Boerkoel v. Hayes Mfg. Corporation, Civil Action No. 963.
Decision Date | 26 March 1948 |
Docket Number | Civil Action No. 963. |
Citation | 76 F. Supp. 771 |
Parties | BOERKOEL v. HAYES MFG. CORPORATION. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Michigan |
Harrington, Waer & Cary and Leon W. Harrington, all of Grand Rapids, Mich., for plaintiff.
McKee Robison, of Detroit, Mich., and Alexander, Cholette, Buchanan, Perkins & Conklin and Paul E. Cholette, all of Grand Rapids, Mich., for defendant.
On December 31, 1946, plaintiff filed complaint under section 16(b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended, 29 U.S.C.A. § 216(b), to recover alleged unpaid overtime compensation and also liquidated damages, court costs, and attorney's fee. He alleged in substance that while employed by defendant in its plant at Grand Rapids, Michigan, during the period from September, 1941, to December, 1944, he was engaged in the production of goods for commerce and that during this period he was employed more than 40 hours a week but received compensation for only 40 hours. He further alleged that he was entitled to overtime compensation under section 7 of the Fair Labor Standards Act, as amended, 29 U.S.C.A. § 207, which provides in part:
Defendant filed answer admitting that plaintiff was engaged in the production of goods for commerce, but denying liability on the ground, among others, that plaintiff was "employed in a bona fide executive and administrative * * * capacity" as provided in section 13(a) of said Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 213(a). On May 14, 1947, subsequent to the beginning of the present suit, Congress amended the Fair Labor Standards Act by passing the so-called Portal-to-Portal Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 251 et seq. Section 2 of this act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 252, which gives "relief from certain existing claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended," provides in part:
Subsequent to the passage of the Portal-to-Portal Act defendant amended its answer by alleging as a special defense that because plaintiff was claiming overtime compensation for activities which were not made compensable by either contract, custom or practice, his action was barred and the court deprived of jurisdiction by section 2(d) of the Portal-to-Portal Act above quoted. Defendant also filed motion to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds:
(1) Because it failed to state a claim against defendant upon which relief could be granted;
(2) Because the court was without jurisdiction of the subject matter, as jurisdiction had been withdrawn by section 2(d) of the Portal-to-Portal Act;
(3) Because plaintiff's alleged claim was barred by section 2(d) of the Portal-to-Portal Act.
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and it has long been established that a complaint must allege facts which affirmatively show jurisdiction. Gully v. First National Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 57 S.Ct. 96, 81 L.Ed. 70; Holland v. General Motors Corporation, D. C., 75 F.Supp. 274; Seese v. Bethlehem Steel Co., D. C., 74 F.Supp. 412. Therefore, the first question in the present case is whether or not, under the Fair Labor Standards Act as amended by the Portal-to-Portal Act, plaintiff's complaint alleges facts establishing the jurisdiction of this court. In considering this question the court has had the benefit of comprehensive and able briefs submitted by counsel for the respective parties.
The constitutionality of the Portal-to-Portal Act, particularly section 2 thereof, has been upheld by many decisions, including the following: Cochran v. St. Paul & Tacoma Lumber Co., D. C., 73 F.Supp. 288; Burfeind v. Eagle-Picher Co., D. C., 71 F.Supp. 929; Holland v. General Motors Corporation, supra; Bumpus v. Remington Arms Co., D. C., 74 F.Supp. 788; Seese v. Bethlehem Steel Co., supra; Bateman v. Ford Motor Company, D. C. E. D. Mich., 76 F.Supp. 178 (decided February 27, 1948).
The present case was begun, and involves activities performed, prior to the passage of the Portal-to-Portal Act. However, it should be noted that the above-quoted provisions of that Act apply to any action or proceeding, whether instituted prior to or after the date of its enactment. It seems clear that under section 2(d), the court does not have jurisdiction unless the complaint alleges facts affirmatively showing that plaintiff's overtime activities were compensable under some contract provision or under a custom or practice as provided by section 2(a) and (b). In Sadler v. W. S. Dickey Clay Mfg. Co., D.C., 73 F.Supp. 690, 691, the court said:
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