Bohannon v. United States, CRIMINAL INDICTMENT NO. 1:14-CR-0130-TWT-JFK-1
| Decision Date | 18 October 2017 |
| Docket Number | CRIMINAL INDICTMENT NO. 1:14-CR-0130-TWT-JFK-1,CIVIL FILE NO. 1:17-CV-1473-TWT-JFK |
| Parties | RASHON BOHANNON, Movant, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia |
Movant has filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate, set aside, or correct her federal sentence entered in this Court under the above criminal docket number. The matter is before the Court on the motion to vacate and supplemental memorandum [263, 265], Respondent's response [267], and Movant's addendum and first and second amended memoranda, [268, 269, 270], construed as motions to amend. For the reasons discussed below, Movant's motion to vacate and a certificate of appealability (COA) are due to be denied. Movant's construed motions to amend shall be granted in part and denied in part.
The grand jury for the Northern District of Georgia indicted Movant for bank fraud conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1344 and 1349, count one, and for bank fraud, counts two through eleven. (Indictment, ECF No. 1). Movant, represented by Thomas C. Wooldridge, pleaded guilty to count one, bank fraud conspiracy. (Guilty Plea and Plea Agreement, ECF No. 166-1). By judgment entered on April 19, 2016, the Court imposed a seventy-two month term of imprisonment. (J., ECF No. 242). The record does not show that Movant appealed, and on April 24, 2017, Movant filed her motion to vacate. (Mot. to Vacate and Grounds in Support, ECF No. 263).
Movant raises twenty grounds for relief in her motion to vacate and grounds in support, (id.), and in her supplemental memorandum, (Suppl. Mem., ECF No. 265), and raises three matters in her construed motions to amend, see infra IV. A. and C., that relate back to grounds one, nine, and eleven. Movant's twenty grounds for relief are as follows:
(1) Movant's conviction was obtained by a coerced confession. (Mot. to Vacate at 4 and Grounds in Support at 1). Movant states that Wooldridge could not form a proper defense, lacked knowledge of cases dealing with bank fraud, and improperly advised her to plead guilty such that his performance coerced Movant into pleading guilty. (Addendum, Mem. in Reply at 2-3, ECF No. 268).
(2) Movant's conviction was obtained by an unconstitutional search and seizure of items and information from Movant's home and business based on a warrant that lacked probable cause. (Mot. to Vacate at 5 and Grounds in Support at 1).
(3) Movant was denied effective assistance of counsel. (Mot. to Vacate at 7 and Grounds in Support at 1).
(4) Movant's conviction was obtained based on "wrong legal status[.]" Movant's "status must be corrected from LEGAL Person to NATURAL Person." (Grounds in Support at 2).
(5) Movant's conviction was obtained by the action of an unconstitutional grand or petit jury, who were provided corrupt information. (Id.).
(6) Movant's conviction was obtained by violation of her right against self incrimination. (Mot. to Vacate at 8, Grounds in Support at 2).
(7) Movant was unconstitutionally denied bail. (Grounds in Support at 2).
(8) Movant's conviction was obtained by denial of a trial by jury as required by due process. (Grounds in Support at 3).
(9) Movant's conviction was obtained by an ex post facto law. (Id.). Movant alleges that any action against her under 18 U.S.C. § 1344 - which she asserts was enacted on January 3, 2012 - violated the ex post facto clause. (Second Am. Mem., ECF No. 270).
(10) Movant's conviction was obtained in a court that operated in excess of common-law, equity, or admiralty/maritime jurisdiction. (Grounds in Support at 3).
(11) Movant's conviction was obtained by a court without authority to adjudicate Movant's case. (Grounds in Support at 4). The Court is without jurisdiction as Movant is a Moorish American. (Addendum at 1).
(12) Movant's conviction was obtained by a court without proper venue over the parties. (Id.).
(13) Movant's conviction was obtained by requiring her to waive certain inalienable rights. (Id.).
(14) Movant's conviction was obtained by a guilty plea that was unlawfully induced and involuntary "due to not understanding the nature of the charge which was defined by a statute." (Grounds in Support at 5).1
(15) Movant was denied her right to appeal because counsel failed to file a timely Notice of Appeal. (Id.).
