Bolden, In re
| Decision Date | 05 May 1978 |
| Parties | In re Ex parte Willie BOLDEN. Ex parte Willie Bolden. 77-418. |
| Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Joel L. Sogol, Asst. Public Defender, Tuscaloosa, for petitioner.
William J. Baxley, Atty. Gen., and Rosa Gunter Hamlett, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
Willie Bolden, the petitioner, was arrested on October 18, 1977 for the offense of first degree burglary, which he had allegedly committed earlier that morning. The Tuscaloosa County Grand Jury indicted Bolden on November 4, 1977, and he was arraigned on November 9. At the time of the alleged offense, and at his indictment and arraignment, Bolden was seventeen years of age.
Beginning January 1, 1978 the age below which individuals are entitled to treatment as juveniles was raised from seventeen to eighteen. Section 12-15-1(3)(b), Code of Alabama 1975. Since Bolden was still seventeen, 1 he filed a motion to transfer the proceedings to juvenile court on February 16, 1978. The trial judge denied the motion on March 3, and Bolden petitioned the Court of Criminal Appeals for a writ of mandamus, which was denied on March 22. This Court granted Bolden's petition for writ of certiorari on April 4, 1978.
The issue presented in this case is one of first impression: Is an individual entitled to treatment as a juvenile when he fits the definition of a "child" at the time of his trial, though he did not fit the definition of a "child" at the time of his alleged offense? After a thorough review of the Alabama statutes governing juvenile proceedings, 2 we must answer this question in the negative, and we affirm the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals.
The Judicial Article Implementation Act, Act No. 1205, Regular Session 1975, repealed the prior law governing juvenile proceedings and replaced it with a new article governing such proceedings. Under the prior law the juvenile court had original and exclusive jurisdiction over a "delinquent child," which was defined as a child who commits a criminal offense while under the age of sixteen. Title 13, sections 350(3), 351, Code of Alabama 1940 (Recomp. 1958). However, only those individuals who were under sixteen when brought before the circuit court on criminal charges were required to be transferred to the juvenile court. Id. § 363. Thus, under these prior statutes the determination of the defendant's age for purposes of juvenile court jurisdiction was made at the time of trial. Davis v. State, 259 Ala. 212, 66 So.2d 714 (1953); Mayton v. State, 52 Ala.App. 626, 296 So.2d 249 (1974).
The new chapter on juvenile proceedings changed these provisions in two ways. First, the jurisdictional age was increased from sixteen to seventeen when the chapter became effective, and after December 31, 1977 it was further increased to eighteen:
Section 12-15-1, Code of Alabama 1975 (emphasis added). Second, the above-quoted definition of "child" and the transfer statute quoted below require the defendant's age for purposes of juvenile court jurisdiction to be determined at the time of the alleged crime: 3
Id. § 12-15-33(a) (emphasis added). Thus, these provisions clearly require an individual's status as a "child" to be determined at the time of the alleged offense under the definition of "child" then in effect.
However, petitioner argues that after December 31, 1977, when the maximum age for juvenile jurisdiction was raised to eighteen, the juvenile court had "exclusive original jurisdiction" over petitioner's proceedings under section 12-15-30(a)(1), Code of Alabama 1975. Therefore, petitioner would have the trial judge, under the transfer provision in section 12-15-33(a), apply the current definition of "child" not the definition in effect when the alleged offense occurred to determine whether the petitioner was entitled to treatment as a juvenile. 4
An adoption of the petitioner's construction of these provisions would result in the automatic transfer of cases from the trial courts to the juvenile courts after December 31, 1977 a result not provided for nor intended by the Legislature. At a time when judicial economy is an important legislative goal, we do not believe the Legislature intended that the indictment and arraignment of a minor, over whom the trial court had proper jurisdiction,...
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