Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst.
| Decision Date | 31 August 2012 |
| Docket Number | No. 00 C 2905,00 C 2905 |
| Parties | STANLEY BOIM, Individually and as Administrator of the Estate of DAVID BOIM, deceased, and JOYCE BOIM, Plaintiffs, v. QURANIC LITERACY INSTITUTE, HOLY LAND FOUNDATION FOR RELIEF AND DEVELOPMENT, ISLAMIC ASSOCIATION FOR PALESTINE, AMERICAN MUSLIM SOCIETY, AMERICAN MIDDLE EASTERN LEAGUE FOR PALESTINE, UNITED ASSOCIATION FOR STUDIES AND RESEARCH, MOHAMMED ABDUL HAMID KHALIL SALAH, MOUSA MOHAMMED ABU MARZOOK, AMJAD HINAWI, and THE ESTATE OF KHALIL TAWFIQ AL-SHARIF, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
Magistrate Judge
Arlander Keys
This case arises out of the murder in Israel of a seventeen-year old American/Israeli citizen. The parents of the victim, David Boim, sued in federal court in Chicago under a little used statute that creates a private, civil right of action by the victims of terrorist acts and their families. The case is currently before the Court on the Boims' renewed motion for summary judgment against the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development. For the reasons explained below, the motion is granted.
On May 13, 1996, David Boim was killed in a Hamas terrorist attack in the West Bank. His parents, Joyce and Stanley Boim, filed suit in 2000 against numerous individuals and organizations under the Antiterrorism Act of 1990, 18 U.S.C.§ 2300 et seq. (West 2004), which creates a cause of action for United States nationals who are injured in their person, property, or business by reason of an act of international terrorism; the Act allows injured persons (or their estates, survivors or heirs) to recover threefold the damages sustained, as well as costs of suit, including attorney's fees. See 18 U.S.C. §2333. The Act does not specify who may or should be sued. But the Boims named as defendants two men who were directly involved in the murder, Amjad Hinawi and Khalil Tawfiq Al-Sharif. They also named several U.S.-based individuals and organizations they claim helped to support Hamas - namely, Mousa Abu Marzook, who theBoims alleged served for many years as the admitted leader of Hamas' political wing in the United States; Mohammed Salah, who they alleged served as the United States-based leader of Hamas' military branch; the United Association for Studies and Research, which they alleged serves as Hamas' political command center in the United States; and the Quranic Literacy Institute, the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development, the Islamic Association for Palestine, the American Muslim Society, and the American Middle Eastern League for Palestine, which they alleged raise and launder money for Hamas and finance Hamas' terrorist activities.
The Court entered default judgments against Amjad Hinawi, UASR, and AMELP, and dismissed the case as to Mousa Abu Marzook and the estate of Khalil Tawfiq Al-Sharif. On November 10, 2004, the Court entered summary judgment against HLF, IAP/AMS and Mohammad Salah on the issue of liability; the judgment against HLF was predicated in part on this Court's determination that findings made in separate proceedings involving HLF's designation as a terrorist organization (discussed below) had a preclusive effect in this case. On December 1, 2004, the case went to trial on the two issues left unresolved by the proceedings up to that point: the question of whether the Quranic Literacy Institute was liable to the Boims under the statute, and the question of the amount of damages, if any, to be awarded to the Boims from theliable defendants. In light of the Court's rulings on summary judgment, and because the United States Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control had seized and frozen the assets of HLF, counsel for that entity elected not to participate in - or even attend - the liability phase of the trial; counsel for IAP/AMS and Mr. Salah followed suit. Counsel for all three defendants informed the Court that they might attend and possibly participate in the damages portion of the trial, and the Court advised them that that was acceptable, yet none of them showed up. On December 8, 2004, the jury returned its verdict: it found QLI liable and awarded damages in the amount of $52 million against all Defendants; the Court then tripled the jury's award, as required by §2333, for a total award of $156 million.
