Boggs v. Town of Riverhead

• Decision Date: 07 November 2018
• Docket Number: 2:17-cv-05411 (ADS) (SIL)
• Citation: Boggs v. Town of Riverhead, 2:17-cv-05411 (ADS) (SIL) (E.D. N.Y. Nov 07, 2018)
• Parties: ELENDELL BOGGS and RANDY MOUZON, Plaintiff, v. TOWN OF RIVERHEAD, Riverhead Town Police Officers "JOHN DOES" 1-10 and "JANE DOES" 1-10, in their official and individual capacities; RIVERHEAD VILLAGE PRESERVATION LLP; CITY OF NEW YORK; New York City Law Enforcement Agents "JOHN DOES" 1-10 and "JANE DOES" 1-10, in their official and individual capacities and; New York State Law Enforcement Agents "JOHN DOES" 1-10 and "JANE DOES" 1-10, in their official and individual capacities, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York

ELENDELL BOGGS and RANDY MOUZON, Plaintiff, v. TOWN OF RIVERHEAD, Riverhead Town Police Officers "JOHN DOES" 1-10and "JANE DOES" 1-10, in their official and individual capacities;RIVERHEAD VILLAGE PRESERVATION LLP;CITY OF NEW YORK; New York City Law Enforcement Agents "JOHN DOES" 1-10and "JANE DOES" 1-10, in their official and individual capacitiesand; New York State Law Enforcement Agents "JOHN DOES" 1-10and "JANE DOES" 1-10, in their official and individual capacities, Defendants.

2:17-cv-05411 (ADS) (SIL)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

November 7, 2018

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION & ORDER

APPEARANCES:

Law Office of Harriet A. Gilliam

Attorney for the Plaintiff

21 W Second St

Po Box 1485

Riverhead, NY 11901

By: Harriet A. Gilliam, Esq., Of Counsel.

Campolo, Middleton & McCormick, LLP

Attorneys for Defendants Town of Riverhead and Riverhead Town Police Officers Joh Does 1-10 and Jane Does 1-10

4175 Veterans Memorial Hwy

Ronkonkoma, NY 11779

By: William McDonald, Esq.,

Meghan McGuire Dolan, Esq., Of Counsel.

London Fischer LLP

Attorneys for Defendant Riverhead Village Preservation LLP

59 Maiden Lane, 39th Floor

New York, NY 10038

By: Brian Patrick McLaughlin, Esq., Of Counsel.

NYC Law Department

Attorneys for Defendant City of New York

100 Church Street

New York, NY 10007

By: Jacqueline C. Chavez, Senior Corporation Counsel, Of Counsel.

SPATT, District Judge:

The plaintiffs Elendell Boggs ("Boggs") and Randy Mouzon ("Mouzon") (collectively, the Plaintiffs") brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("Section 1983") alleging violations of their federal and state constitutional rights by the Town of Riverhead (the "Town"), Riverhead Village Preservation LLP, the City of New York (the "City"), and various law enforcement officers named as John and Jane Does.

Presently before the Court is a motion to dismiss by the City, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("FED. R. CIV. P." or "Rule") 12(b)(6), seeking to dismiss the claims against the City for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. ECF 12. For the following reasons, the Court grants the motion to dismiss by the City in its entirety.

I. BACKGROUND

This action arises from an incident that allegedly took place on November 6, 2014 at the Plaintiffs' apartment in Riverhead, Suffolk County, New York. ECF 1 ¶ 16. According to the Plaintiffs, law enforcement officers from the Town, the City, and the State of New York entered the Plaintiffs' apartment without requesting permission, showing a search warrant, identifying themselves, or explaining the reason for their presence. Id. ¶ 19-21. Upon entering the apartment, they handcuffed all the individuals present, including Mouzon, but not Boggs, who they told to sit on the couch. Id. ¶¶ 23-24. The officers then proceeded to search the remainder of the apartment. Id. ¶ 31.

The Complaint alleges that the officers "mocked" and "taunted" and threatened the Plaintiffs throughout the search. Id. ¶ 38. At some point, one of the officers took Mouzon into a different room and called Boggs into that room 20 minutes later. Id. ¶¶ 33-34. Then, the officers told the Plaintiffs that they were looking for Mouzon's son and threatened to arrest the Plaintiffs if they did not assist. Id. ¶¶ 35-36. The Plaintiffs further allege that the officers denied Mouzon medical assistance in the form of his asthma inhaler, despite his visible difficulty breathing. Id. ¶ 38.

