Boire v. Greyhound Corporation, No. 77

CourtUnited States Supreme Court
Writing for the CourtSTEWART
Citation11 L.Ed.2d 849,376 U.S. 473,84 S.Ct. 894
Decision Date23 March 1964
Docket NumberNo. 77
PartiesHarold A. BOIRE, Regional Director, Twelfth Region, National Labor Relations Board, Petitioner, v. The GREYHOUND CORPORATION

376 U.S. 473
84 S.Ct. 894
11 L.Ed.2d 849
Harold A. BOIRE, Regional Director, Twelfth Region, National Labor Relations Board, Petitioner,

v.

The GREYHOUND CORPORATION.

No. 77.
Argued Feb. 17, 1964.
Decided March 23, 1964.

Norton J. Come, Washington, D.C., for petitioner.

Warren E. Hall, Jr., Bartow, Fla., for respondent.

Page 474

Mr. Justice STEWART delivered the opinion of the Court.

The Amalgamated Association of Street, Electric Railway and Motor Coach Employees of America, AFL-CIO (the Union) filed an amended petition with the National Labor Relations Board pursuant to § 9(c) of the National Labor Relations Act,1 requesting a representation election among the porters, janitors and maids working at four Florida bus terminals operated by the respondent (Greyhound). The amended petition designated the 'employer' of the employees sought to be represented

Page 475

as Greyhound and Floors, Inc. The latter, a corporation engaged in the business of providing cleaning, maintenance and similar services to various customers in Florida, had contracted with Greyhound to provide such services at the four terminals in question.

At the Board hearing on the petition, the Union contended alternatively that the unit requested was appropriate as a residual unit of all unrepresented Greyhound employees a the four terminals—on the ground that Greyhound was at least a joint employer with Floors of the employees—or that the unit was appropriate because the employees comprised a homogeneous, distinct group. Greyhound and Floors claimed that the latter was the sole employer of the employees, and that the appropriate bargaining unit should therefore encompass all Floors' employees, either in all four cities in which the terminals are located, or in separate groups.

The Board found that while Floors hired, paid, disciplined, transferred, promoted and discharged the employees, Greyhound took part in setting up work schedules, in determining the number of employees required to meet those schedules, and in directing the work of the employees in question. The Board also found that Floors' supervisors visited the terminals only irregularly—on occasion not appearing for as much as two days at a time—and that in at least one instance Greyhound had prompted the discharge of an employee whom it regarded as unsatisfactory. On this basis, the Board, with one member dissenting, concluded that Greyhound and Floors were joint employers, because they exercised common control over the employees, and that the unit consisting of all employees under the joint employer relationship was an appropriate unit in which to hold an election. The Board thereupon directed an election to determine whether the employees desired to be represented by the Union.

Page 476

Shortly before the election was schedule to take place, Greyhound filed this suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, seeking to set aside the decision of the Board and to enjoin the pending election. After a hearing, the court entered an order permanently restraining the election. 205 F.Supp. 686. Concluding that it had jurisdiction on the basis of this Court's decision in Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184, 79 S.Ct. 180, 3 L.Ed.2d 210, the court held on the merits that the Board's findings were insufficient as a matter of law to establish a joint employer relationship, that those findings established, as a matter of law, that Floors was the sole employer of the employees in question, and that the Board had therefore violated the National Labor Relations Act by attempting to conduct a representation election where no employment relationship existed between the employees and the purported employer. The Court of Appeals affirmed, 309 F.2d 397, and we granted certiorari to consider a seemingly important question of federal labor law. 372 U.S. 964, 83 S.Ct. 1090, 10 L.Ed.2d 128. We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

Both parties agree that in the normal course of events Board orders in certification proceedings under § 9(c) are not directly reviewable in the courts. This Court held as long ago as American Federation of Labor v. National Labor Relations Board, 308 U.S. 401, 60 S.Ct. 300, 84 L.Ed. 347, that the 'final order(s)' made reviewable by §§ 10(e) and (f)2 in the Courts of

Page 477

Appeals do not include Board decisions in certification proceedings. Such decisions, rather, are normally reviewable only where the dispute concerning the correctness of the certification eventuates in a finding by the Board that an unfair labor practice has been committed as, for example, where an employer refuses to bargain with a certified representative on the ground that the election was held in an inappropriate bargaining unit. In such a case, § 9(d) of the Act makes full provision for judicial review of the underlying certification order by providing that 'such certification and the record of such investigation shall be included in the transcript of the entire record required to be filed' in the Court of Appeals.3

That this indirect method of obtaining judicial review imposes significant delays upon attempts to challenge the validity of Board orders in certification proceedings in obvious. But it is equally obvious that Congress explicitly

Page 478

intended to impose precisely such delays. At the time of the original passage of the National Labor Relations Act in 1935, the House Report clearly delineated the congressional policy judgment which underlay the restriction of judicial review to that provided for in § 9(d):

'When an employee organization has built up its membership to a point where it is entitled to be recognized as the representative of the employees for collective bargaining, and the employer refuses to accord such recognition, the union, unless an election can promptly be held to determine the choice of representation, runs the risk of impairment of strength by attrition and delay while the case is dragging on through the courts, or else is forced to call a strike to achieve recognition by its own...

