Boiter v. South Carolina Dep't of Transp.

Decision Date21 July 2011
Docket NumberNo. 26981.,26981.
CourtSouth Carolina Supreme Court
PartiesLarry Lee BOITER, Appellant,v.SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION and South Carolina Department of Public Safety, Respondents.andJeannie Boiter, Appellant,v.South Carolina Department of Transportation and South Carolina Department of Public Safety, Respondents.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

James Fletcher Thompson, of Spartanburg, for Appellants.Andrew F. Lindemann, of Davidson & Lindemann, of Columbia and Ronald H. Colvin, of Spartanburg, for Respondents.Justice HEARN.

Two issues are presented in this appeal: (1) whether the two-tier statutory cap in the South Carolina Tort Claims Act is constitutional, and (2) whether two separate governmental entities' negligent acts, which resulted in severe injuries to Larry Lee and Jeannie Boiter (collectively, the Boiters) constitute one or two occurrences under the Tort Claims Act. The circuit court found the statutory caps constitutional and that only one occurrence was presented by the facts. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

FACTS

The Boiters were injured when the motorcycle they were riding collided with a car driven by Nancy Kochenower at an intersection near Inman, South Carolina. The red signal light bulbs for the road that Kochenower was traveling had burned out earlier that day. The Boiters suffered significant injuries as a result of being thrown from the motorcycle, requiring lengthy hospital stays and incurring $888,756 in medical bills and $203,897 in lost wages. They settled with Kochenower for her policy limits of $50,000.

The Boiters filed four separate lawsuits against South Carolina Department of Transportation (SCDOT) and South Carolina Department of Public Safety (SCDPS) (collectively, Respondents), alleging negligence in their failure to prevent the accident. With respect to SCDOT, the Boiters alleged SCDOT failed to implement an appropriate re-lamping policy to replace bulbs in traffic signals before they burn out. With respect to SCDPS, the Boiters alleged that a citizen's call one hour and twenty-seven minutes prior to the accident reporting the outage should have resulted in SCDPS notifying a trooper to report to the scene and direct traffic. The negligence of both agencies is undisputed in this appeal. At trial, the jury found in favor of the Boiters and awarded each of them a total of 1.875 million dollars.

Thereafter, Respondents filed motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, a new trial, and to reduce the verdict amount pursuant to the Tort Claims Act. In response, the Boiters filed a motion challenging the constitutionality of the two-tier cap in the Tort Claims Act, and in the alternative, asserted that Respondents' negligence constituted two separate occurrences under the Act. The circuit court denied Respondents' motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and a new trial as well as the Boiters' motion challenging the cap's constitutionality, but the court found there was only one occurrence and granted Respondents' motion to reduce the verdict pursuant to the Act. Therefore, the Boiters' verdict was reduced to $300,000 each, for a total of $600,000. This appeal followed.

ISSUES

The Boiters raise two issues on appeal:

(1) Did the circuit court err in failing to find that the two-tier cap on damages under the Tort Claims Act is unconstitutional as a violation of equal protection?

(2) Did the circuit court err in failing to find that two separate occurrences gave rise to the Boiters' injuries?

ANALYSIS

I. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF CAP

Section 15–78–120 of the South Carolina Code (2005) states the following, in pertinent part:

(1) Except as provided in Section 15–78–120(a)(3), no person shall recover ... a sum exceeding three hundred thousand dollars because of loss arising from a single occurrence regardless of the number of agencies or political subdivisions involved.

(2) Except as provided in Section 15–78–120(a)(4), the total sum recovered hereunder arising out of a single occurrence shall not exceed six hundred thousand dollars regardless of the number of agencies or political subdivisions or claims or actions involved.

(3) No person may recover in any action or claim ... caused by the tort of any licensed physician or dentist, employed by a governmental entity and acting within the scope of his profession, a sum exceeding one million two hundred thousand dollars because of loss arising from a single occurrence....

(4) The total sum recovered hereunder arising out of a single occurrence of liability of any governmental entity for any tort caused by any licensed physician or dentist, employed by a governmental entity and acting within the scope of his profession, may not exceed one million two hundred thousand dollars regardless of the number of agencies or political subdivisions or claims or actions involved.

