Bogan v. Scott-Harris

Decision Date03 March 1998
Docket Number961569
Citation140 L.Ed.2d 79,118 S.Ct. 966,523 U.S. 44
PartiesDaniel BOGAN and Marilyn Roderick, Petitioners, v. Janet
CourtU.S. Supreme Court
Syllabus*

Respondent Scott-Harris filed suit under 42 U.S.C. §1983 against the city of Fall River, Massachusetts, petitioners Bogan (the city's mayor) and Roderick (the vice president of the city council), and other officials, alleging that the elimination of the city department in which Scott-Harris was the sole employee was motivated by racial animus and a desire to retaliate against her for exercising her First Amendment rights in filing a complaint against another city employee. The District Court twice denied petitioners' motions to dismiss on the ground of absolute immunity from suit. The jury returned a verdict in favor of all defendants on the racial discrimination charge, but found the city and petitioners liable on respondent's First Amendment claim. The First Circuit set aside the verdict against the city but affirmed the judgments against Roderick and Bogan. Although concluding that petitioners have absolute immunity from civil liability for damages arising out of their performance of legitimate legislative activities, that court held that their conduct in introducing, voting for, and signing the ordinance that eliminated respondent's office was not "legislative.'' Relying on the jury's finding that respondent's constitutionally sheltered speech was a substantial or motivating factor underlying petitioners' conduct, the court reasoned that the conduct was administrative, rather than legislative, because Roderick and Bogan relied on facts relating to a particular individual, respondent, in the decisionmaking calculus.

Held:

1.Local legislators are entitled to the same absolute immunity from civil liability under §1983 for their legislative activities as has long been accorded to federal, state, and regional legislators. See, e.g., Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 372, 372-376, 71 S.Ct. 783, 95 L.Ed. 1019; Amy v. Supervisors, 11 Wall. 136, 138, 20 L.Ed. 101, distinguished. Such immunity finds pervasive support not only in common-law cases and older treatises, but also in reason. See Tenney, 341 U.S., at 376, 71 S.Ct., at 788. The rationales for according absolute immunity to federal, state, and regional legislators apply with equal force to local legislators. Regardless of the level of government, the exercise of legislative discretion should not be inhibited by judicial interference or distorted by the fear of personal liability. See, e.g., id., at 377, 71 S.Ct. at 788-89. Furthermore, the time and energy required to defend against a lawsuit are of particular concern at the local level, where the part-time citizen-legislator remains commonplace. See id., at 377, 71 S.Ct. at 788-89. And the threat of liability may significantly deter service in local government, where prestige and pecuniary rewards may pale in comparison to the threat of civil liability. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 827, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2742-43, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (Burger, C. J., dissenting). Moreover, certain deterrents to legislative abuse may be greater at the local level than at other levels of government, including the availability of municipal liability for constitutional violations, e.g., Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 405, n. 29, 99 S.Ct. 1171, 1179, n. 29, 59 L.Ed.2d 401, and the ultimate check on legislative abuse, the electoral process, cf. Tenney, supra, at 378, 71 S.Ct. at 789. Indeed, any argument that the rationale for absolute immunity does not extend to local legislators is implicitly foreclosed by Lake Country Estates, supra, at 401-402, 99 S.Ct. at 1177-78. Pp. ___-___.

2.Petitioners' actions in this case were protected by absolute immunity, which attaches to all acts taken "in the sphere of legitimate legislative activity.'' Tenney, 341 U.S. at 376, 71 S.Ct., at 788. The First Circuit erroneously relied on petitioners' subjective intent in resolving whether their acts so qualified. Whether an act is legislative turns on the nature of the act itself, rather than on the motive or intent of the official performing it. Id., at 370, 377, 71 S.Ct., at 785, 788-89. This Court has little trouble concluding that, stripped of all considerations of intent and motive, petitioners' actions were legislative. Most evidently, petitioner Roderick's acts of voting for the ordinance eliminating respondent's office were, in form, quintessentially legislative. Petitioner Bogan's introduction of a budget that proposed the elimination of city jobs and his signing the ordinance into law also were formally legislative, even though he was an executive official. Officials outside the legislative branch are entitled to legislative immunity when they perform legislative functions, see Supreme Court of Va. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 446 U.S. 719, 731-734, 100 S.Ct. 1967, 1974-76, 64 L.Ed.2d 641; Bogan's actions were legislative because they were integral steps in the legislative process. Cf., e.g., Edwards v. United States, 286 U.S. 482, 490, 52 S.Ct. 627, 630, 76 L.Ed. 1239. Furthermore, this particular ordinance, in substance, bore all the hallmarks of traditional legislation: It reflected a discretionary, policymaking decision implicating the city's budgetary priorities and its services to constituents; it involved the termination of a position, which, unlike the hiring or firing of a particular employee, may have prospective implications that reach well beyond the particular occupant of the office; and, in eliminating respondent's office, it governed in a field where legislators traditionally have power to act, Tenney, supra, at 379, 71 S.Ct., at 789. Pp. ___-___.

