Boissy v. Chevion

• Decision Date: 20 September 2011
• Docket Number: No. 2010–372.,2010–372.
• Parties: Aaron M. BOISSY and another v. Ruth CHEVION.
• Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court

162 N.H. 388

33 A.3d 1109

Aaron M. BOISSY and another

v.Ruth CHEVION.

No. 2010–372.

Supreme Court of New Hampshire.

Argued: June 9, 2011.Opinion Issued: Sept. 20, 2011.

Coughlin, Rainboth, Murphy & Lown, P.A., of Portsmouth (Kenneth D. Murphy on the brief and orally), for the petitioners.

Ruth Chevion, by brief and orally, pro se.

DALIANIS, C.J.

The respondent, Ruth Chevion, appeals, and the petitioners, Aaron M. and Katie E. Boissy, cross-appeal, an order of the Superior Court ( Smukler, J.) granting in part and denying in part the petitioners' petition to quiet title. The trial court ruled that the respondent lacked an easement to use a certain well on the petitioners' property, but that she had a deeded right-of-way over the property to access a former ice pond. We affirm.

The trial court found the following facts. The parties own neighboring parcels of land in Hopkinton. The petitioners own three lots, one of which adjoins the respondent's lot. The petitioners brought this action to quiet title to two easements the respondent claimed to have on their property. The first easement allegedly gave the respondent the right to pipe water to her house from a well on one of the petitioners' three lots. The second easement allegedly gave the respondent a right-of-way over the petitioners' property to access an “ice pond.”

The trial court rejected the petitioners' assertion that the respondent's well easement was extinguished by abandonment. The trial court ruled that the easement was extinguished, nonetheless, because its purpose—to allow use of a certain well on the petitioners' property—was impossible to accomplish. See Restatement (Third) of Property (Servitudes) § 7.10(1), at 394 (2000); see also J.W. Bruce & J.W. Ely, Jr., The Law of Easements and Licenses in Land § 10.8, at 10–16 to 10–17 (2011). The trial court found that the old well had not been used at least since the respondent purchased her property in 1982. The trial court further found that the well could not now be located and, therefore, the respondent could not use the easement “unless she creates a new well and runs piping.” By contrast, the trial court ruled that the respondent's alleged easement to access the “ice pond” was intact, even though no “ice pond” currently exists. This appeal and cross-appeal followed.

In an action to quiet title, the burden is on each party to prove good title as against all other parties whose rights may be affected by the court's decree. Hersh v. Plonski, 156 N.H. 511, 514, 938 A.2d 98 (2007). We will uphold the trial court's determination unless it is erroneous as a matter of law or unsupported by the evidence. Id.

I. Well Easement

We first address the respondent's appeal of the trial court's ruling that her alleged well easement was extinguished because its purpose could no longer be accomplished. The respondent first argues that the purpose of the easement was to supply her property with water, not, as the trial court concluded, to allow use of a well. “The focus of the easement,” she contends, “is the water, not the well.” She contends that because the trial court's ruling rests upon a mistaken premise, its conclusion that the easement's purpose could no longer be accomplished was error.

Resolving this issue requires that we interpret the relevant deeds. The interpretation of deeds is a question of law, ultimately to be resolved by this court. See Flanagan v. Prudhomme, 138 N.H. 561, 565, 644 A.2d 51 (1994). Thus, we review the trial court's deed interpretation de novo. Mansur v. Muskopf, 159 N.H. 216, 221, 977 A.2d 1041 (2009). Our interpretation is based upon the parties' intentions gleaned from construing the language of the deed from, as nearly as possible, the position of the parties at the time of the conveyance and in light of surrounding circumstances. Flanagan, 138 N.H. at 565–66, 644 A.2d 51. We base our judgment on this question of law upon the trial court's findings of fact. Arcidi v. Town of Rye, 150 N.H. 694, 701, 846 A.2d 535 (2004). If the language of the deed is clear and unambiguous, we will interpret the intended meaning from the deed itself without resort to extrinsic evidence. See Flanagan, 138 N.H. at 566, 644 A.2d 51.

The original grant of the well easement to the respondent's predecessors-in-title provided:

There is also granted herewith the right to a well on adjoining land of the grantors from which water is now being piped into the residence by gravity flow, together with the right to cross the woodland and field between the house and the well for the purpose of maintaining the water flow between the well and the house.

