Boise Payette Lumber Co. v. Idaho Gold Dredging Corp.

• Decision Date: 04 May 1936
• Docket Number: 6247
• Citation: 58 P.2d 786,56 Idaho 660
• Parties: BOISE PAYETTE LUMBER COMPANY, a Corporation, Appellant, v. IDAHO GOLD DREDGING CORPORATION, a Corporation, Respondent
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

58 P.2d 786

56 Idaho 660

BOISE PAYETTE LUMBER COMPANY, a Corporation, Appellant, v. IDAHO GOLD DREDGING CORPORATION, a Corporation, Respondent

No. 6247

Supreme Court of Idaho

May 4, 1936

PLEADING - DEMURRER - ADMISSIONS - SCOPE OF INQUIRY BY COURT-JUDGMENT-ACTION TO ENJOIN - NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE - COMPLAINT, SUFFICIENCY OF.

1. On demurrer, pleading must be sufficient in and of itself, and court can refer to other pleadings neither to aid otherwise insufficient pleading nor to determine that pleading is insufficient.

2. Although general demurrer does not admit mere conclusions of law, all facts properly pleaded are admitted as well as all reasonable inferences which can be drawn therefrom.

3. Suitor seeking relief from judgment on ground of newly discovered evidence in independent suit in equity commenced after time has expired under statute in which to move for new trial is required to show same diligence litigant is required to show who moves for new trial under statute (I. C. A., sec 7-602).

4. Complaint held insufficient to state cause of action in equity to set aside judgment for injury to gold dredge pond through oil and grease nuisance created by lumber company on ground that judgment was based on mistaken theory that oil would continue to flow indefinitely in absence of showing of means of discovery of evidence of mistake or that evidence of mistake could not have been discovered prior to motion for new trial in law action (I. C. A., sec. 7-602).

5. Mining company's judgment for injury to gold dredge pond through oil and grease nuisance created by lumber company held not enjoinable on ground that mining company had concealed from lumber company fact that damage was being caused so as to obtain proof of damage where lumber company had notice of grounds on which recovery was sought from date of service of complaint and hence had full opportunity to prepare defense by making independent test with respect to damage.

6. Complaint held insufficient to state cause of action to set aside judgment against lumber company for injury to gold dredge pond through oil and grease nuisance, on ground of perjury in evidence as to damage where complaint alleged impossibility of determining true facts and failed to allege that perjury could not have been discovered in time to have been available as defense in law action, or means by which perjury was discovered.

7. Complaint held insufficient to state cause of action to set aside judgment against lumber company for damage to gold dredge pond caused by oil and grease nuisance on ground that suppression of evidence and perjury in action in which judgment was obtained deprived lumber company of property without due process of law where impossibility of determining truth of testimony alleged to have been perjured and suppressed was alleged (Const. U.S. , Amend. 14).

8. Party seeking relief must not himself be negligent.

9. In equity, defense is not to be deemed "newly discovered" or "lost by accident or mistake" if it was or should have been within knowledge of party when he was called on for defense in action at law.

APPEAL from the District Court of the Third Judicial District, for Ada County. Hon. Charles F. Koelsch, Judge.

Suit to enjoin the collection of a judgment. Suit dismissed. Appeal from judgment of dismissal. Affirmed.

Judgment affirmed. Costs to respondent. Petition for rehearing denied.

Alfred A. Fraser and Richards & Haga, for Appellant.

The controlling element in determining whether one should be enjoined from receiving the fruits of a judgment is the unconscionable character of the judgment. The manner of obtaining the judgment is of importance only in pleading the facts in the suit for injunction. The crowning purpose of courts is to administer justice rather than putting an end to litigation before justice has been attained. (Laun v Kipp, 155 Wis. 347, 145 N.W. 183, 5 A. L. R. 655; Boring v. Ott, 138 Wis. 260, 119 N.W. 865, 19 L. R A., N. S., 1080; Taylor v. Nashville & Chat. R. R. Co., 86 Tenn. 228, 6 S.W. 393; Edmondson v. Jones, 204 Ala. 133, 135, 85 So. 799.)

To take one's liberty or property by fraud and perjured evidence is no less a wrong because done in the presence of the court. Constitutional rights and safeguards go deeper than such artificial and superficial formulas and rules of procedure. (United States Supreme Court in Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 55 S.Ct. 340, 79 L.Ed. 791, 98 A. L. R. 406.)

