Bohler v. City of Fairview, Case No. 3:17-cv-1373
| Decision Date | 05 November 2018 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 3:17-cv-1373 |
| Parties | DAVID PAUL BOHLER, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF FAIRVIEW, TENNESSEE, PATRICK H. STOCKDALE, TIMOTHY SHANE DUNNING, JOSEPH COX, RONNIE SCOTT COLLINS, PATTI CARROLL, TONEY SUTTON, SHANNON CRUTCHER, STUART JOHNSON, TERRY HARRIS, SCOTT SMITH, TERRY AMONETTE, ROY RUSSELL, ZACH HUMPHREYS, and BRANDY JOHNSON, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Tennessee |
DAVID PAUL BOHLER, Plaintiff,
v.
CITY OF FAIRVIEW, TENNESSEE, PATRICK H. STOCKDALE, TIMOTHY SHANE DUNNING,
JOSEPH COX, RONNIE SCOTT COLLINS, PATTI CARROLL, TONEY SUTTON,
SHANNON CRUTCHER, STUART JOHNSON, TERRY HARRIS, SCOTT SMITH,
TERRY AMONETTE, ROY RUSSELL, ZACH HUMPHREYS, and BRANDY JOHNSON, Defendants.
Case No. 3:17-cv-1373
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE NASHVILLE DIVISION
November 5, 2018
Judge Aleta A. Trauger
MEMORANDUM
David Paul Bohler has filed a Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment (Docket No. 119), to which Responses have been filed by Terry Amonette (Docket No. 123), Joseph Cox, Timothy Shane Dunning, and Patrick H. Stockdale (Docket No. 124), the City of Fairview (Docket No. 125), and Patti Carroll, Shannon Crutcher, Stuart Johnson, and Toney Sutton (Docket No. 127), and Bohler has filed a Reply (Docket No. 131). For the reasons set out herein, Bohler's motion will be granted in part and denied in part.
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Bohler is a former detective with the Fairview Police Department ("FPD") in Fairview, Tennessee, a small city in Williamson County. (Docket No. 1 ¶¶ 1-2.) On November 28, 2016, Bohler filed a Complaint in Williamson County Circuit Court against Stockdale, Dunning, Cox, and the City of Fairview, pleading claims for defamation and violations of the Tennessee Public Protection Act ("TPPA") related to the events leading up to Bohler's departure from the FPD in October 2016. (Docket No. 35-1.) On July 19, 2017, he notified the Circuit Court of his intent to voluntarily dismiss the state-court action, and an order to that effect was entered on August 4, 2017. (Docket No. 35-2.)
In a Declaration later filed with this court, Bohler's now-former, then-current attorney, Stephen E. Grauberger, explained that his "original intention was to file suit in federal court alleging, among other claims, a violation of Due Process" but that "preliminary research and evidence in hand led [him] to believe that [Bohler], as a Fairview police officer, did not have a property interest in his employment, which negated a required element of the Due Process claim." (Docket No 57-1 ¶ 3.) Believing that he lacked a federal claim or any other basis for federal jurisdiction, Bohler filed in state court. However, according to Bohler's attorney, "a subsequent filing in federal court by counsel for . . . Stockdale and Dunning," in their own, separate federal suit against the city, "revealed supporting evidence and a strong argument that Fairview police officers do in fact have a property interest in their jobs." (Id. ¶ 6.) Bohler and his counsel therefore agreed that they would drop the state lawsuit and file in federal court. (Id. ¶ 8.)
On October 15, 2017, Bohler filed his Complaint in this court. (Docket No. 1.) He asserted claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against several defendants, including many who were not included
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in his original state-court complaint. (Id.) He also asserted a number of state law claims. (Id.) In the months following Bohler's filing of his federal Complaint, a number of motions were filed: a Motion to Dismiss filed by Cox, Dunning, and Stockdale (Docket No. 32); a Motion to Dismiss filed by Roy Russell (Docket No. 36); a Motion to Dismiss filed by Terry Harris (Docket No. 64); a Motion to Dismiss and/or Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Amonette (Docket No. 74); a Motion to Dismiss Filed by Scott Smith (Docket No. 79); a Motion to Dismiss filed by Carroll, Crutcher, Johnson, and Sutton (Docket No. 89); a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings filed by Ronnie Scott Collins (Docket No. 92); a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings filed by the City of Fairview (Docket No. 95); a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings filed by Harris (Docket No. 107); and a Motion for Costs from Previous Action filed by Cox, Dunning, and Stockdale (Docket No. 34). On June 19, 2018, the court entered a Memorandum and Order granting the various dispositive motions and denying the motion for costs. (Docket Nos. 115-16.) Specifically, the court held that Bohler's claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 were untimely and dismissed the claims against the defendants who had raised the statute of limitations in their motions; dismissed the § 1983 claims against Russell on the merits; granted summary judgment to Amonette; and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Bohler's state law claims.
