Bohles v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am.

• Decision Date: 03 March 1913
• Citation: 84 N.J.L. 315,86 A. 438
• Parties: BOHLES v. PRUDENTIAL INS. CO. OF AMERICA.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

86 A. 438

84 N.J.L. 315

BOHLES

v. PRUDENTIAL INS. CO. OF AMERICA.

Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey.

March 3, 1913.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Appeal from Supreme Court.

Action by Anna Bohles against the Prudential Insurance Company of America. From a judgment of the Supreme Court reversing a judgment of the circuit court for defendant (83 Atl. 904), defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Edward D. Duffield, of Newark, for appellant.

Samuel Kalisch, Jr., and Samuel Press, both of Newark, for appellee.

TRENCHARD, J. This is an appeal pursuant to "the Practice Act of 1912" (P. L. 1912, p. 377) from a judgment of the Supreme Court reversing a judgment of nonsuit in an action at law in the Essex circuit on a policy of life insurance. The policy was issued by the defendant company December 30, 1902 on the life of the husband of the plaintiff, the beneficiary. The defense was that the policy lapsed for nonpayment of the premiums. The premiums were payable "quarter annually." A quarterly premium became due June 30, 1904. The policy provided that "a grace of one month will be allowed, during which time the policy will remain in force." The learned trial judge granted the nonsuit upon the theory that it conclusively appeared from the evidence that the premium due June 30, 1904, had not been paid within the grace period of one month allowed by the policy contract. We are of the opinion that the Supreme Court properly held that such nonsuit was erroneous.

The word "month," as there used, means a calendar month. 38 Cyc. 312. Since the premium was due June 30th, the month of July was the period of grace to which the insured was entitled. The last day of grace therefore was July 31st. That day was Sunday. The company afforded no opportunity to pay on that day, and the insured was therefore entitled to pay the premium on the first day thereafter upon which business could be lawfully transacted, which was Monday, August 1st.

So to hold is to put this case in accord with the great weight of authority (Serrell v. Rothstein, 49 N. J. Eq. 385, 24 Atl. 369), and is consistent with the well-settled rule that, so far as fair construction of the language used will permit, the conditions and provisions of a policy with reference to forfeiture should be strictly construed in favor of the insured and against the company (State Insurance Co. v. Maackens, 38 N. J. Law, 564).

The defendant insists that, while a month means a calendar month, it runs from the day in one month to the corresponding day in the ensuing month, and refers to cases of promissory notes and the like. That contention ignores this plain distinction: Where a note or obligation is due one month from date, the computation is necessarily made by counting the day of the date, and that, of course, makes the month end on the corresponding day of the ensuing month. But where the provision is, as here, that a grace of one month will be allowed, the month starts with the day following that on which the premium became due. Any other construction would give less than a month's grace. Now the evidence in the present case would have justified the jury in finding that the premium due June 30, 1904, was paid to the company on Monday, August 1,...