Boland v. Greer
Citation | 422 N.E.2d 1236 |
Decision Date | 13 July 1981 |
Docket Number | No. 3-479A109,3-479A109 |
Parties | Robert BOLAND, Administrator of the Estate of Lee Boland, Deceased, and Robert Boland, Appellant (Plaintiff below), v. Earl F. GREER, Appellee (Defendant below). |
Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
Appeal from the Porter Superior Court; Bruce W. Douglas, Judge.
Frank J. Galvin, Jr., Galvin & Galvin, Hammond, for appellant (plaintiff below).
James J. Nagy, Paul A. Rake, Eichhorn, Eichhorn & Link, Hammond, for appellee (defendant below).
John P. McQuillan, Samuel J. Bernardi, Jr., Robin D. Pierce, Spangler, Jennings, Spangler & Dougherty, P. C., Merrillville, for amicus curiae, Indiana Defense Lawyers Ass'n, Inc.
Jeffrey A. Cooke, Cooke & Bache, Lafayette, for amicus curiae, Indiana Trial Lawyers Ass'n.
Petition to Transfer Denied (For opinion of Court of Appeals
see 409 N.E.2d 1116)
ON PETITION TO TRANSFER
I must respectfully dissent from this Court's refusal to grant Boland's petition to transfer. In so acting, we perpetuate here today a wholly anomalous rule of law which, but for its roots in stare decisis, has no legal or factual basis. That rule is that the assessment of damages suffered by a parent for the wrongful death of a child cannot include the parent's loss of love, affection, and companionship. I would grant transfer and vacate the opinion of the Court of Appeals, Boland v. Greer, (1980) Ind.App., 409 N.E.2d 1116, wherein that court reaffirmed the above rule.
The prohibition against a parent's recovery for the loss of love, affection, society, and companionship which accompanies the wrongful death of a child is, as I have described it, anomalous to the case law which surrounds it. This Court has recognized that a parent's loss of companionship and mental suffering occasioned by the abduction of a minor child were compensable injuries. Montgomery v. Crum, (1928) 199 Ind. 660, 161 N.E. 251. This Court has held that a parent could recover damages for injured feelings and family dishonor resulting from the seduction of a daughter. Felkner v. Scarlet, (1867) 29 Ind. 154; Pruitt v. Cox, (1863) 21 Ind. 15. And this Court has recognized that a child's loss of love and affection occasioned by the wrongful death of a parent is a compensable injury. American Carloading Corp. v. Gary Trust & Sav. Bank, (1940) 216 Ind. 649, 25 N.E.2d 777; Richmond Gas Corp. v. Reeves, (1973) 158 Ind.App. 338, 302 N.E.2d 795.
American Carloading Corp., supra, as well as Richmond Gas Corporation v. Reeves, supra; State v. Daley, (1972) 153 Ind.App. 330, 287 N.E.2d 552, and New York Central Railroad Company v. Wyatt, (1962) 135 Ind.App. 205, 184 N.E.2d 657, stand for the proposition that the loss of love and affection are compensable under the general wrongful death statute, Ind.Code § 34-1-1-2 (Burns 1973). It is only under the statute relevant here, Ind.Code § 34-1-1-8 (Burns 1973), which specifically governs actions for the wrongful death of a minor child, that such injuries are not compensable-in-law. Louisville, N.A. & C. Ry. Co. v. Rush, (1891) 127 Ind. 545, 26 N.E. 1010; Siebeking v. Ford, (1958) 128 Ind.App. 475, 148 N.E.2d 194; Hahn v. Moore, (1956) 127 Ind.App. 149, 133 N.E.2d 900. But see Childs v. Rayburn, (1976) 169 Ind.App. 147, 346 N.E.2d 655. 1
What is the reason for the rule? Why the distinction between the general and specific wrongful death statutes? It is not by virtue of any language which the legislature employed in either statute; both are silent on the subject.
Rather, the prohibition is directly attributable to the common law rule that parents have a "property right" in their minor child's services. Louisville, N.A. & C. Ry. Co. v. Rush, supra; Siebeking v. Ford, supra; Hahn v. Moore, supra. The court in Siebeking explained:
The implication is not a subtle one: A parent's interest, legal or otherwise, in a minor child does not extend beyond the property right in the child's services.
As surely as this narrow view of a minor child's meaning to his or her parents calls to mind the classical works of Charles Dickens, so the origins of the rule have been traced to the era of industrial development which dominated nineteenth century England. Wycko v. Gnodtke, (1960) 361 Mich. 331, 105 N.W.2d 118. In Wycko, Justice Smith described the then-prevailing socio-economic mood and the development of Lord Campbell's Act, the precursor of our modern-day wrongful death statutes. He concluded:
"This, then, was the day from which our precedents come, a day when employment of children of tender years was the accepted practice and ther (sic) pecuniary contributions to the family both substantial and provable. It is not surprising that the courts of such a society should have read into the statutory words 'such damages as they (the jury) may think proportional to the injury resulting from such death' not only the requirement of a pecuniary loss, but, moreover, a pecuniary loss established by a wage benefit-less-costs measure of damages. Other losses were unreal and intangible and at this time in our legal history the courts would have no truck with what Chief Baron Pollock termed in Duckworth, supra, 'imaginary losses.' Loss meant only money loss, and money loss from the death of a child meant only his lost wages. All else was imaginary. The only reality was the King's shilling.
361 Mich. at 336, 105 N.W.2d at 121.
Here, neither the Court of Appeals nor the various parties which tendered briefs to this Court have even remotely suggested that a parent's interest in a child does not in fact extend beyond the value of the child's services. Nor has anyone attempted even distantly to imply that if a child dies, the parent does not suffer a loss of love, affection, and companionship. Nor has anyone maintained that when the death occurs by another's negligent act, the lost love, affection, and companionship is not a "natural consequence" of the negligence. See generally New York, Chicago & St. Louis R. Co. v. Henderson, (1957) 237 Ind. 456, 146 N.E.2d 531; Charlie Stuart Oldsmobile, Inc. v. Smith, (1976) 171 Ind.App. 315, 357 N.E.2d 247.
Why then is the rule perpetuated? Defendant Greer, as well as the amicus curiae brief filed on his behalf, asserts that the prohibition should continue because the damages are too "speculative" to allow recovery. That claim, simply stated, is a red herring. It is true that damages for lost love, affection, and companionship are not susceptible by mathematical computation, but that is not required by the law. New York, Chicago & St. Louis R. Co. v. Henderson, supra; Friendship Farms Camps, Inc. v. Parson, (1977) 172 Ind.App. 73, 359 N.E.2d 280. Rather, it is the well-settled rule that the existence and degree of psychological injuries may be determined by a jury based on "human experience." New York, Chicago & St. Louis R. Co. v. Henderson, supra. It is on this basis that juries have been entrusted with the responsibility to assess damages for numerous and assorted intangible injuries. See, e. g., Troue v. Marker, (1969) 253 Ind. 284, 252 N.E.2d 800 ( ); New York, Chicago & St. Louis R. Co. v. Henderson, supra ( ); Harness v. Steele, (1902) 159 Ind. 286, 64 N.E. 875 ( ); Kline...
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