On July 18, 2018, Bohler—now represented by new counsel—filed a Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment, arguing that the court erred by dismissing the claims against some of the defendants as untimely. (Docket No. 119.) He further argues that the court should reconsider its decision not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. He does not dispute the court's rulings on the federal claims against Scott Collins, Terry Amonette, Roy Russell, or Scott Smith. (Id. at 2 n.1.)
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Under Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a court may alter or amend a judgment based on: (1) a clear error of law; (2) newly discovered evidence; (3) an intervening change in controlling law; or (4) a need to prevent manifest injustice. Leisure Caviar, LLC v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 616 F.3d 612, 615 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing Intera Corp. v. Henderson, 428 F.3d 605, 620 (6th Cir. 2005)). A motion under Rule 59(e) is not, however, a vehicle for presenting new legal arguments that could have been raised before a judgment was issued. Roger Miller Music, Inc. v. Sony/ATV Publ'g, LLC, 477 F.3d 383, 395 (6th Cir. 2007); Leisure Caviar, 616 F.3d at 616 (noting movant "cannot use a Rule 59 motion to raise arguments which could, and should, have been made before judgment issued" (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). In the Sixth Circuit, "[t]he grant or denial of a Rule 59(e) motion is within the informed discretion of the district court, reversible only for abuse." Betts v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 558 F.3d 461, 467 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Scotts Co. v. Central Garden & Pet Co., 403 F.3d 781, 788 (6th Cir. 2005)).
In its original Memorandum and Order, the court resolved the federal claims raised by Bohler and declined to exercise jurisdiction over the state law claims. Accordingly, the court will first consider whether Bohler is entitled to resurrect some or all of his federal claims under Rule 59(e) and will then turn, if necessary, to the state law claims.
A. Claims against the City of Fairview
Bohler argues first that the court should not have dismissed his claim against the City of Fairview as untimely because his cause of action against the City was timely under Tennessee's savings statute, Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-1-105. Bohler concedes that he did not originally make this
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argument in response to the City's motion but argues that he should nevertheless be allowed to raise it now, because failing to apply the savings statute would amount to a clear error of law and a manifest injustice. The City responds that Bohler's failure to raise the savings statute amounts to a waiver and that Rule 59(e) does not provide an avenue for him to put forth a new argument that he failed to raise at the appropriate time. The City argues next that, even if the savings statute argument is properly before the court, the argument fails, because the savings statute does not apply to Bohler's § 1983 claim.
Generally speaking, "Rule 59(e) motions are aimed at reconsideration, not initial consideration," and therefore are not considered an appropriate avenue for raising an issue for the first time. Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians v. Engler, 146 F.3d 367, 374 (6th Cir. 1998) (quoting FDIC v. World Univ. Inc., 978 F.2d 10, 16 (1st Cir. 1992)). Bohler can hardly be said to have lacked the opportunity to consider the full range of possible responses to the argument that his § 1983 claims were untimely. To the contrary, the statute of limitations was raised multiple times by multiple parties. (See, e.g., Docket No. 79-1 at 4-5; Docket No. 90 at 8-10; Docket No. 93 at 7-8; Docket No. 96 at 7-8; Docket No. 108 at 6-7). Specifically, the argument that Bohler's claims were barred by the one-year statute of limitations was raised at least as early as Scott Smith's Amended Answer on December 20, 2017. (Docket No. 59 at 9.) The City indicated that it wished to raise the defense itself in its February 8, 2018 Motion to Amend Answer (Docket No. 77 at 1), which was granted—unopposed—on March 1, 2018 (Docket No. 86 at 1; see Docket No. 88 ¶ 212). The City indicated that it intended to rely on the statute of limitations as a basis for judgment on the pleadings a week later. (Docket No. 96 at 7.) In his Response to the City's motion, Bohler made no mention of the savings statute and, indeed, made no attempt at all to defend the timeliness of any § 1983 claim accruing as of the date of his resignation notice. Instead, he merely
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argued for slightly later dates of accrual. (Docket No. 101 at 2-4.) Those arguments failed as a defense to the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, and Bohler does not argue, in his Motion to Alter or Amend, that the court erred—clearly or otherwise—in its determination of the initial date of accrual.
The court filed its Memorandum and Order resolving the various pending motions on June 19, 2018. (Docket Nos. 115 & 116.) Bohler, by that point, had had months during which he could have sought to file supplemental briefing if he realized he had failed to raise an important issue. Moreover, it was Bohler's own counsel, with Bohler's consent, who made the wholly voluntary, strategic decision to dismiss Bohler's state-court claims in the first place. Bohler and his counsel could have, at the time, made sure that they knew what they would need to do and argue in order to establish that his federal-court claims would be considered timely. Allowing Bohler to raise the savings statute now, after so many failed opportunities to...
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