Bolduc v. Pioneer Plastics Corp.

• Decision Date: 02 April 1973
• Citation: 302 A.2d 577
• Parties: Wilfred BOLDUC v. PIONEER PLASTICS CORPORATION &/or American Mutual Liability.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

Page 577

302 A.2d 577

Wilfred BOLDUC v.PIONEER PLASTICS CORPORATION &/or American Mutual Liability.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

April 2, 1973.

Fales & Fales by Roscoe H. Fales, Lewiston, for plaintiff.

Mahoney, Robinson, Mahoney & Norman by Robert F. Hanson, Portland, for defendant.

Before DUFRESNE, C. J., and WEBBER, WEATHERBEE, WERNICK and ARCHIBALD, JJ.

DUFRESNE, Chief Justice.

This is an appeal under 39 M.R.S.A. § 103 from a pro forma decree of the Superior Court reflecting as it must the decree of the Industrial Accident Commission ordering that 'compensation be paid to the Employee at the rate of fifty (50%) percent, being Thirty-five dollars and sixty-two cents ($35.62) per week in the event the Employee does not find employment, and at varying rates if he does until further order of the Industrial Accident Commission.'Plaintiff contends that the Commission erred as a matter of law when it decreed compensation for partial incapacity instead of allowing benefits based on total disability as prayed for in his petition for further compensation.

On June 23, 1970Wilfred Bolduc while employed by Pioneer Plastics Corporation sustained a compensable injury when in the course of his work as janitor-custodian he incurred a tear of the rotator cuff of the right shoulder.Surgical intervention was made to repair the injury and, while undergoing post-operative treatment and during convalescence, Bolduc was totall incapacitated for work within the purview of 39 M.R.S.A. § 54 and received compensation benefits for 16 5/6 weeks at the rate of $71.23 upon agreement of the parties approved by the Commissioner of Labor and Industry pursuant to 39 M.R.S.A., § 94.Returning to his job with Pioneer Plastics Corporation on October 15, 1970 Bolduc agreed to the discontinuance of compensation.Discharged on June 7, 1971 from his employment for inability fully to perform his janitorial duties, he filed the instant petition on August 13, 1971 seeking further compensation based on total incapacity for work.The issue before us is, whether the Commission erred in allowing benefits on the basis of 50% partial disability?The appeal is denied.

We note initially that the plaintiff in his brief argues that, absent an express actual finding of fact by the Commission that the employee was suffering from partial or total disability, the Law Court is free to make its own specific findings from the evidence.We decry, as does the plaintiff, the failure of the Commission to make specific findings of the underlying facts supportive of the ultimate facts and conclusions of law.The Commission has a duty to make specific findings of the basic facts which in its view of the evidence support its final order.In this way, the Commission will establish an adequate basis in the record for proper review on appeal.The statute contemplates no less.¹We might say, as did this Court in Leclerc v. Gilbert, 1957, 152 Me. 399, 131 A.2d 202, that the failure of the Commission to make an express finding of 50% partial incapacity for work in the instant case was 'trivial,' in that by a minimum of effort of one's deductive process, anyone would understand readily that such underlying fact by necessity had to be found before the Commission could reach the ultimate decision that compensation should be paid to the employee at the rate of 50%.The absence of findings of subordinate facts to shore up the finding of 50% disability for work cannot, however, be so easily dissipated, except that, in the instant case, the issue was not raised in the points on appeal and, on review, we believe the ultimate Commission decision has genuine support in the evidence.Specific findings of fact are more important on appeal than a recital of the evidence which serves at best a minimal purpose.We disapprove the practice.

Compensability for work disability or loss of earning capacity under our Workmen's Compensation Act is conditioned upon inability, as the result of a work-connected injury, to perform or obtain work suitable to the employee's qualifications and training.See, 2 Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law, § 57.00.'An employee who is so injured that he can perform no services other than those which are so limited in quality, dependability, or quantity that a reasonable stable market for them does not exist, may well be classified as totally disabled.'2 Larson supra, at section 57.51.'Inability to get work traceable directly to a compensable injury may be as effective in establishing disability, as inability to perform work.'2 Larson, supra, at section 57.60.See, Ray's Case, 1922, 122 Me. 108, 110, 119 A. 191.

But, whether there is disability due to the injury, the nature and extent of such disability, whether total or partial, are all questions of fact upon which the finding of the Commissioner is final if there is any credible competent evidence to support it.White v. Monmouth Canning Company, 1967, Me., 228 A.2d 795;Cote v. Central Tire Company, 1972, Me., 290 A.2d 368;Crosby v. Grandview Nursing Home, 1972, Me., 290 A.2d 375.

To show entitlement to compensation for total incapacity, Bolduc had the burden of proof and the duty to furnish evidence to the hearing Commissioner to convince him by the fair preponderance of the evidence that he, the plaintiff, had used reasonable efforts to obtain the kind of work which was within the tolerance of his physical condition and that he had failed, either because employers would not hire people with such limitational capacity to do the type of work which was within the plaintiff's capacity, or because there was no market in the area of the plaintiff's residence for the restricted work of which he was...