134 F.3d 427, reversed.

THOMAS, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

Charles Rothfeld, Washington, DC, for petitioners.

Harvey A Schwartz, Boston, MA, for respondent.

Justice THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court.

It is well established that federal, state, and regional legislators are entitled to absolute immunity from civil liability for their legislative activities. In this case, petitioners argue that they, as local officials performing legislative functions, are entitled to the same protection. They further argue that their acts of introducing, voting for, and signing an ordinance eliminating the government office held by respondent constituted legislative activities. We agree on both counts and therefore reverse the judgment below.

I

Respondent Janet Scott-Harris was administrator of the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) for the city of Fall River, Massachusetts, from 1987 to 1991. In 1990, respondent received a complaint that Dorothy Biltcliffe, an employee serving temporarily under her supervision, had made repeated racial and ethnic slurs about her colleagues. After respondent prepared termination charges against Biltcliffe, Biltcliffe used her political connections to press her case with several state and local officials, including petitioner Marilyn Roderick, the vice president of the Fall River City Council. The city council held a hearing on the charges against Biltcliffe and ultimately accepted a settlement proposal under which Biltcliffe would be suspended without pay for 60 days. Petitioner Daniel Bogan, the mayor of Fall River, thereafter substantially reduced the punishment.

While the charges against Biltcliffe were pending, Mayor Bogan prepared his budget proposal for the 1992 fiscal year. Anticipating a 5 to 10 percent reduction in state aid, Bogan proposed freezing the salaries of all municipal employees and eliminating 135 city positions. As part of this package, Bogan called for the elimination of DHHS, of which respondent was the sole employee. The City Council Ordinance Committee, which was chaired by Roderick, approved an ordinance eliminating DHHS. The city council thereafter adopted the ordinance by a vote of 6 to 2, with petitioner Roderick among those voting in favor. Bogan signed the ordinance into law.

Respondent then filed suit under Rev. Stat. §1979, 42 U.S.C. §1983, against the city, Bogan, Roderick, and several other city officials. She alleged that the elimination of her position was motivated by racial animus and a desire to retaliate against her for exercising her First Amendment rights in filing the complaint against Biltcliffe. The District Court denied Bogan's and Roderick's motions to dismiss on the ground of legislative immunity, and the case proceeded to trial. Scott-Harris v. City of Fall River, et al., Civ. 91-12057-PBS (Mass., Jan. 27, 1995), App. to Pet. for Cert. 1.

The jury returned a verdict in favor of all defendants on the racial discrimination charge, but found the city, Bogan, and Roderick liable on respondent's First Amendment claim, concluding that respondent's constitutionally protected speech was a substantial or motivating factor in the elimination of her position. 1 On a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the District Court again denied Bogan's and Roderick's claims of absolute legislative immunity, reasoning that "the ordinance amendment passed by the city council was an individually-targeted administrative act, rather than a neutral, legislative elimination of a position which incidentally resulted in the termination of plaintiff.'' Id., at 20.

The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit set aside the verdict against the city but affirmed the judgments against Roderick and Bogan. Scott-Harris v. City of Fall River, 134 F.3d 427 (1997). 2 Although the court concluded that petitioners have "absolute immunity from civil liability for damages arising out of their performance of legitimate legislative activities,'' id., at 440, it held that their challenged conduct was not "legislative,'' id., at 440. Relying on the jury's finding that "constitutionally sheltered speech was a...

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