Boland v. Morrill

• Decision Date: 13 January 1967
• Docket Number: No. 40174,40174
• Citation: 275 Minn. 496,148 N.W.2d 143
• Parties: Lee A. BOLAND, Appellant, v. Charles Henry MORRILL and Olson Manufacturing Company, Respondents.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Page 143

148 N.W.2d 143

275 Minn. 496

Lee A. BOLAND, Appellant, v. Charles Henry MORRILL and Olson Manufacturing Company, Respondents.

No. 40174.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Jan. 13, 1967.

Syllabus by the Court

1. A husband living with his wife is deemed to have the exclusive right to recover for past medical expenses resulting from injury to his wife, and the wife has no right of action except under unusual circumstances such as where she has paid or expressly or impliedly assumed liability for such expenses.

2. A recovery by a wife as an assignee of her husband for past medical expenses in her separate action for personal injuries caused by negligence bars a subsequent suit by her husband for his personal injuries and loss of services of his wife caused by the same negligence.

Nemerov, Perl & Hunegs, Minneapolis, Hanson & Grinley, Albert Lea, for appellant.

Peterson & Peterson, Albert Lea, Robb, Robb & Van Eps, Douglas D. Reid, Jr., and M. W. Gaughan, Minneapolis, for respondents.

OPINION

ROGOSHESKE, Justice.

The question presented on this appeal is whether a wife's recovery of her past medical expenses, as an assignee of her husband, in her separate action for personal injuries caused by negligence bars a subsequent suit by her husband for his personal injuries and loss of services of his wife caused by the same negligence.

The question arises in this way. On December 15, 1961, plaintiff, Lee A. Boland, Mabel Boland, his wife, and Ida Boland, his mother, were involved in a collision with an automobile owned and driven by Charles Henry Morrill. Lee A. Boland was driving an automobile owned by his employer, The Good Samaritan Home. Mabel Boland and Ida Boland were passengers in that vehicle. All of the Bolands sustained personal injuries. Mabel Boland, by William Orr, her guardian, brought suit against Charles Henry Morrill, his employer, Olson Manufacturing Company, and the Good Samaritan Society. Ida Boland sued the same defendants and added her son, Lee A. Boland. Both claimants were represented by counsel who represents plaintiff in this action. In the Ida Boland case, the Good Samaritan Society and Lee A. Boland, represented by counsel employed by an insurance carrier, cross-claimed for indemnity. Charles Henry Morrill sued the Good Samaritan Society and Lee A. Boland. These cases were consolidated and tried to verdict in October 1962.

During the course of trial, Lee A. Boland was called as witness for his wife. As the trial court expressly found in this action, by plaintiff husband's testimony he orally waived and assigned to his wife his right to recover past medical expenses incurred in treating her injuries. Although the wife had separate earnings, there is no evidence that she either paid or personally incurred or assumed liability for these expenses or that her husband refused or was unable to pay them. Mabel Boland recovered $125,000, of which approximately $11,000 was for medical expenses. Her recovery was based upon findings by special verdict that, which both drivers were negligent, the negligence of Charles Henry Morrill was the sole cause of the collision. Judgment in the Mabel Boland action was entered against Morrill and Olson Manufacturing Company on November 1, 1962. ¹

On December 5, 1962, Lee A. Boland brought the present action against Morrill and Olson for his personal injuries and for the loss of services of his wife resulting from the same accident. He did not include as an element of damages his wife's medical expenses. Defendants' motion for summary judgment was granted on the ground that he had split a single and indivisible cause of action. The court, applying the rule of former adjudication as declared in Myhra v. Park, 193 Minn. 290, 258 N.W. 515, held the remainder of his cause of action to be barred.

1. Necessarily underlying the court's ruling is a determination that the wife has no right to sue for medical expenses absent the husband's assignment. If a wife living with her husband under the circumstances presented has such right to sue, the husband's assignment was mere surplusage and the rule against splitting the cause of action would not apply.