Therefore, a two-tier statutory cap on damages exists based on who allegedly committed the act. For state-employed physicians and dentists, the cap is 1.2 million dollars per person and per occurrence. For all other state entities, the cap is $300,000 per person and $600,000 per occurrence. The Boiters allege this disparate treatment based solely on the identity of the tortfeasor violates their constitutional right to equal protection of the laws.

Because no fundamental right has been infringed, we focus our analysis on the rational basis test. See Wright v. Colleton County School Dist., 301 S.C. 282, 291, 391 S.E.2d 564, 570 (1990). Under this framework, the Equal Protection Clause is satisfied if: (1) the classification bears a reasonable relation to the legislative purpose sought to be effected; (2) the members of the class are treated alike under similar circumstances and conditions; and (3) the classification rests on some reasonable basis. Samson v. Greenville Hospital System, 295 S.C. 359, 368 S.E.2d 665 (1988). “Those attacking the validity of legislation [under the rational basis test of the Equal Protection Clause] have the burden to negate every conceivable basis which might support it.” Lee v. SC Dept. of Natural Resources, 339 S.C. 463, 470 n. 8, 530 S.E.2d 112, 115 n.8 (2000)(citing to Fed'l Commc'ns Comm'n v. Beach Comm'n, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 113 S.Ct. 2096, 124 L.Ed.2d 211 (1993)). The Boiters argue the two-tier cap's different treatment of injured plaintiffs based on the identity of the tortfeasor does not have a rational basis sufficient to withstand constitutional scrutiny. Respondents counter that this Court has consistently upheld the constitutionality of the monetary caps, and the Boiters have not put forth sufficient evidence to depart from this precedent.

This Court has upheld the constitutionality of the statutory caps in three prior cases. In Wright, the Court upheld the general existence of statutory caps. Wright, 301 S.C. at 292, 391 S.E.2d at 570. There, a child was injured while working with a product on the school district's premises. Id. at 284, 391 S.E.2d at 566. Wright, who was the child's mother, and the child filed actions against the school district, among other entities. See id. The circuit court granted judgment to Wright and the child in the amount of $750,000. Id. at 285, 391 S.E.2d at 566. Wright and the child appealed, arguing numerous constitutional challenges, including equal protection. See id. at 290, 391 S.E.2d at 569. This Court upheld the constitutionality of the statute, finding:

The limitation on damages as set forth in the statute bears a reasonable relationship to the legislative objectives as expressed in Section 15–78–20(a) of relieving the government from hardships of unlimited and unqualified liability and preserving the finite assets of governmental entities which are needed for an effective and efficient government. The limitations set forth in the statute rest on a reasonable basis and are not arbitrary in that the legislature has balanced the needs for services and demand for reasonable taxes against the fair reimbursement of injured tort victims. Finally, we find that the damage limitation provisions apply to similar plaintiffs in a similar manner.

Id. at 291, 391 S.E.2d at 570.

In Foster v. South Carolina Department of Highways & Public Transportation, 306 S.C. 519, 413 S.E.2d 31 (1992), the Court had an opportunity to examine the two-tier cap at issue in this case. Foster sued the Highway Department after she was involved in a car accident, claiming the Highway Department failed to give proper warning of a low shoulder and failed to maintain the highway. Foster was awarded three million dollars, and the circuit court reduced the verdict amount to $250,000. Id. at 522, 413 S.E.2d at 33–34. Foster appealed, claiming the two-tier cap was unconstitutional as a violation of her right to equal protection. Id.

This Court found Foster, as the party asserting the unconstitutionality of the statute, failed to meet her burden of proof to show that the classification was arbitrary and without any reasonable basis. See id. at 526–27, 413 S.E.2d at 36. The Court noted that it affords great deference to a legislative classification and will uphold a classification if it is “not plainly arbitrary and there is any reasonable hypothesis to support it.” Id. at 526, 413 S.E.2d at 36. In finding against Foster, we said, “The fact that the classification results in some inequity does not render it in violation of the Constitution.” Id. at 527, 413 S.E.2d at 36 (citing State v. Smith, 271 S.C. 317, 247 S.E.2d 331 (1978)). The Court also articulated a specific basis found in the statute for the two tiers: “These higher limits and mandated coverages are recognition by the General Assembly of significantly higher damages in cases of medical malpractice.” In regards to Foster's burden of proof, the Court instructed,

Foster must offer evidence that the legislative finding of higher awards in actions of medical malpractice was unfounded...

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