Bohannan v. Griffin
| Decision Date | 30 June 2016 |
| Docket Number | NO. 4:11-CV-299-A,4:11-CV-299-A |
| Parties | MICHAEL BOHANNAN Plaintiff, v. WESLEY GRIFFIN, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas |
On December 3, 2015, the court sua sponte created a motion for summary judgment by an order that set forth the grounds of the motion and explained pertinent summary judgment principles and legal principles applicable to grounds of the motion. Doc. 249 at 4-13.1 The court gave each party until 2:00 p.m. on January 19, 2016, to file a response to the summary judgment grounds.
Since December 3, 2015, two extensions of time for a response have been ordered, the first extending the deadline to March 2, 2016, and the second extending the deadline to May 27, 2016. Docs. 262 & 325 at 3. Defendant, Wesley Griffin, ("Griffin") filed his responsive summary judgment documents on May 25, 2016.2 Docs. 346, 347, 348. Bohannan did not file a responsive document of any kind by the May 27, 2016 deadline, and has not sought to file one since then. By order issued May 25, 2016, the court gave Bohannan a deadline of June 27, 2016, for the filing of a reply to the summary judgment documents filed by Griffin on May 25, 2016. The court has not received anything from Bohannan that would constitute such a reply.
The live pleading of plaintiff, Michael Bohannan, ("Bohannan") is the document he filed August 7, 2014, titled "Plaintiff's Refiled Third Amended Complaint." Doc. 115. He alleged that all his claims are based on events that occurred while he was at the Fort Worth Community Correctional Facility ("FWCCF") in early 2009 pursuant to a civil commitment order. Id. at 3, ¶ 5. The record discloses that he was under supervision of a State of Texas agency known as the Council on Sex Offender Treatment ("CSOT")3 at that facility during the first three months of the year 2009 pursuant to a sexually violent predator adjudication against him in January 2009, when he was civilly committed as a sexually violent predator under the authority of chapter 841 of the Texas Health & Safety Code.4 Griffin was employed by CSOT as Bohannan's case manager at the FWCCF.
Bohannan's alleged causes of action against Griffin, individually,5 are that:
First Claim:
Griffin unreasonably interfered with his freedoms of speech, association, and religion, Doc. 115 at 6-9, ¶¶ 12-30;
Second Claim:
Griffin was deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs, id. at 9-12, ¶¶ 31-43, 46;
Third Claim:
Griffin retaliated against him, and maliciously prosecuted him, because of his use of CSOT grievance process and his exercise of his right of access to the courts, id. at 12-21, ¶¶ 47-58, 61-63, 80, 85-108;
Fourth Claim:
Griffin infringed on his Fifth Amendment rights by requiring him to self-report any of his rules violations to Griffin and the treatment provider and to undergo regular polygraph examinations, id. at 21-24, ¶¶ 116-131;
Fifth Claim:
By seizing his legal papers, and causing them to become disorganized, Griffin violated Bohannan's access-to-court rights, id. at 24-27, ¶¶ 141-157; Sixth Claim:
Griffin committed the state law torts of false arrest and/or false imprisonment against Bohannan, id. at 28, ¶ 183; and
Seventh Claim:
Griffin committed the state law tort of malicious prosecution against Bohannan, id. at 29, ¶¶ 184-85.
The First through Fifth Claims are alleged violations of Bohannan's rights under the United States Constitution that were brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1983, and the Sixth and Seventh are state law claims over which the court has supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
The court has concluded for the reasons given below that Griffin is entitled to summary judgment as to each of Bohannan's claims and that judgment should be granted denying Bohannan any relief from Griffin.
The grounds of the motion for summary judgment are as follows:
See Doc. 249 at 11-13.
Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the court shall grant summary judgment on a claim or defense if there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986). The movant bears the initial burden of pointing out to the court that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 325 (1986). The movant can discharge this burden by pointing out the absence of evidence supporting one or more essential elements of the nonmoving party's claim, "since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Id. at 323.
Once the movant has carried its burden under Rule 56(a), the nonmoving party must identify evidence in the record that creates a genuine dispute as to each of the challenged elements of its case. Id. at 324; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) (). If the evidence identified could not lead a rational trier of fact to find in favor of the nonmoving party as to each essential element of the nonmoving party's case, there is no genuine dispute for trial and summary judgment is appropriate. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 597 (1986). In Mississippi Prot. & Advocacy Sys. v. Cotten, the Fifth Circuit explained:
Where the record, including affidavits, interrogatories, admissions, and depositions could not, as a whole, lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no issue for trial.
929 F.2d 1054, 1058 (5th Cir. 1991).
The standard for granting a motion for summary judgment is the same as the standard for rendering judgment as a matter of law.6 Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323. If the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue for trial. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 597; see also Mississippi Prot. & Advocacy Sys., 929 F.2d at 1058.
The qualified immunity defense has potential applicability to the First through Fifth Claims. That defense embraces the factors of whether Griffin engaged in the conduct about which Bohannan complains, whether by doing so Griffin violated Bohannan's constitutional rights, and whether the constitutional rights allegedly violated were clearly established at the time.
Griffin, as an employee or official of an agency of the State of Texas performing discretionary functions, is entitled to assert the qualified immunity defense as to plaintiff's § 1983 claims. In Fraire v. City of Arlington, the Fifth Circuit explained the qualified immunity defense:
Substantively, qualified immunity shields government officials performing discretionary functions from civil damages liability as long as their actions could reasonably have been thought consistent with the rights they are alleged to have violated. Whether a defendant asserting qualified immunity may be personally liable turns on the objective legal reasonableness of the defendant's actions assessed in light of clearly established law. The Supreme Court...
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