Bohn v. Dakota County

• Decision Date: 11 September 1985
• Docket Number: No. 84-5100,84-5100
• Citation: 772 F.2d 1433
• Parties: Wayne Louis BOHN and Sharon Anne Bohn, Individually and as Natural Guardians and Guardians Ad Litem, Bradley L. Bohn, a Minor, and Wayne Arthur Bohn, Appellants, v. COUNTY OF DAKOTA: Shirley L. Utzinger, Director of Social Services, Dakota County Human Services Department; Beth Welshons, Worker, Child Protection Assessment Unit; Anthony A. Bibus, Supervisor, Child Protection Assessment Unit; Kenneth E. Malvey, Assistant County Attorney; Robert F. Carolan, County Attorney; Dakota County Human Services Board; John S. Voss, Chairman, Joseph A. Harris, Gerald E. Hollenkamp, Steven Loeding and Russell L. Streefland, Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Page 1433

772 F.2d 1433

Wayne Louis BOHN and Sharon Anne Bohn, Individually and as Natural Guardians and Guardians Ad Litem, Bradley L. Bohn, a Minor, and Wayne Arthur Bohn Appellants, v. COUNTY OF DAKOTA: Shirley L. Utzinger, Director of Social Services, Dakota County Human Services Department; Beth Welshons, Worker, Child Protection Assessment Unit; Anthony A. Bibus, Supervisor, Child Protection Assessment Unit Kenneth E. Malvey, Assistant County Attorney; Robert F Carolan, County Attorney; Dakota County Human Services Board; John S. Voss, Chairman, Joseph A. Harris, Gerald E Hollenkamp, Steven Loeding and Russell L. Streefland, Appellees.

No. 84-5100.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted May 15, 1985.

Decided Sept. 11, 1985.

Dale C. Nathan, Eagan, Minn., for appellants.

Douglas J. Muirhead, Minneapolis, Minn., for appellees.

Before HEANEY, Circuit Judge, FLOYD R. GIBSON, Senior Circuit Judge, and McMILLIAN, Circuit Judge.

HEANEY, Circuit Judge.

Wayne and Sharon Bohn appeal from the district court's dismissal of their suit against Dakota County under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 for failure to state a claim. For reversal, the Bohns argue, first, that the County denied them due process by failing to provide them with notice of a finding of child abuse, statement of the basis for that finding, and notice of their right to appeal; ¹ and, second, that deficient administrative procedures for contesting or appealing a finding of child abuse violate the fourteenth amendment. ² We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND.

On May 31, 1982, Wayne Bohn forcibly interceded to break up a fight between his two sons, one of whom then ran to a neighbor's house as a result. The incident prompted an investigation by the Dakota County Department of Social Services, which concluded that there was "substantial evidence" of child abuse by the Bohns. Although the Bohns disputed this conclusion, ³ the Department assigned a child protection worker to the case, pursuant to statute, and the social worker met with the Bohns and their children repeatedly in an attempt to remedy the presumed problems stemming from the alleged child abuse.

The Bohns attempted to clear the record of these charges, but their efforts were generally ineffective. Initially, they complained to the County Department of Social Services and explained that they wished to contribute their side of the story to the decision-making process, but the Department refused and stated that the investigation was complete. Thereafter, through counsel, the Bohns sought to correct the record through a variety of means, including a juvenile court action, an appeal to the State Department of Public Welfare, appeals of the juvenile action to the Dakota County District Court and the Minnesota Supreme Court, and requests for action through the Dakota County Human Services Board, their county commissioner, and their state representative.

When these measures were unavailing, the Bohns filed this section 1983 action in federal court. After the complaint was amended and was before the district court on a motion to dismiss, appellants' counsel wrote to the Minnesota Office of Administrative Hearings to demonstrate that appellants had no right of direct appeal from the finding of child abuse. That office responded by citing the rules of the Commissioner of Administration which implement the state's administrative procedure act and govern appeals of contested cases. After finding that the Bohns were provided with a procedure to challenge the finding of child abuse, and finding that it satisfied constitutional standards of due process, the district court determined that the Bohns had not stated a claim on which relief could be granted; accordingly, the district court dismissed the complaint. The Bohns appeal, arguing the due process defects we have mentioned above.