It is a widely accepted general rule that at common law, and even under provisions of modern statutes emancipating a married woman from her husband, the husband is deemed to have the exclusive right to recover for past medical expenses made necessary by injury to his wife and the wife has no right to action except under unusual circumstances such as where she has paid or expressly or impliedly assumed liability for such expenses. Annotation, 66 A.L.R. 1189. The reason for the rule is that married women's acts removing the disability of married women to independently contract and incur liability were not intended to free the husband of his common-law duty to support his wife and to be liable for her necessities. Our agreement with the general rule was first declared in Belyea v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S.S.M. Ry. Co., 61 Minn. 224, 63 N.W. 627. Earlier, Skoglund v. Minneapolis St. Ry. Co., 45 Minn. 330, 47 N.W. 1071, 11 L.R.A. 222, recognized the husband's right to recover. In Libaire v. Minneapolis & St. L.R. Co., 113 Minn. 517, 523, 130 N.W. 8, 10, upholding the wife's right to recover her loss of wages, the court approved the general rule and stated:

'* * * It is well settled * * * in this state, that where damages to a wife, resulting from defendant's actionable fault, have in no part been caused by the wife's own wrong, two distinct causes of action may accrue--one to her, for the direct injuries to her person and the like; the other to her husband, for the consequential injuries to him, consisting of loss of her services and society, and of expense to which he may have been put, and the like. The wife is allowed to sue in her own name for her injuries which are direct.'

Thereafter, Fink v. Baer, 180 Minn. 433, 434, 230 N.W. 888, reiterated the rule announced in Belyea but, as an exception, permitted the wife to recover where her husband had died after the accident but before trial and she had assumed liability for and paid her medical expenses. The court stated that, even if the husband were living, the wife's assumption of liability and payment of expenses allows her to claim them because her payment shows that the husband had no cause of action for the expenses since he would not be and could not be 'put to expense' for them. Where the wife has paid such expenses, many cases hold that the wife may sue and recover. ² The Fink case was followed and extended in Paulos v. Koelsch, 195 Minn. 603, 263 N.W. 913, where, despite no proof of pretrial payment, the court allowed recovery by a wife who had not lived with nor been supported by her husband for 5 years. ³ Permission to sue and recover was upheld because the circumstantial evidence of her separate maintenance, coupled with her acceptance of the medical services which she alone requested, established by implication that she assumed liability for the expenses. The court brushed aside objections of the possibility of double recovery by stating that defendant's payment to the wife would be a perfect defense to a suit by the husband. ⁴ In other jurisdictions, mere assumption of liability for medical expenses, which, as demonstrated in Paulos v. Koelsch, supra, may be shown by circumstantial evidence, ⁵ has been held sufficient to support the wife's recovery. ⁶

Approaching the question from the standpoint of the wife's liability for medical services, it is true that under provisions of the married women's acts in this ⁷ and other states a married woman may enter into and be bound by any contract to the same extent as if unmarried. However, where the goods and services contracted for are 'necessaries' for which the husband is liable under his duty to support the wife, ⁸ the cases reviewed indicate that to render the wife personally liable they must be supplied on her individual credit. ⁹ That is to say, her liability must be based upon a showing of her unequivocal assumption of liability by contract, express or implied in fact from the circumstances. ¹⁰ Where she has not so contracted to the exclusion of her husband, she is not to be held liable, even though she receives the benefit, by reason of the presumption that a wife living with her husband is acting as his agent in purchasing services and articles of necessity. Flynn v. Messenger, 28 Minn. 208, 9 N.W. 759. In that case it was held that a seamstress could not recover wages in an action against a wife for services performed at the wife's request which were beneficial to the family despite the fact that she told the seamstress she had property of her own, this not being 'sufficient to shift the obligation of payment from the husband to the defendant or to render her liable.' ¹¹ 28 Minn. 210, 9 N.W. 760.

It should be noted that with respect to some articles of necessity the statute makes the wife jointly liable with the husband. Minn.St. 519.05 provides in part:

'* * * Where husband and wife are living together, they shall be jointly and severally liable for all necessary household articles and supplies furnished to and used by the family.'

However, Flynn v. Messenger, supra, held this statute, absent a clearly expressed legislative declaration, was not intended to change the common law and make the wife liable for all necessities absent her express assumption of liability. Whether or not such interpretation is now open to question, the phrase 'household articles and supplies furnished to and used by the family' cannot reasonably be deemed to include medical services.

Some states have statutes either expressly authorizing a wife's suit to recover her medical expenses in a personal injury action ¹² or have interpreted their married women's acts to permit the wife to recover this element of damages. ¹³

Section 519.01, ¹⁴ which was in effect when Belyea v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S.S.M. Ry. Co., sup...