Based on these events, the Plaintiffs allege that the Town, the City, and the State of New York (the "State") conspired to violate their rights under the United States and New York State Constitutions. Id. ¶¶ 56-59. The Plaintiffs assert that the Town, the City, and the State engaged the Village, which is the management company of the Plaintiffs' apartment building, in the conspiracy. Id. ¶ 17, 27, 57. Accordingly, the Plaintiffs brought this action against the Town, the City, and the Village, as well as Riverhead Town Police Officers, "John Does" 1-10 and "Jane Does 1-10"; New York City Law Enforcement Agents "John Does" 1-10 and "Jane Does 1-10" (the "City John and Jane Does"); and New York State Law Enforcement Agents "John Does" 1-10 and "Jane Does 1-10."

On March 5, 2018, the City brought the present motion seeking dismissal of the action against itself. ECF 12.

II. DISCUSSION

A. THE LEGAL STANDARD ON A MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO RULE 12(B)(6).

In reviewing a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must accept the factual allegations set forth in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the Plaintiff. See Walker v. Schult, 717 F.3d 119, 124 (2d Cir. 2013); Cleveland v. Caplaw Enters.,448 F.3d 518, 521 (2d Cir. 2006); Bold Elec., Inc. v. City of N.Y., 53 F.3d 465, 469 (2d Cir. 1995); Reed v. Garden City Union Free School Dist., 987 F. Supp. 2d 260, 263 (E.D.N.Y. 2013).

Under the now well-established Twombly standard, a complaint should be dismissed only if it does not contain enough allegations of fact to state a claim for relief that is "plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1974, 167 L.Ed. 2d 929 (2007). The Second Circuit has explained that, after Twombly, the Court's inquiry under Rule 12(b)(6) is guided by two principles:

First, although a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint, that tenet is inapplicable to legal conclusions, and [t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice. Second, only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss and [d]etermining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.

Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 664, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1940, 173 L.Ed. 2d 868 (2009)).

Thus, "[w]hen there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and . . . determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement of relief." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.

B. THE CITY'S SECTION 1983 MUNICIPAL LIABILITY.

Under Section 1983, a municipality cannot be held liable solely on a theory of respondeat superior. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 694-95, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2037, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). "Rather, in order to sustain a claim for relief pursuant to § 1983 against a municipal defendant, a plaintiff must show the existence of an official policy or custom that caused injury and a direct causal connection between that policy or custom and the deprivation of a constitutional right." Norton v. Town of Brookhaven, 33 F. Supp. 3d 215, 244 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (Spatt, J.).

A plaintiff can establish the existence of a municipal policy or custom by showing:

the existence of[ ] (1) a formal policy which is officially endorsed by the municipality; (2) actions taken or decisions made by municipal officials with final decision-making authority, which caused the alleged violation of plaintiff's civil rights; (3) a practice so persistent and widespread that it constitutes a custom of which constructive knowledge and acquiescence *16 can be implied on the part of the policy making officials; or (4) a failure by policymakers to properly train or supervise their subordinates, amounting to deliberate indifference to the rights of those who come in contact with the municipal employees.

Boston v. Suffolk Cty., New York, 326 F. Supp. 3d 1, 15-16 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) (Spatt, J.); Norton, 33 F. Supp. 3d at 244; see also Jones v. Town of E. Haven, 691 F.3d 72, 81 (2d Cir. 2012) (explaining that municipal liability attaches if acts "were done pursuant to municipal policy, or were sufficiently widespread and persistent to support a finding that they constituted a custom, policy, or usage of which supervisory authorities must have been aware, or if a municipal custom, policy, or usage would be inferred from evidence of deliberate indifference of supervisory officials to such abuses.").

The Plaintiffs assert Monell liability under a failure to train theory. ECF 16 at 2, 4. They claim that "the municipal Defendants (collectively and individually) were negligent in training, hiring and supervising its officers and agents, employees and representatives in carrying out searches and arrests, thereby resulting in a denial of Plaintiffs' constitutional rights under the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 4. The Court finds that the Complaint fails to state a claim in this regard.

"A municipality's culpability for a deprivation of rights is at its most tenuous where a claim turns on a failure to train." Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1359, 179 L. Ed. 2d 417 (2011). Only where a plaintiff can demonstrate that a municipality's failure to train "amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of those with whom municipal employees will come into contact" will a policy or custom actionable under Section 1983 be established. Morayv. City of Yonkers, 924 F. Supp. 8, 12 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); see also Connick, 563 U.S. at 61-62, 131 S.Ct. 1350; City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 1204, 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989).

While plaintiffs need not prove their allegations at the pleading stage, a complaint will only survive a motion to dismiss if it "contain[s] specific factual allegations tending to support the inference that the municipality failed to train its employees." Aguilera v. Cty. of Nassau, 425 F. Supp. 2d 320, 324 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (Spatt, J.). Generally, allegations of a single, isolated incident of police misconduct will not suffice. See City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 387, 109 S.Ct. 1197; Dwares v. City of N.Y., 985 F.2d 94, 100 (2d Cir.1993) ("[A] single incident alleged in a complaint, especially if it involved only actors below the policymaking level, generally will not suffice to raise an inference of the...