The defendants appealed from the final judgment, and a three-judge panel of the Seventh Circuit vacated the judgment with instructions to redetermine liability (Judge Evans agreed with the reversal as to HLF, but otherwise dissented). The plaintiffs then petitioned for rehearing en banc, and the full court granted the petition. After analyzing the question of whether secondary liability is appropriately imposed under section 2333, Judge Posner, writing for the majority, held that "[i]n addition to providing material support after the effective date of section 2339A, a donor to terrorism, to be liable under section 2333, must have known that the money would be used inpreparation for or in carrying out the killing or attempted killing of, conspiring to kill, or inflicting bodily injury on, an American citizen abroad." Boim v. Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development, et al., 549 F.3d 685, 691 (7th Cir. 2008)(en banc). The Court then examined the history of the law on joint tortfeasor liability, and held that providing material support to a terrorist organization - even if you "earmark it for the organization's nonterrorist activities" - does not "get you off the liability hook . . . ." Id. at 698. Nor, the Court held, can donors to terrorism escape liability by funneling money through a chain or intermediate organization; as long as the donor "either knows or is reckless in failing to discover that donations to [the intermediate organization] end up with Hamas, [the donor] is liable." Id. at 702.
Applying these standards, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the entry of summary judgment against the bulk of the defendants and affirmed the judgment in all respects except two. First, the Court determined that, because Mohammad Salah was in jail in Israel from 1993 to 1997, he could not have provided material support to Hamas during the time period from 1994 (the effective date of the statute) through the time of David Boim's murder in 1996; because of this, the court determined that he could not be held liable under the statute and that the judgment against him must, therefore, be reversed. Id. at 691. The court indicatedthat the same might be true of HLF, but vacated the judgment against HLF on other grounds and so did not decide the question. Id. Instead, the Court determined that this Court's reliance on collateral estoppel was erroneous, and sent the case against HLF back for further proceedings. Id. at 700-701.
On January 23, 1995, President Clinton signed Executive Order 12947, prohibiting transactions with terrorists who threaten to disrupt the Middle East peace process. See Executive Order No. 12947, 60 Fed. Reg. 5079 (Jan. 23, 1995). Annexed to the Order was a relatively short list (with just twelve entries) of such terrorist organizations (thereafter referred to as "Specially Designated Terrorists" or "SDTs"). Id., 60 Fed. Reg. at 5081.3 Hamas (also known as the Islamic Resistance Movement) was one of the organizations on the list. Id. Executive Order12947, inter alia, prohibited donations to designated organizations, directed all agencies of the United States Government to take all appropriate measures within their authority to carry out the Order's provisions, directed the Federal Bureau of Investigation to handle the investigation of possible violations of the Order, and directed the FBI to timely notify the Department of the Treasury of any action taken on such investigations.
To that end, on November 5, 2001, Dale L. Watson, then Assistant Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Counterterrorism Division, wrote an "action memorandum" to R. Richard Newcomb, Director of the United States Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control ("OFAC"), concerning HLF. Mr. Watson's memo described some of the history of Hamas, one of the frontrunner SDTs; it also described the history of HLF, HLF's organizational structure, and the results of various surveillance projects capturing and documenting the relationship between HLF and Hamas. Mr. Watson summed up his memo by recommending that OFAC add HLF (which he referred to as HLFRD) to the list of SDTs:
Watson Memorandum, p. 49 (Bates No. 0108) (attached to the Declaration of Samuel A. Simon, Jr., at Exhibit 13 of Plaintiffs' (HLF) Rule 56.1 Statement).4 On December 4, 2001, Director Newcomb issued a "Blocking Notice" to HLF, advising that OFAC had blocked all of HLF's real and personal property, including offices, furnishings, equipment, and vehicles, as well as all funds and accounts in which HLF has any interest. See Exhibit 14 to Plaintiffs' (HLF) Rule 56.1 Statement.
On March 8, 2002, HLF sued then Attorney General John Ashcroft and other federal officials and agencies, seeking a declaration that the...
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