In later deeds, including the respondent's, the description of the easement changed only slightly. The respondent's deed describes the easement as follows:

There is also granted the right to a well on adjoining land now or formerly of Frank and Claudine G. Doyle from which water is now being piped into the premises by gravity flow, together with the right to cross the woodland and field between the premises and the well, for the purpose of maintaining water flow between the well and the premises.

According to the plain and unambiguous language of the relevant deeds, the easement's purpose is to grant the respondent and her predecessors-in-title “the right to a well” on the petitioners' land. The easement also grants a right-of-way “for the purpose of maintaining water flow between the well and the premises.” (Emphasis added.) The stated purpose of the easement, therefore, was to grant the respondent and her predecessors a right to use a particular well on the petitioners' property. See Surprise v. Ferris, No. CV020068751, 2004 WL 2165171, at *1, *3 (Conn.Super.Ct. Aug. 27, 2004). Contrary to the respondent's assertions, the right granted was not a general right to a water supply but a specific right “to take water from a certain well.” Gowing v. Lehmann, 98 N.H. 414, 417, 101 A.2d 463 (1953): see DeForge v. Balint, 128 N.H. 452, 453, 514 A.2d 827 (1986).

Our decisions in Gowing and DeForge are instructive. The parties in Gowing, like the parties in this case, owned adjoining properties. Gowing, 98 N.H. at 415, 101 A.2d 463. On the defendant's property had been an artesian well with an attached electric pump through which water was pumped into a pipe line that supplied water to buildings on the defendant's property as well as to a building on the property later owned by the plaintiff. Id. Deeds in the plaintiff's chain of title conveyed, in addition to the land and buildings, “the right and easement to take water from the well” on the defendant's property as well as the right to enter the defendant's land “for the purpose of repairing and replacing said pipes when necessary.” Id. (quotations omitted). The easement included “the use of the pipe line.” Id. (quotation omitted). The defendant acquired his property in 1943 and, until 1952, operated the pump attached to the well. Id. In 1952, the defendant developed a new water system that supplied water from a nearby lake instead of the well and bypassed the line supplying the plaintiff's property. Id. The defendant left the prior well system and pump intact for winter use when the lake system was not usable. Id. at 415–16, 101 A.2d 463. In June 1952, the defendant discontinued operating the well pump, thereby stopping the flow of water to the plaintiff's property. Id. at 416, 101 A.2d 463.

The issue on appeal was whether the defendant was required to operate and maintain the pump on his property for the purpose of supplying water to the plaintiff's property. Id. We held that the plaintiff's easement, which was to take water from a specific well, did not include the right to require the defendant to operate and maintain a pump to supply water to the plaintiff's property. Id. at 417, 101 A.2d 463.

We reaffirmed Gowing in DeForge. In that case, the easement granted the plaintiff's predecessors-in-title the “right to draw water from the well” located on the defendants' land and to “enter upon” the defendants' land “to relay or repair” the pipe used to supply water to the plaintiff's land. DeForge, 128 N.H. at 453, 514 A.2d 827 (quotations omitted). The issue on appeal was whether the defendants were “required to supply the plaintiff with water from the well on their land or merely to allow the plaintiff to draw water from the well.” Id. We ruled that the language of the easement “clearly [gave] the plaintiff the right to draw water from the defendants' well and the right to enter the land to repair the pipe which furnishes the water.” Id. Accordingly, the defendants, we held, “had no obligation to furnish water to the plaintiff or to furnish her a pump and power under the terms of the easement.” Id.

Here, like the dominant estate owners in Gowing and DeForge, the respondent and her predecessors-in-title were given the right to draw water from a specific well. The petitioners, like the servient estate owners in Gowing and DeForge, had no obligation to provide a water supply to the respondent, but merely to allow access to a particular well. Indeed, the respondent concedes that the relevant deeds gave her, as the dominant estate owner, “the sole control over the repair of the well.”

In arguing that her easement was for a water supply, and not for the right to draw water from a specific well, the respondent mistakenly relies upon our decision in Gagnon v. Carrier, 96 N.H. 409, 77 A.2d 868 (1951). In that case, the trial court decided that the purpose of the easement at issue was for a water supply. Gagnon, 96 N.H. at 410, 77 A.2d 868 (preface to opinion summarizing trial court decision). This ruling was not challenged on appeal, and, thus, we never considered whether the trial court's conclusion was correct. See id. at 410, 411, 77 A.2d 868. The sole issue for our review was whether the easement had been abandoned. See id. at 411, 77 A.2d 868. Accordingly, Gagnon does not support the respondent's...