Bolden v. Dart

• Decision Date: 23 July 2013
• Docket Number: No. 11 C 8661,11 C 8661
• Parties: VAN ALEXANDER BOLDEN, Plaintiff, v. TOM DART, DANIEL MORECI, STEVE GLUSZEK, and MICHAEL MILLER, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

VAN ALEXANDER BOLDEN, Plaintiff,

v.TOM DART, DANIEL MORECI, STEVE GLUSZEK, and MICHAEL MILLER, Defendants.

No. 11 C 8661

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION

July 23, 2013

Judge Feinerman

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Van Alexander Bolden, presently in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections, brought this pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. His complaint alleges that Cook County Sheriff Tom Dart, Executive Director Michael Miller, Superintendent Daniel Moreci, and Correctional Officer Steve Gluszek were deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of harm posed to him by other detainees at Cook County Jail. Doc. 6. Defendants have moved for summary judgment. Doc. 48. The motion is granted.

Background

Consistent with the local rules, Defendants filed a Local Rule 56.1(a)(3) statement of undisputed facts along with their summary judgment motion. Doc. 49. Each substantive assertion of fact in the Local Rule 56.1(a)(3) statement cites evidentiary material in the record and is supported by the cited material. See N.D. Ill. L.R. 56.1(a) ("The statement referred to in (3) shall consist of short numbered paragraphs, including within each paragraph specific references to the affidavits, parts of the record, and other supporting materials relied upon tosupport the facts set forth in that paragraph."). Also consistent with the local rules, Defendants filed and served on Bolden a Local Rule 56.2 Notice, which explains in detail the requirements of Local Rule 56.1. Doc. 51. Bolden filed a Local Rule 56.1(b)(3)(B) response. Doc. 55 at 1-12. The response expressly admits ¶¶ 1, 3, 4, 7, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 22, 26, 27, 28, and 29 of Defendants' Local Rule 56.1(a)(3) statement. Id. at ¶¶ 1, 3, 4, 7, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 22, 26, 27, 28, and 29. The response denies the remaining paragraphs of the Local Rule 56.1(a)(3) statement, but the denials violate Local Rule 56.1 in several respects.

The first violation concerns Local Rule 56.1(b)(3)(B)'s requirement that the non-movant's response to the movant's Local Rule 56.1(a)(3) statement "respon[d] to each numbered paragraph in the moving party's statement, including, in the case of any disagreement, specific references to the affidavits, parts of the record, and other supporting materials relied upon." N.D. Ill. L.R. 56.1(b)(3)(B) (emphasis added). Paragraphs 11, 17, and 31 of Bolden's Local Rule 56.1(b)(3)(B) response do not cite any record evidence to support his denial of the facts asserted in the corresponding paragraphs of Defendants' Local Rule 56.1(a)(3) statement. Doc. 55 at ¶¶ 11, 17, 31. Accordingly, those paragraphs of the Local Rule 56.1(a)(3) statement are deemed admitted. See Cracco v. Vitran Express, Inc., 559 F.3d 625, 632 (7th Cir. 2009); FTC v. Bay Area Bus. Council, Inc., 423 F.3d 627, 634 (7th Cir. 2005); Smith v. Lamz, 321 F.3d 680, 682-83 (7th Cir. 2003); Waldridge v. Am. Hoechst Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 922 (7th Cir. 1994) (collecting cases).

Second, ¶¶ 2, 5, 6, 8, 9, 16, 18, 19, 21, 23, 24, 25, 30, 32 of Bolden's Local Rule 56.1(b)(3)(B) response cite his affidavit (Doc. 55 at 13-20) to support his denials of the facts asserted in the corresponding paragraphs of Defendants' Local Rule 56.1(a)(3) statement. Doc.55 at ¶¶ 2, 5, 6, 8, 9, 16, 18, 19, 21, 23, 24, 25, 30, 32. The eight-page, single-spaced affidavit is not divided into paragraphs or sections, and the above-referenced paragraphs of Bolden's Local Rule 56.1(b)(3)(B) statement cite the affidavit in its entirety rather than any particular page. This violates Local Rule 56.1(b)(3)(B). As the Seventh Circuit has held:

[W]here a non-moving party denies a factual allegation by the party moving for summary judgment, that denial must include a specific reference to the affidavit or other part of the record that supports such a denial. Citations to an entire transcript of a deposition or to a lengthy exhibit are not specific and are accordingly, inappropriate. A court should not be expected to review a lengthy record for facts that a party could have easily identified with greater particularity.

Ammons v. Aramark Uniform Servs., Inc., 368 F.3d 809, 817-18 (7th Cir. 2004) (emphasis added); see also Brasic v. Heinemann's, Inc., 121 F.3d 281, 285 (7th Cir. 1997). And as a judge sitting in this District has explained:

"[S]pecific reference" [in Local Rule 56.1(b)(3)(B)] means including proper ... citations to exact pieces of the record that support the factual contention contained in the paragraph. In other words, citations must include page (or paragraph) numbers, as opposed to simply citing an entire deposition, affidavit, or other exhibit document. District courts are not obliged in our adversary system to scour the record looking for factual disputes. Factual allegations not properly supported by citation to the record are nullities.

