Boice's Estate, In re
Citation | 209 Or. 521,307 P.2d 324 |
Parties | , 64 A.L.R.2d 773 In the Matter of the ESTATE of Bert E. BOICE, Deceased. Leroy B. SKOUSEN, administrator c. t. a. of the estate of Bert E. Boice, deceased, Appellant, v. Edith R. Dahihammer ROELFS, Respondent. |
Decision Date | 21 February 1957 |
Court | Oregon Supreme Court |
B. G. Skulason and Leroy B. Skousen, Portland, for appellant.
S. J. Graham, Portland, for respondent. With him on the brief was Ben F. Forbes, Portland.
Before TOOZE, Acting C. J., and LUSK, BRAND and McALLISTER, JJ.
We are called upon to construe a paragraph of the will of Bert E. Boice, deceased, reading as follows:
The real property on the Rockwood road referred to above consisted of two contiguous tracts, designated in the record as tract No. 1 containing 15.54 acres, and tract No. 2 containing 8.9308 acres.
On April 4, 1926, Benjamin F. Dahlhammer was the owner of tract No. 1 and he and his wife, Pearlettie A. Dahlhammer, were the owners of tract No. 2 as tenants by the entirety. Benjamin F. Dahlhammer died intestate in Multnomah County on April 4, 1926, leaving surviving him as his only heirs at law his widow, Pearlettie A. Dahlhammer, his son George and his daughter Edith.
On June 15, 1927, the widow, Pearlettie A. Dahlhammer, married Bert E. Boice. After this marriage, the title to both tract No. 1 and tract No. 2 was transferred by various conveyances to Bert E. Boice and Pearlettie A. Boice as tenants by the entirety. Pearlettie A. Boice died on October 4, 1943, and thereafter Bert E. Boice claimed to be the owner of both tracts of the Rockwood road property as the surviving tenant by the entirety.
On August 12, 1949, when Bert E. Boice made his last will containing the paragraph quoted above, he apparently believed that he was the sole owner of the said real property and according to appellant's brief, in making the bequests of $2,000 each to George and Edith, he 'was giving to the stepchildren what he believed to be an amount fairly covering whatever interest they might have in the property, because formerly owned by their mother.'
On February 16, 1950, George Dahlhammer and his sister Edith Dahlhammer Roelfs filed a suit in the circuit court for Multnomah county against their stepfather, Bert E. Boice, to impress a trust in their favor upon both tracts of the Rockwood road property. The circuit court entered a decree on November 6, 1951, holding that George and Edith were the owners in fee of tract No. 1 but had no interest in tract No. 2. The case was appealed to this court which held that George had no interest in either tract but that Edith was the owner of an undivided one-half interest in tract No. 1. A more detailed narrative of the transactions concerning this property and the background of this litigation is contained in our opinion in Dahlhammer and Roelfs v. Schneider, 197 Or. 478, 252 P.2d 807.
Bert E. Boice died on November 13, 1952, while the above case was pending on appeal in this court and C. G. Schneider was appointed executor of his estate. Schneider died before the probate was completed and the appellant Leroy B. Skousen was appointed in his stead as administrator with the will annexed.
The executor paid the bequest of $2,000 to George Dahlhammer but filed his final account without paying the like bequest to Edith. Edith objected to the final account because her legacy had not been paid and after a hearing, the circuit court held the legacy valid and ordered that it be paid. From that order this appeal has been taken.
The appellant contends that the legacy to Edith 'is specific and payable only out of a sale of the real property and since the testator did not own the property at the time of his death, the legacy lapsed.'
Legacies are usually classified as general, specific or demonstrative. In re Preston's Estate, 157 Or. 631, 73 P.2d 369, 371, includes an informative discussion of the elements of specific and demonstrative legacies and a definition of each, as follows:
'A 'demonstrative legacy' is a gift of money or other property charged on a particular fund in such way as not to amount to a gift of the corpus of the fund, or to evidence an intent to relieve the general estate from liability in case the funds fails. Nusly v. Curtis, 36 Colo. 464, 85 P. 846, 7 L.R.A., N.S., 592, 118 Am.St.Rep. 113, 10 Ann.Cas. 1134, cited with approval in 28 R.C.L. 292.
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