Bogle v. JD Technologies, Inc., 2:21-CV-00319-MJH
| Decision Date | 16 July 2021 |
| Docket Number | 2:21-CV-00319-MJH |
| Parties | ROBERT BOGLE, Plaintiff, v. JD TECHNOLOGIES, INC., RADIATOR SPECIALTY COMPANY, INC., Defendants, |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania |
Plaintiff Robert Bogle, brings claims for Strict Liability under 402A Breach of Express Warranties, Breach of Implied Warranty of Merchantability, Breach of Implied Warranty of Fitness for a Particular Purpose, and Unfair Trade Practices alleging that he was injured by Defendants' product. (ECF No. 1). Defendants moved to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(2) and 12(b)(6). (ECF Nos. 8 and 11). The matter is now ripe for consideration.
Upon consideration of Mr. Bogle's Complaint (ECF No. 1) Defendants' Motions to Dismiss (ECF No. 8 and 11), the respective briefs and responses of the parties (ECF Nos. 9, 12, 24-26 and 29-30), and for the following reasons, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(2) will be denied, and Defendants' Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) will be granted. Mr. Bogle will be granted leave to amend.
I.Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(2)
Mr. Bogle filed the instant action arising from injuries he allegedly sustained from a rubber strap designed, manufactured, assembled, sold, and distributed by Defendants, JD Technologies Inc. and Radiator Specialty Company, Inc (RSC). (ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 4, 9). JDS is a corporation with a principal place of business in Oneida, Tennessee. Id. at ¶ 3. RSC is a corporation with a principal place of business in Indian Trail, North Carolina. Id. at ¶ 8. Mr. Bogle avers that both JDS and RSC have engaged in continuous and systematic business within Pennsylvania and with sufficient “contacts” within Pennsylvania to confer jurisdiction. Id. at ¶¶ 5, 10. He also alleges that Pennsylvania has jurisdiction over JDS and RSC because they sold and distributed and/or placed their product, the “Hold-Zit” strap, to the general public and into the chain of commerce in Pennsylvania. Id. at ¶¶ 6, 11.
In a declaration submitted by RSC, it asserts that it is a company organized and existing under the laws of the State of North Carolina and with its principal place of business in North Carolina. (ECF No. 9-1 at ¶¶ 4-5). Similarly, JDS submitted a declaration where it asserts that it is a company organized and existing under the laws of the State of Tennessee and with its principal place of business in Tennessee. (ECF No. 12 at p. 21, ¶¶ 4-5). From Both RSC and JDS's inspection of provided photographs, they assert that the subject strap was manufactured by JDS Technologies in the State of Tennessee and shipped to RSC in North Carolina. (ECF Nos. 9-1 at Id. at ¶ 6 and 12 at p. 21, ¶6). RSC and JDS also maintain that the Complaint does not include information on how the subject strap reached Pennsylvania or how, where, or when Mr. Bogle came to possess the strap. (ECF Nos. 9-1 at Id. at ¶ 7 and 12 at p. 22, ¶9). In their declarations, RSC and JDS deny that they are registered to do business in Pennsylvania or that they maintain a registered office in Pennsylvania. (ECF Nos. 9-1 at Id. at ¶¶ 8-9 and 12 at p. 22, ¶¶ 8-9 (misnumbered)). RSC and JDS also assert that they do not own, lease, rent, possess, operate, or otherwise have an interest in any real property within Pennsylvania, nor do they maintain any inventory or equipment in Pennsylvania. (ECF Nos. 9-1 at Id. at ¶10 and 12 at p. 22, ¶10 (misnumbered)). RSC and JDS maintain they do not have any employees, do not maintain any corporate records, and do not have any offices, warehouses, or plants located in Pennsylvania. (ECF Nos. 9-1 at Id. at ¶¶ 11-13 and 12 at p. 22, ¶¶ 11-13 (misnumbered)).
