Boiko v. Henry Ford Hospital, Docket No. 49326

• Decision Date: 20 October 1981
• Docket Number: Docket No. 49326
• Citation: 313 N.W.2d 344,110 Mich.App. 514
• Parties: Arlene BOIKO, Administratrix of the Estate of Raymond Boiko, deceased, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. HENRY FORD HOSPITAL, a Michigan corporation, Defendant-Appellant. 110 Mich.App. 514, 313 N.W.2d 344
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 344

313 N.W.2d 344

Arlene BOIKO, Administratrix of the Estate of Raymond Boiko deceased, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. HENRY FORD HOSPITAL, a Michigan corporation Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 49326.

110 Mich.App. 514, 313 N.W.2d 344

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Oct. 20, 1981.

Released for Publication Dec. 22, 1981.

[110 MICHAPP 515] Zeff & Zeff by Howard J. Radner, Detroit, for plaintiff-appellee.

Kitch, Suhrheinrich, Smith, Saurbier & Drutchas, P. C. by Brian J. Doren, Detroit, for defendant-appellant.

Before WALSH, P. J., and RILEY and KUHN, ^* JJ.

RILEY, Judge.

Defendant appeals, by leave granted, an order entered on November 30, 1979, by the Wayne County Circuit Court, denying defendant's motion for accelerated judgment and to compel arbitration.

The facts, as agreed upon by the parties, are straightforward. On April 17, 1977, decedent Raymond Boiko was admitted to Henry Ford Hospital. At the time of admission, Boiko signed a medical malpractice arbitration agreement. It is stipulated that he signed the agreement voluntarily, that the hospital personnel complied in all respects with statutory requirements and that the agreement complied with all of the statutory requirements also, including sufficient notice of the legal representative's right to revoke the agreement.

The medical malpractice arbitration agreement provided that the patient, Raymond Boiko, understood:

[110 MICHAPP 516] "(T)hat this agreement to arbitrate is binding on me, and all my agents, representatives and heirs and assigns, as well as on this hospital, its employees and those of its independent staff doctors and consultants who have agreed to arbitrate."

In addition, the agreement provided:

"This agreement to arbitrate is not a prerequisite to health care or treatment, and may be revoked within 60 days after discharge by notification in writing to (the hospital)."

Raymond Boiko died of a heart attack in the hospital on April 28, 1977. He had not, prior to that time, made any attempt to revoke the arbitration agreement. On September 13, 1978, plaintiff, Arlene Boiko, was appointed as administratrix of Raymond Boiko's estate. Plaintiff filed suit sounding in malpractice and charging wrongful death on April 20, 1979, against defendant hospital.

Defendant, thereafter, filed a motion for accelerated judgment and to compel arbitration based on the arbitration agreement. The trial court denied the motion based on the following rationale:

"The arbitration agreement involved is nonenforceable because of the death of Raymond Boiko in Defendant Henry Ford Hospital, the agreement never having come into being as far as Raymond Boiko is concerned because the opportunity to revoke within 60 days after discharge proved to be an impossibility in that Mr. Boiko was never 'discharged' from Henry Ford Hospital."

The trial court certified the following question of law for our consideration:

"When a patient signs a medical malpractice arbitration[110 MICHAPP 517] agreement while a patient admitted to a hospital in complete conformance with (MCL 600.5040 et seq., MSA 27A.5040 et seq.,) but the patient dies during the course of his hospital admission, is the arbitration agreement thereby rendered nonenforceable on the basis that the patient was not 'discharged' from the hospital and the right to revoke thus impossible."

The Michigan Medical Malpractice Arbitration Act provides in pertinent part:

"(1) The provisions of this chapter shall be applicable to the arbitration of a dispute, controversy, or issue arising out of or resulting from injury to, or the death of, a person caused by an error, omission, or negligence * * * " M.C.L. § 600.5040(1); M.S.A. § 27A.5040(1). (Emphasis added.)

Additionally, this act also provides:

"(3) The agreement to arbitrate shall provide that the person receiving health care or treatment or his legal representative, but not the hospital, may revoke the agreement within 60 days after discharge from the hospital by notifying the hospital in writing." M.C.L. § 600.5042(3); M.S.A. § 27A.5042(3). (Emphasis added.)

Although the question before us is one of first impression in this state, we are guided in our decision by a cardinal rule of statutory construction. That rule, as stated in Washtenaw County v. Saline River Intercounty Drainage Board, 80 Mich.App. 550, 555, 264 N.W.2d 53 (1978), is that "legislative enactments be read as a whole so as to harmonize the meaning of their separate provisions and give effect to the Legislature's intent".

Section 5040(1) evidences a strong legislative intent that the provisions of the arbitration statute apply not only to disputes arising out of or [110 MICHAPP 518] resulting from injury but also to disputes concerning death. As defendant points out in its brief, the trial court's ruling effectively precludes the arbitration of disputes in hospital-death cases. A holding that the agreement was valid and thus binding on Boiko's representative, in spite of Boiko's death in the hospital, would seem to promote a reasonable interpretation and application of both the arbitration statute and the agreement.

The trial court's holding also appears to conflict with § 5042(3), which provides that an agreement may be revoked by either the individual who received treatment or his legal representative. This clearly contemplates the application of the act to death cases since in personal injury actions the patient himself would have the right to revoke, while in death actions that right would rest with decedent's legal representative. We note that the act contains no provision suggesting that its application to death actions is limited to cases where such death results after discharge. Furthermore, if, as plaintiff argues, the act is only applicable in cases where the patient does not die until after 60 days subsequent to discharge, § 5042(3), which gives the legal representative the right to revoke within 60 days after discharge, would be superfluous since the legal representative of a decedent is not normally appointed until after the decedent's death.

Perhaps more fundamentally, we cannot agree with ...