. County of Imperial, supra, 35 Cal.3d at pp. 69-70, 196 Cal.Rptr. 715, 672 P.2d 121.)

A writ of mandate is also an appropriate remedy for improperly denied summary judgment motions. In Roman Catholic Archbishop v. Superior Court (1971) 15 Cal.App.3d 405, 410-411, 93 Cal.Rptr. 338, the court stated:

"A writ of mandate is a proper remedy to compel a trial court to grant a motion for summary judgment where the affidavits in support of the moving party are sufficient to sustain a judgment in his favor, and his opponent does not by counteraffidavit show facts sufficient to present a triable issue of fact. (Bank of America v. Superior Court (1970) 4 Cal.App.3d 435, 441 ...; Whitney's at the Beach v. Superior Court (1970) 3 Cal.App.3d 258, 266-267 ....) However, writ relief is to be used sparingly, with doubts resolved in favor of denial of review. 'It may be assumed that the meritorious movant who has been denied his summary relief will ultimately prevail in the trial court without more trouble and expense than would have attended his efforts prior to the existence of the summary remedy.' ( Whitney's at the Beach v. Superior Court, supra, at p. 266 .) In determining whether summary judgment is warranted, the affidavits of the moving party are to be strictly construed and those of the opponent liberally construed. ( Whitney's at the Beach v. Superior Court, supra, at p. 267 .)"

A motion for summary judgment is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. In the absence of a clear abuse of discretion, the judgment will not be disturbed on appeal. (Brewer v. Homeowners Auto Finance Co. (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 337, 341, 89 Cal.Rptr. 231.)

II.

GA is a program of last resort for indigent and disabled persons unable to qualify for other kinds of public benefits. GA is often the only means by which they can obtain the basic necessities. (See Goldberg v. Kelly (1970) 397 U.S. 254, 264, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 1018, 25 L.Ed.2d 287; Mooney v. Pickett (1971) 4 Cal.3d 669, 681, 94 Cal.Rptr. 279, 483 P.2d 1231; see generally, Note, General Assistance in California (1984) 12 U. San Fernando Val.L.Rev. 31.) The program is unique because the responsibility for funding and administering it rests entirely upon individual county governments.

Section 17000 provides that "Every county ... shall relieve and support all incompetent, poor, indigent persons, and those incapacitated by age, disease, or accident, lawfully resident therein, when such persons are not supported and relieved by their relatives or friends, by their own means, or by state hospitals or other state or private institutions." (Emphasis added.) Section 17001 imposes a mandatory duty on each county to adopt standards of aid and care for the indigent and dependent poor. (City and County of San Francisco v. Superior Court (1976) 57 Cal.App.3d 44, 47, 128 Cal.Rptr. 712.) Counties do, however, have discretion to determine eligibility for, the type and amount of, and conditions to be attached to indigent relief. (County of L.A. v. Dept. of Social Welfare (1953) 41 Cal.2d 455, 458, 260 P.2d 41.) The courts have no authority to interfere " '... in the absence of a clear showing of fraud or arbitrary or capricious conduct ....' " (E.g., Adkins v. Leach (1971) 17 Cal.App.3d 771, 778-779, 95 Cal.Rptr. 61.)

Nonetheless, a county's discretion can be exercised only within fixed boundaries and consistent with the underlying purpose of the statutes which impose the duty. (See Mooney v. Pickett, supra, 4 Cal.3d at p. 679, 94 Cal.Rptr. 279, 483 P.2d 1231.) Section 10000 outlines the statutory purpose and legislative intent of division 9 (§§ 10000-18971), which contains the provisions governing GA (§§ 17000-17410).

"The purpose of this division is to provide for protection, care, and assistance to the people of the state in need thereof, and to promote the welfare and happiness of all of the people of the state by providing appropriate aid and services to all of its needy and distressed. It is the legislative intent that aid shall be administered and services provided promptly and humanely, with due regard...