Malec v. Sanford, 191 F.R.D. 581, 583 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Corley v. Rosewood Care Center, Inc. of Peoria, 388 F.3d 990, 1001 (7th Cir. 2004); Banks v. Fuentes, 2012 WL 6184880, at *3-4 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 11, 2012); Diadenko v. Folino, 890 F. Supp. 2d 975, 982 n.4 (N.D. Ill. 2012). Because Bolden has failed to properly controvert ¶¶ 2, 5, 6, 8, 9, 16, 18, 19, 21, 23, 24, 25, 30, 32 of Defendants' Local Rule 56.1(a)(3) statement, those paragraphs are deemed admitted.

Third, numerous paragraphs of Bolden's Local Rule 56.1(b)(3)(B) response make factual assertions that go well beyond the facts asserted in the corresponding paragraphs of Defendants' Local Rule 56.1(a)(3) statement. Doc. 55 at ¶¶ 5, 6, 8, 9, 11, 16, 17, 18, 19, 21, 23, 24, 31. To the extent that those extraneous factual assertions are supported with no record citations or with only Bolden's affidavit, they will be ignored for the reasons stated above. To the extent that those extraneous assertions are supported with reasonably specific record citations, see id. at ¶¶ 18, 19, 23, 31, they will be ignored because a non-movant seeking to assert facts that go beyond what is fairly responsive to the movant's factual assertions must do so not in his Local Rule 56.1(b)(3)(B) response, but in a Local Rule 56.1(b)(3)(C) statement of additional facts that require the denial of summary judgment. See Johnson v. Cnty. of Cook, 2012 WL 2905485, at *12 (N.D. Ill. July 16, 2012) ("It is inappropriate for a non-movant to include additional facts, meaning facts extraneous to the substance of the paragraph to which the non-movant is responding, in a Local Rule 56.1(b)(3)(B) response. Rather, Local Rule 56.1 requires specifically that a litigant seeking to oppose a motion for summary judgment file a response that contains a separate statement under Local Rule 56.1(b)(3)(C) of any additional facts that require the denial of summary judgment.") (first emphasis added, citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The court therefore will disregard the extraneous facts set forth in Bolden's Local Rule 56.1(b)(3)(B) response. See Ciomber v. Cooperative Plus, Inc., 527 F.3d 635, 643-44 (7th Cir. 2008) (affirming the district court's refusal to consider additional facts set forth in the non-movant's Local Rule 56.1(b)(3)(B) response); Eason v. Nolan, 416 F. App'x 569, 569-70 (7th Cir. 2011) (same); Levin v. Grecian, 2013 WL 2403642, at *1 (N.D. Ill. May 31, 2013); Johnson, 2012 WL 2905485, at *12.

Finally, ¶ 16 of Bolden's Local Rule 56.1(b)(3)(B) response incorrectly denies that the evidentiary materials cited by Defendants in the corresponding paragraph of their Local Rule 56.1(a)(3) statement support the factual assertion in that paragraph. Doc. 55 at ¶ 16. Paragraph 16 of Defendants' Local Rule 56.1(a)(3) statement cites Bolden's deposition transcript for the proposition that "[a]pproximately around 11:00 a.m. [on August 29, 2011,] Officer Gluszek let Plaintiff out of his cell per Plaintiff's request." Doc. 49 at ¶ 16. Bolden vigorously maintains that the cited deposition testimony does not support the proposition that he asked to be let out of his cell. Doc. 55 at ¶ 16. As the deposition testimony itself shows, Bolden is incorrect. Doc. 49-4 at 68-69 ("Q. Now, you said you had been waiting to go to sick call, right? A. Yes, because I had put in for it. The interlock door right there before you go to sick call. So I was anticipating that. I just got back and they gave me all my medicine. ... Q. So why had you requested to go back to sick call? A. For my medications. Q. Okay. So then when you — you walked out of your cell, correct? A. Yes, I walked. Yeah, I walked out my cell. A. And was Officer Glus[z]ek out there? A. He shut my door and locked it."). The factual dispute is immaterial in any event.^*

This court may and should strictly enforce Local Rule 56.1. See Stevo v. Frasor, 662 F.3d 880, 886-87 (7th Cir. 2011) ("Because of the high volume of summary judgment motions and the benefits of clear presentation of relevant evidence and law, we have repeatedly held that district judges are entitled to insist on strict compliance with local rules designed to promote theclarity of summary judgment filings"); Patterson v. Ind. Newspapers, Inc., 589 F.3d 357, 360 (7th Cir. 2009) ("[w]e have repeatedly held that the district court is within its discretion to strictly enforce compliance with its local rules regarding summary-judgment motions"); Cichon v. Exelon Generation Co., 401 F.3d 803, 809 (7th Cir. 2005) ("We have ... repeatedly held that a district court is entitled to expect strict compliance with Rule 56.1."). Whether they seek or oppose summary judgment, parties have a right to expect that Local Rule 56.1 will be enforced and that facts not properly presented under the rule will be disregarded. See Renta v. Cnty. of Cook, 2011 WL 249501, at *1-2 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 26, 2011). Bolden's status as a pro se litigant does not excuse him from complying with Local Rule 56.1. See McNeil v. United States, 508...