To continue reading

Request your trial
455 practice notes
  • Lipscomb v. Federal Labor Relations Authority, No. Civ.A. 401CV158LN.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 5th Circuit. Southern District of Mississippi
    • December 19, 2001
    ...with a certified representative on the ground that the election was held in an inappropriate bargaining unit." Boire v. Greyhound Corp., 376 U.S. 473, 477, 84 S.Ct. 894, 896-97, 11 L.Ed.2d 849 (1964). Although this is the normal procedure for review, the courts have recognized "[t]hree `ext......
  • NLRB v. Air Control Products of St. Petersburg, Inc., No. 21017.
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (5th Circuit)
    • July 28, 1964
    ...the District Courts. American Federation of Labor v. NLRB, 1940, 308 U.S. 401, 60 S.Ct. 300, 84 L.Ed. 347; Boire v. Greyhound Corp., 1964, 376 U.S. 473, 84 S.Ct. 894, 11 L.Ed.2d 849; cf. Leedom v. Kyne, 1958, 358 U.S. 184, 79 S.Ct. 180, 3 L.Ed.2d All of this has been done deliberately by Co......
  • Griffith v. Federal Labor Relations Authority, No. 86-5720
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (District of Columbia)
    • March 25, 1988
    ...at 189, 79 S.Ct. at 184. Page 493 The Leedom v. Kyne exception is intended to be of extremely limited scope. See Boire v. Greyhound Corp., 376 U.S. 473, 480-81, 84 S.Ct. 894, 898, 11 L.Ed.2d 849 (1964); Council of Prison Locals v. Brewer, 735 F.2d 1497, 1501 (D.C.Cir.1984); Hartz Mountain C......
  • Brennan v. Gilles & Cotting, Inc., No. 73-2471
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (4th Circuit)
    • October 18, 1974
    ...question of whether the term 'employer' should be interpreted to cover general contractors as 'joint employers,' cf. Boire v. Greyhound, 376 U.S. 473, 84 S.Ct. 894, 11 L.Ed.2d 849 (1964), or 'statutory The statute itself does not answer the question. The Act depends wholly on the brief lang......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
455 cases
  • Lipscomb v. Federal Labor Relations Authority, No. Civ.A. 401CV158LN.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 5th Circuit. Southern District of Mississippi
    • December 19, 2001
    ...with a certified representative on the ground that the election was held in an inappropriate bargaining unit." Boire v. Greyhound Corp., 376 U.S. 473, 477, 84 S.Ct. 894, 896-97, 11 L.Ed.2d 849 (1964). Although this is the normal procedure for review, the courts have recognized "[t]hree `ext......
  • NLRB v. Air Control Products of St. Petersburg, Inc., No. 21017.
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (5th Circuit)
    • July 28, 1964
    ...the District Courts. American Federation of Labor v. NLRB, 1940, 308 U.S. 401, 60 S.Ct. 300, 84 L.Ed. 347; Boire v. Greyhound Corp., 1964, 376 U.S. 473, 84 S.Ct. 894, 11 L.Ed.2d 849; cf. Leedom v. Kyne, 1958, 358 U.S. 184, 79 S.Ct. 180, 3 L.Ed.2d All of this has been done deliberately by Co......
  • Griffith v. Federal Labor Relations Authority, No. 86-5720
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (District of Columbia)
    • March 25, 1988
    ...at 189, 79 S.Ct. at 184. Page 493 The Leedom v. Kyne exception is intended to be of extremely limited scope. See Boire v. Greyhound Corp., 376 U.S. 473, 480-81, 84 S.Ct. 894, 898, 11 L.Ed.2d 849 (1964); Council of Prison Locals v. Brewer, 735 F.2d 1497, 1501 (D.C.Cir.1984); Hartz Mountain C......
  • Brennan v. Gilles & Cotting, Inc., No. 73-2471
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (4th Circuit)
    • October 18, 1974
    ...question of whether the term 'employer' should be interpreted to cover general contractors as 'joint employers,' cf. Boire v. Greyhound, 376 U.S. 473, 84 S.Ct. 894, 11 L.Ed.2d 849 (1964), or 'statutory The statute itself does not answer the question. The Act depends wholly on the brief lang......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT