Bolar v. Frank
Decision Date | 11 July 1991 |
Docket Number | No. 1699,D,1699 |
Citation | 938 F.2d 377 |
Parties | 56 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 577, 56 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 40,871 Sheila M. BOLAR, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Anthony M. FRANK, Postmaster General of the United States Postal Service, Defendant-Appellee. ocket 91-6060. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit |
Denny Chin, New York City, for plaintiff-appellant.
Tai H. Park, Asst. U.S. Atty., Southern District of New York, New York City (Otto G. Obermaier, U.S. Atty. for the Southern District of New York, Marla Alhadeff, Asst. U.S. Atty., Southern District of New York, New York City, of counsel), for defendant-appellee.
Before MESKILL, KEARSE and McLAUGHLIN, Circuit Judges.
Shelia M. Bolar appeals from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, Patterson, J., dismissing her complaint against her former employer, the Postmaster General of the United States Postal Service (USPS), for lack of venue.
Bolar claims that the Southern District of New York is an appropriate venue for this handicap discrimination action under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1391(e) or, alternatively, that the action should be transferred to the Southern District of Ohio rather than be dismissed. The USPS cross-appeals, contending that the district court also should have dismissed the action due to Bolar's failure to exhaust administrative remedies in enforcing her administrative award. We first address the question of venue.
The competing venue provisions are 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1391(e) and 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(f)(3). Section 1391(e) is a general venue provision. It permits a case to be brought against the federal government in the district where the plaintiff resides. Section 2000e-5(f)(3) was enacted two years after section 1391(e) and is part of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e et seq. The remedial and procedural provisions of Title VII, including section 2000e-5(f)(3), are incorporated in the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 701 et seq., under which Bolar brought this action. See 29 U.S.C. Sec. 794a(a)(1). Section 2000e-5(f)(3) states:
[A]n action may be brought in any judicial district in the State in which the unlawful employment practice is alleged to have been committed, in the judicial district in which the employment records relevant to such practice are maintained and administered, or in the judicial district in which the aggrieved person would have worked but for the alleged unlawful employment practice, but if the respondent is not found within any such district, such an action may be brought within the judicial district in which the respondent has his principal office.
Bolar concedes that, with respect to her lawsuit, the Southern District of New York does not satisfy any of the four bases for venue delineated in section 2000e-5(f)(3). If, however, section 1391(e) governs this action then Bolar, who currently resides in New York City, may bring her lawsuit in the Southern District of New York.
The relevant statutory language and case law convince us that section 2000e-5(f)(3) controls the question of venue in this instance. It is clear that section 1391(e) has its limitations. It applies to civil actions in which an agency of the United States is a defendant "except as otherwise provided by law." Section 2000e-5(f)(3), having been incorporated into the Rehabilitation Act, is one such law that "otherwise provide[s]." Moreover, venue for Bolar's right of action is circumscribed by the very statute that gives her the right to sue in the first place. See Stebbins v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 413 F.2d 1100, 1102-03 (D.C.Cir.) (per curiam) (, )cert. denied, 396 U.S. 895, 90 S.Ct. 194, 24 L.Ed.2d 173 (1969). By incorporating section 2000e-5(f)(3), the Rehabilitation Act clearly evinces congressional intent that venue for actions brought under the Act be limited to district courts having a connection with the alleged discrimination. See id. Another provision of Title VII also supports this interpretation. Section 2000e-16(d) of Title VII states that "[t]he provisions of section 2000e-5(f) through (k) of this title, as applicable, shall govern" employment discrimination actions. The "shall govern" language is mandatory. As such, it undermines Bolar's point that Title VII does not refer specifically to the inapplicability of section 1391(e). Finally, given the conflict between the two statutes, well settled principles of statutory construction dictate that the later, specific venue provision (section 2000e-5(f)(3)) applies rather than the earlier, general venue provision (section 1391(e)).
Almost uniformly, courts considering this question have applied section 2000e-5(f)(3) to determine venue in employment discrimination actions premised on Title VII or, as in this case, the Rehabilitation Act. See, e.g., Stebbins, 413 F.2d at 1102-03; Templeton v. Veterans Admin., 540 F.Supp. 695, 696-97 (S.D.N.Y.1982) ( ); Arrocha v. Panama Canal Comm'n, 609 F.Supp. 231, 234-35 (E.D.N.Y.1985) (same); Archuleta v. Sullivan, 725 F.Supp. 602, 604 (D.D.C.1989) ( ). Attempting to parry this authority, Bolar cites two district court cases, Eberhart v. Baker, 652 F.Supp. 1475, 1476 (W.D.Pa.1987), and Wright v. Columbia University, 520 F.Supp. 789, 795 (E.D.Pa.1981), in which the broader venue provisions of section 1391 were applied to employment discrimination actions. These cases deserve little weight, however. Neither of them acknowledges section 2000e-5(f)(3) or discusses the above case law.
Having determined that the venue provisions of section 2000e-5(f)(3) govern Bolar's claim, we must consider her alternative request. For the first time on appeal, she asks that rather than dismiss the action we transfer it pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1406(a). This request raises two questions. First, as an appellate court, do we have authority to transfer a case to a federal district court under section 1406(a)? Second, if we do, should we exercise that authority in this instance? The government, it bears note, has taken no position on the issue of our authority to transfer the action directly.
Section 1406(a) does not mention whether an appellate court may transfer an action to cure a venue defect. It only refers to a district court's authority to transfer a case to the appropriate judicial district. Other circuit courts, seeking to further judicial economy and the underlying policies of section 1406, have granted transfer requests to plaintiffs who did not make such a request before the district court. See Cox Enterprises, Inc. v. Holt, 691 F.2d 989, 990 (11th Cir.1982) ( ); cf. Dr. John T. MacDonald Foundation v. Califano, 571 F.2d 328, 332 (5th Cir.) (in banc) (, )cert. denied, 439 U.S. 893, 99 S.Ct. 250, 58 L.Ed.2d 238 (1978). Several circuit courts also have found an inherent power to transfer administrative review proceedings over which they have jurisdiction but not venue to other circuit courts. See, e.g., Alexander v. C.I.R., 825 F.2d 499, 501-02 (D.C.Cir.1987) (per curiam) ( ); Clark & Reid Co., Inc. v. United States, 804 F.2d 3, 7 (1st Cir.1986) ( ); Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 337 F.2d 249, 252 (10th Cir.1964) (transferring petition for review of administrative decision from Tenth Circuit, which did not have venue, to Eighth Circuit, which did). Cf. American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. F.C.C., 519 F.2d 322,...
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