The guarantees of due process of law and of the equal protection of the law by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States are not satisfied by a procedure which provides no relief from unconscionable judgments that take one's property and that were obtained by fraud, perjury or mistake, or by a procedure that refuses to recognize newly discovered evidence that would have been a complete defense if it had been available at the trial. (Mooney v. Holohan, supra; Marshall v. Holmes, 141 U.S. 589, 12 S.Ct. 62, 35 L.Ed. 870.)

Whenever a party has obtained, either with or without fraudulent means, an unconscionable judgment through some mistake of fact, and the defendant being free from negligence in preparing for trial, a court of equity will enjoin the enforcement of the judgment. (3 Freeman on Judgments, 5th ed., sec. 1246; Taylor v. Sutton, 15 Ga. 103, 60 Am. Dec. 682, Oliver v. Pray, 4 Ohio 175, 19 Am. Dec. 595; Barnes v. Milne, Rich. Eq. Cas. (S. C.) 459, 24 Am. Dec. 422; 15 R. C. L. 752.)

Luther W. Tennyson and Hawley & Worthwine, for Respondent.

Is there no limit to litigation--must a successful party be dragged again and again through the courts to relitigate issues which have been definitely determined and decided by lower and appellate courts? Judicial wisdom has answered this question emphatically--there is an end to litigation and when an attempt is made to relitigate the same issues between the same parties, the attempt is met by the doctrine of res adjudicata.

There are innumerable decisions on this point, but there is no necessity to go beyond our Idaho decisions. (Joyce v. Murphy Land & Irr. Co., 35 Idaho 549-553, 208 P. 241; Baldwin v. Anderson, 52 Idaho 243-247, 13 P.2d 650; South Boise Water Co. v. McDonald, 50 Idaho 409-414, 296 P. 591; Marshall v. Underwood, 38 Idaho 464, 221 P. 1105; Jensen v. Berry & Ball Co., 37 Idaho 394, 216 P. 1033.)

The doctrine applies to an action of this kind which seeks an injunction against the enforcement of a judgment.

15 R. C. L., paragraph 446, says:

"The same judgment operates as res judicata, not only in regard to the existence of the plaintiff's cause of action, but as the nonexistence of the defense which was not pleaded. The reason for this rule lies in the principle that there must be an end to litigation, and where a party has an opportunity to present his defense and neglects to do so, the demands of the law require that he should take the consequences."

"Equity will not entertain a bill for relief against a judgment, founded on any matters which were tried and determined in the action at law, or which were so put in issue that they might have been adjudicated, however unjust the judgment may appear to be. Such matters have become res adjudicata. The rule assumes that there has been a trial in which the respective parties have had an opportunity fully to present their claims. . . .

"Equity will refuse to interfere by injunction when the grounds presented for its action have been already considered and held insufficient on a motion made in the trial court to open or vacate the judgment or for a new trial." (Judgments, 34 C. J., sec. 733; Judgments, 15 R. C. L., sec. 203, p. 750.)

"A bill to enjoin a judgment at law is not regarded with favor by the courts." (34 C. J., par. 680; Life & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Clark, 165 Tenn. 219, 54 S.W.2d 965.)

HOLDEN, J. Givens, C. J., Morgan, J., and Rice, D. J., concur. Budge and Ailshie, JJ., did not sit at the hearing nor participate in the opinion.

OPINION

HOLDEN, J.

This suit was commenced February 15, 1935, for the purpose of perpetually enjoining the collection of a judgment theretofore recovered by the respondent against appellant for the sum of one hundred thousand dollars. It is alleged in the complaint that appellant (hereinafter called the Lumber Company), during the year 1920 and for each year thereafter until the forepart of the year 1926, was engaged in cutting timber on the public domain under contracts with the United States Forest Service, and on other lands situated in what is known as Boise Basin, Boise County, and on tributaries of Grimes Creek in said Boise Basin; that as a part of its logging operations, it transported the logs so cut to the railroad landings by skidding the logs through chutes constructed for that purpose, and in places where the gradient was low, the Lumber Company reduced the friction by oiling and greasing the logging chutes. Some of the oil and grease, in the course of the logging operations, dropped from the chutes to the ground or would be otherwise wasted on the ground along the course of such chutes.

That from about the middle of April, 1926, to on or about the 13th day of April, 1928, the predecessor in interest of the Idaho Gold Dredging Corporation (respondent), hereinafter called the Mining Company, to wit, the Gold Dredging & Power Corporation, was engaged in dredging certain placer mining claims then owned by it and located in the valley of Grimes Creek and along the banks of the creek, and from about the 13th day of April, 1928, to the 4th day of June, 1929, the Mining Company, successor in interest of the Gold Dredging &amp Power Corporation, was engaged in dredging said mining claims, some of which were located below the mouth of the tributaries...