Boland v. Wilkins
| Decision Date | 21 July 2020 |
| Docket Number | 3:18cv1958 (MPS) |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut |
| Parties | MATTHEW BOLAND, Plaintiff, v. WILKINS, et al., Defendants. |
On November 30, 2018, the plaintiff, Matthew D. Boland, a pro se inmate currently confined at the Cheshire Correctional Institution ("Cheshire") of the Connecticut Department of Correction ("DOC"), brought a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. §§§§ 1983, 1985, 1986, and 1988 against five DOC officials: Lieutenant Wilkins, Correctional Officer Orengo, Correctional Officer Duquette, Correctional Officer Mulligan, and another official named Mendez. Compl. (ECF No. 1). In an amended complaint filed on December 14, 2018, Boland alleged violation of his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Am. Compl. (ECF No. 7). He also raised state law claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress, assault, and battery. Id. at ¶¶ 14-16.
In an initial review order, the court permitted Boland's Eighth Amendment claims of excessive force and state law claims of assault and battery to proceed against Correctional Officer Orengo, Correctional Officer Duquette, and Lieutenant Wilkins ("the Defendants") in their individual capacities for damages. (ECF No. 16). All other claims were dismissed. Id.
The Defendants have filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that they have not violated the Eighth Amendment and cannot be held liable for assault and battery. (ECF No. 39). Boland has filed opposition papers. (ECF No. 49).
A motion for summary judgment may be granted only where there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(a), Fed. R. Civ. P.; see also Nick's Garage, Inc. v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 875 F.3d 107, 113-14 (2d Cir. 2017). "A genuine issue of material fact exists if 'the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.'" Nick's Garage, 875 F.3d at 113-14 (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)).
The moving party bears the initial burden of informing the court of the basis for its motion and identifying the admissible evidence it believes demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once the moving party meets this burden, the nonmoving party must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Wright v. Goord, 554 F.3d 255, 266 (2d Cir. 2009). He cannot "rely on conclusory allegations or unsubstantiated speculation but must come forward with specific evidence demonstrating the existence of a genuine dispute of material fact." Robinson v. Concentra Health Servs., 781 F.3d 42, 34 (2d Cir. 2015) (quotation marks and citation omitted). To defeat a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must present such evidence as would allow a jury to find in his favor. Graham v. Long Island R.R., 230 F.3d 34, 38 (2d Cir. 2000). The Court construes the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Hoyt v. Andreucci, 433 F.3d 320, 327 (2d Cir. 2006). Although the court is required to read a self-represented "party's papers liberally and interpret them to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest," Willey v. Kirkpatrick, 801 F.3d 51, 62 (2d Cir. 2015), "unsupported allegations do not create a material issue of fact" and do not overcome a properly supported motion for summary judgment. Weinstock v. Columbia Univ., 224 F.3d 33, 41 (2d Cir. 2000).
The Defendants have filed a Local Rule 56(a) statement of facts, with supporting exhibits, including video footage of the alleged incidents of misuse of force. Boland has filed an opposition brief, a statement of disputed facts, and exhibits. These materials reflect the following background.2
On March 6, 2016, Boland was in a physical altercation with another inmate at Cheshire. Defs.' SMF at ¶ 1. Correctional Officer Orengo, Correctional Officer Duquette, and Lieutenant Wilkins were all involved in the response to the incident. Id. at ¶ 2.
After Correctional Officer Duquette ordered Boland to cease and desist all actions toward the other inmate, he complied and was secured to the floor. Id. at ¶ 3. At this point, Correctional Officer Orengo assisted Correctional Officer Duquette by stabilizing Boland on the floor on while handcuffs were applied by Duquette.3 Id. at ¶ 5; Pl.'s SDF at ¶ 5. Boland was secured tothe floor until the other inmate with whom he had had the physical altercation was removed from the scene. Id. at ¶ 6. see Defs' ex. 4, Pl.'s Dep. at 36; see also Defs' ex. 3-1 at :26-:50.