II. DUE PROCESS AND THE FINDING OF CHILD ABUSE.

The procedural protections guaranteed in the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the Constitution are triggered by the existence of a protectible liberty or property interest. Thus, the process that is due depends upon the nature of the interest at stake. In considering such questions, therefore, we engage in a two-step analysis by which we search for a protectible interest and, when one is apparent, examine the established procedures to determine whether they satisfy constitutional standards.

The privacy and autonomy of familial relationships involved in a case like this are unarguably among the protectible interests which due process protects. We can conceive of no more important relationship, no more basic bond in American society, than the tie between parent and child. In Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972), the Supreme Court stated that the interest of a widower "in the children he has sired and raised, undecidedly warrants deference and, absent a powerful countervailing interest, protection." Id. at 651, 92 S.Ct. at 1212. The Court continued:

the interest of a parent in the companionship, care, custody and management of his or her children "come[s] to this Court with a momentum for respect lacking when appeal is made to liberties which derive merely from shifting economic arrangements." Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 US 77, 95, 93 L Ed 513, 527, 69 S Ct 448 , 10 ALR2d 608 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).

The Court has frequently emphasized the importance of the family. The rights to conceive and to raise one's children have been deemed "essential," Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 US 390, 399, 67 L Ed 1042, 1045, 43 S Ct 625 , 29 ALR 1446 (1923), "basic civil rights of man," Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 US 535, 541, 86 L Ed 1655, 1660, 62 S Ct 1110 [1113] (1942), and "[r]ights far more precious ... than property rights," May v. Anderson, 345 US 528, 533, 97 L Ed 1221, 1226, 73 S Ct 840 (1953). "It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder." Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 US 158, 166, 88 L Ed 645, 652, 64 S Ct 438 (1944). The integrity of the family unit has found protection in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Meyer v. Nebraska, supra [262 U.S.], at 399 , 67 L Ed at 1045, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Skinner v. Oklahoma, supra [316 U.S.], at 541 , 86 L Ed at 1660, and the Ninth Amendment, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 US 479, 496, 14 L Ed 2d 510, 522, 85 S Ct 1678 [1688] (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).

Id.

In another case considering the protections due a foster family, the Supreme Court first considered the case of natural families, and concluded that "the liberty interest in family privacy has its source, and its contours are ordinarily to be sought, not in state law, but in intrinsic human rights, as they have been understood in 'this Nation's history and tradition.' Moore v. East Cleveland, ante [431 U.S. 494] at 503 , 52 L.Ed.2d 531 [ (1977) ]." Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 845, 97 S.Ct. 2094, 2110, 53 L.Ed.2d 14 (1977). ⁴

Having identified the protectible interests at stake, we next turn to the procedural protections that are due under Minn.Stat.Ann. Sec. 626.556. To assist the courts in evaluating the propriety of such procedures, the Supreme Court in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976), identified three factors:

First, the private interest that will be affected by the initial action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burden that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.

Id. at 335, 96 S.Ct. at 903.

Our review of the competing interests harmonized in Minn.Stat.Ann. Sec. 626.556, the procedural protections embodied in the statute, and the method for administrative reconsideration of the finding leads us to conclude that the Bohns received adequate procedural protection.

The statute of which the Bohns complain, Minn.Stat.Ann. Sec. 626.556, (entitled "Reporting of Maltreatment of Minors"), includes a declared public policy "to protect children whose health or welfare may be jeopardized through physical abuse, neglect, or sexual abuse; to strengthen the family and make the home safe for children through improvement of parental and guardian capacity for responsible child care; and to provide a safe temporary or permanent home environment for physically or sexually abused children." Minn.Stat.Ann. Sec. 626.556, subd. 1. The statute requires that certain specified professionals must report instances of suspected child abuse to local authorities, and that any other person having such knowledge may voluntarily make such a report. Id. at subd. 3. Local welfare officials are then obligated to "immediately investigate and offer protective social services for purposes of preventing further abuses, safeguarding and enhancing the welfare of the abused or neglected minor, and preserving family life whenever possible," as well as to maintain "appropriate records." Id. at subd. 10.

The records are maintained in accordance with Minn.Stat.Ann. Chapter 13 on Government Data Practices. The records maintained are private except insofar as they are disclosed to investigating, petitioning or prosecuting authorities. The subject of these records has access to these records, except that the reporter's name is disclosed only upon court order. Id. at subd. 11. Records relating to unsubstantiated reports are destroyed unless the subject requests otherwise; substantiated records are destroyed seven months after the final entry in the case, and cases that are neither substantiated nor unsubstantiated may be maintained for up to...