Mr. Bogle has submitted documents that, contrary to both JDS and RSC's declaration, they are both registered as foreign businesses in Pennsylvania . (ECF Nos. 24-6 and 24-7). In response, RSC concedes that its prior representation regarding registration in Pennsylvania was in error. (ECF No. 25 at p. 2). In its response, JDS did not dispute Mr. Bogle's submissions that it was also registered to do business in Pennsylvania. (ECF No. 26).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) permits a party to move for dismissal of a pleading for lack of personal jurisdiction. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(2). Whether personal jurisdiction may be exercised over an out-of-state defendant is a question of law for the court. Vetrotex Certainteed Corp. v. Consolidated Fiber Glass Products Co., 75 F.3d 147, 150 (3d Cir. 1996). The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing personal jurisdiction. O'Connor v. Sandy Lane Hotel Co., Ltd., 496 F.3d 312, 316 (3d Cir. 2007). A federal court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant to the extent permissible under the law of the forum state. Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(k)(1)(A). Personal jurisdiction may be either general or specific, and both the quality and quantity of the necessary contacts differs according to which sort of jurisdiction applies. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 412, 104 S.Ct. 1868, 80 L.Ed.2d 404 (1984).
RSC and JDS argue that they are not subject to general jurisdiction because neither are headquartered or incorporated in Pennsylvania. RSC, and JDS by joinder, contends that, despite its business registration in Pennsylvania, the exercise of general-jurisdiction-by-corporate-registration is unconstitutional. Mr. Bogle maintains that prevailing case law holds that a foreign jurisdiction consents to jurisdiction when it registers its business under Pennsylvania's corporate registration statute.
General jurisdiction may be asserted over a defendant even when the cause of action has no relation to the defendant's contacts with the forum if the defendant's “ ‘affiliations with the [s]tate are so ‘continuous and systematic' as to render them essentially at home in the forum [s]tate.' ” Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 128 (2014) (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 920 (2011)).
Under Pennsylvania's jurisdictional statute, consent may also serve as a basis for jurisdiction:
42 Pa.C.S. § 5301(a)(2). Since 1991, the Third Circuit has held that business registration under § 5301 was a sufficient basis for Pennsylvania courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over a company. Bane v. Netlink, Inc., 925 F.2d 637, 641 (3d Cir. 1991). In its analysis, Bane noted that “[c]onsent is a traditional basis for assertion of jurisdiction long upheld as constitutional.” Id. Defendants contend that Pennsylvania's jurisdictional statute violates its Due Process rights by expanding the scope of “general personal jurisdiction” beyond the holdings of Daimler. Defendants also argue that Bane is no longer good law given the pronouncements in Daimler.
A majority of district courts within the Third Circuit who have considered the constitutionality of the consent-by-registration statute have held that it validly confers general personal jurisdiction upon defendants.[1] As one such court observed, despite Daimler's holding, the Supreme Court “did not address ‘the interplay between consent to jurisdiction and the due process limits of general jurisdiction.' ” Kraus v. Alcatel-Lucent, 441 F.Supp.3d 68, 75 (E.D. Pa. 2020) (quoting Plumbers' Local Union No. 690 Health Plan v. Apotex Corp., Civ. A. No. 16-665, 2017 WL 3129147, at *11 (E.D. Pa. Jul. 24, 2017)). And just a few years prior to Daimler, The Supreme Court indicated that J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 880 (2011).
Despite Defendants' contentions that Supreme Court jurisprudence has evolved on personal jurisdiction and other jurisdictions have struck consent-by-registration statutes, Bane still controls. Unless and until either the Third Circuit, United States Supreme Court, or the Pennsylvania Supreme Court[2] holds to contrary, this Court will not depart from Bane's holding. Here, the submissions by the parties do not dispute that both JDS and RSC registered as foreign businesses pursuant to Pennsylvania's registration statute. Therefore, because Pennsylvania's foreign business consent statute is enforceable under Bane, the Court may maintain general jurisdiction over both Defendants. Because the general jurisdiction analysis is dispositive, the Court need not undertake a specific jurisdiction analysis.
Accordingly, Defendants' Motions to Dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(2), for lack of personal jurisdiction, will be denied.
II. Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6)
Mr Bogle alleges that he “came into possession” and used one of Defendants' “Hold-Zit” straps. (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 16). On March 22, 2019, Mr. Bogle alleges he suffered injuries while using the Hold-Zit strap when it unexpectedly failed and broke. Id. at ¶ 17. Mr. Bogle avers that Defendants expressly warranted and guaranteed the Hold-Zit...
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