While he was being held down, Boland was able to speak, but he asserts that he informed the correctional staff that he could not breathe. Defs.' SMF at ¶ 7. In his deposition, Boland stated that he was struggling to breathe due to the weight of the officers who were holding him face down with his head turned toward the right, and that he told them to get off of him because he could not breathe. See Defs.' ex. 4, Pl.'s Dep. at 34-38. Boland has acknowledged he was already "out of breath" when the officers responded to his "scuffle" with the other inmate. Id. at 37.
Under the direction of Lieutenant Wilkins, Correctional Officers Orengo and Duquette assisted Boland to his feet and commenced escorting him out of the housing unit where the physical altercation had occurred. Defs.' SMF at ¶ 11. During this escort, Boland and the escorting officers approached an area where a food cart and a juice cart were located. Id. at ¶ 13; see also Defs' ex. 2, video at 1:40. The approximately six-foot high food cart was located next to a three-foot high juice cart; neither cart was moving at the time that Boland's escort approached the area. Id.
See Defs' ex. 4, Pl.'s Dep. at 47.4 Correctional Officers Orengo and Duquette then secured Boland to a nearby wall, id. at ¶ 16, and Lieutenant Wilkins deployed a burst of chemical agent to Boland's facial area. Id. at ¶ 18; see Defs.' ex. 2 at 1:42. Boland was thereafter examined by medical staff, at which time he denied any injury or discomfort. Id. at ¶ 20. Boland maintains that he did not become aware of his injury until the adrenaline and effects of the chemical agent wore off. Pl.'s Opp. at ¶ 10.
On March 19, 2016, Boland reported extreme pain to his jaw and was transported to the UConn Medical Center Emergency Room for further evaluation. Id.; see Pl.'s Opp. Exs. 7-8.
Boland claims excessive force on the basis of Correctional Officer Orengo's holding him down (while Boland was cuffed behind his back) and continuing to apply pressure to Boland, despite Boland's statements that he could not breathe. See Pl's. Opp. at ¶¶ 9-10. In his Statement of Disputed Facts, Boland asserts that Lieutenant Wilkins used excessive force by spraying him with a chemical agent while he was cuffed and stabilized against a wall, and that Correctional Officers Duquette and Orengo could have intervened to prevent Boland from being sprayed with the chemical agent. Pl's SDF at ¶¶ 1, 3, 4; see also Boland's depo., ECF No. 39-4 at 16 ().
The Eighth Amendment protects against punishments that "involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain." Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976). An inmate alleging excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment has the burden of establishing both anobjective and a subjective component of his claim. Sims v. Artuz, 230 F.3d 14, 22 (2d Cir. 2000); see also Romano v. Howarth, 998 F.2d 101, 105 (2d Cir. 1993).
To meet the objective component, the inmate must show that the defendant's conduct was serious enough to have violated "contemporary standards of decency." Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A de minimis use of force will rarely be sufficient to satisfy the objective component unless that force is also "repugnant to the conscience of mankind." Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 38 (2010) (quoting Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9-10 (internal quotation marks omitted)). However, it is the force used, not the injury sustained, that "ultimately counts." Id. "When prison officials maliciously and sadistically use force to cause harm, contemporary standards of decency always are violated." Hudson, 503 at 9. The inmate need not have suffered a significant injury as a result of the defendant's conduct to satisfy the objective component. See Wilkins, 559 U.S. at 37 (2010).
The subjective component requires the inmate to show that the prison officials acted wantonly and focuses on "whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm." Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7 (citing Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-321 (1986)). The court considers factors including "the need for application of force, the relationship between that need and the amount of force used, the threat reasonably perceived by the responsible officials, and any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response." Id. (internal quotations and citation omitted).
Officers are liable not only when they use excessive force themselves, but also when they fail to intervene to stop the excessive use of force by another officer when they are in a position to observe the...
To continue reading
Request your trial