(16) Movant's conviction was obtained in violation of double jeopardy in that Movant had previously rectified the same matter with the State of Georgia. (Id.).
(17) Movant's conviction was obtained by an accuser who is a corporate fiction. (Grounds in Support at 6).
(18) Movant is being unlawfully held in violation of the Constitution. (Id.).
(19) Movant has an inalienable right to the writ of habeas corpus. (Id.).
(20) Movant's conviction was obtained in violation of due process in that the statute defining her offense is void for vagueness. (Suppl. Mem.).
Respondent argues that Movant's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel fail as conclusory and that her non-ineffectiveness claims are defeated by her knowing and voluntary appeal waiver and are barred by procedural default. (Resp't Resp. at 1, 7-17, ECF No. 267).
Section 2255 of Title 28 allows a district court to vacate, set aside, or correct a federal sentence that was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States or was imposed by a court without jurisdiction, exceeds the maximum sentence authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack. 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Collateral relief, however, is limited. "Once [a] defendant's chance to appeal has been waived or exhausted, . . . we are entitled to presume he stands fairly and finally convicted," United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 164 (1982), and it is the movant's burden to establish his right to collateral relief, Rivers v. United States, 777 F.3d 1306, 1316 (11th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct. 267 (2015).
Section 2255 relief "is reserved for transgressions of constitutional rights and for that narrow compass of other injury that could not have been raised in direct appeal and would, if condoned, result in a complete miscarriage of justice." Lynn v. United States, 365 F.3d 1225, 1232 (11th Cir. 2004) (quoting Richards v. United States, 837 F.2d 965, 966 (11th Cir. 1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 505-09 (2003) ().
"The district court is not required to grant a petitioner an evidentiary hearing if the § 2255 motion 'and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief.'" Rosin v. United States, 786 F.3d 873, 877 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct. 429 (2015) (quoting § 2255(b)). That is the case here, as shown in the discussion below.
Movant pleaded guilty to Count One, bank fraud conspiracy, and agreed that she was giving up the right to be tried by a jury, to confront and cross-examine witnesses against her, to present evidence and subpoena witnesses to testify on her behalf, and to pursue any affirmative defenses and pre-trial motions that could have been filed. (Guilty Plea and Plea Agreement at 1-3). The government agreed that all remaining counts (counts two through eleven) against Movant would be dismissed and that it would bring no further criminal charges against Movant related to the charge to which she was pleading guilty. (Id. at 4-5). The government agreed to recommend that Movant receive an acceptance-of-responsibility adjustment (unless contradicted by Movant's conduct), that Movant receive a one-level downward variance and anadditional ten-month downward variance, and that Movant be sentenced at the low end of the adjusted guideline range. (Id. at 6-7, 11-12). Movant agreed that she voluntarily and expressly waived the right to appeal or collaterally attack her conviction and sentence, with the exception of ineffective assistance of counsel claims and other exceptions that do not apply here. (Id. at 17).
During her plea hearing, Movant took an oath that she would testify truthfully, and the Court explained to Movant the rights that she was giving up by pleading guilty, including the right to a jury trial with the assistance of counsel, to have the government prove her guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, to subpoena witnesses to testify on her behalf, to cross-examine witnesses against her and object to evidence against her, and the right to testify or not to testify. (Plea Hr'g Tr. at 3, 5-7, ECF No. 259). Movant, under oath, stated that she understood and that she was willing to waive all of these rights. (Id. at 7). The government stated that Movant was pleading guilty to count one and reviewed the plea agreement in detail, including the appeal waiver. (Id. at 7-12). Movant confirmed that the government had accurately reviewed the agreement. (Id. at 12).
The Court asked Movant if anyone had forced or threatened her to plead guilty, and Movant stated, "No." (Id.). The Court asked Movant if anyone had told her thatif she did not plead guilty further charges would be brought or some other adverse action would be taken, and Movant stated, "No." (Id.). The Court asked Movant whether anyone had advised her not to tell the complete truth before the Court, and Movant stated, "No." (Id. at 13). The Court then asked Movant whether she had received...
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