Boles v. Blackstock

• Court: Alabama Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: BEATTY
• Citation: 484 So.2d 1077
• Decision Date: 07 February 1986
• Parties: Earl BOLES and Mary Boles v. Tommy BLACKSTOCK and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, Inc., a Corporation. 84-823.

Page 1077

484 So.2d 1077 Earl BOLES and Mary Boles
v.
Tommy BLACKSTOCK and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, Inc., a Corporation. 84-823. Supreme Court of Alabama. Feb. 7, 1986.

Page 1078

B. Stephen Sansom, Florala, for appellants.

Ab Powell, III for Powell, Powell & Pearson, Andalusia, for appellees.

BEATTY, Justice.

This is an appeal by the plaintiffs, Earl Boles and Mary Boles, from an order granting the defendants' motion to dismiss. We affirm.

On November 16, 1983, Earl Boles was injured in a motor vehicle accident involving the truck driven by Boles and an automobile driven by defendant Tommy Blackstock. Blackstock's automobile was insured by State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, Inc. (State Farm), also a defendant herein. Pursuant to settlement negotiations conducted with the Boleses by James Kyzer, a claims adjuster for State Farm, the plaintiffs, along with Hinton Boles, the owner of the truck driven by Earl Boles, executed a release in favor of Tommy and Gayle Blackstock on January 18, 1984. The consideration stated for the release was $4,500.

Some eleven months after executing the release, the plaintiffs filed this action against Blackstock, claiming damages for injuries resulting from Blackstock's alleged negligent operation of his automobile on November 16, 1983. In his answer to the complaint, Blackstock denied that the plaintiffs are entitled to recover damages and alleged that their claims had been "paid and satisfied." Simultaneously with his answer, Blackstock filed a motion for summary judgment, which stated in part that "[t]hese plaintiffs have been paid in full and have executed a valid release, the terms of which release this defendant from any liability to these plaintiffs arising out of an accident that occurred on November 16, 1983." A copy of the release was attached as an exhibit to the motion for summary judgment. This motion was scheduled to be heard at 11:00 a.m. on February 11, 1985; however, on that date, but prior to the hearing, the plaintiffs amended their complaint, adding State Farm as an additional defendant and seeking a rescission of the release based on fraud and mutual mistake. The plaintiffs also sought damages against State Farm for its alleged fraudulent misrepresentations in negotiating the release. This amendment was accompanied by the affidavits of Earl and Mary Boles. A hearing was never held on Blackstock's motion for summary judgment.

On February 20, 1985, defendants Blackstock and State Farm filed a motion to dismiss plaintiffs' amended complaint on the grounds that it (1) failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted; (2) failed to state sufficient facts to constitute mutual mistake sufficient to set aside

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a release; (3) failed to state a claim for fraud upon which relief could be granted; (4) failed to set out sufficient facts with required specificity to state a claim for fraud upon which relief could be granted; and (5) showed affirmatively that the plaintiffs' claims had been paid and satisfied. Defendants' motion to dismiss was granted on March 4, 1985. This appeal followed.

At the outset, it is necessary to determine the standard of review applicable in this case. Plaintiffs state in their brief the standard applicable to motions to dismiss, namely, that "a plaintiff's complaint should not be dismissed on a motion to dismiss unless it appears beyond all doubt that the plaintiff can prove no facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief under some legally cognizable theory," citing Roberts v. Meeks, 397 So.2d 111 (Ala.1981). However, where matters outside the pleadings are considered on a motion to dismiss, the motion is converted into a motion for summary judgment as provided in Rule 12(c), A.R.Civ.P., regardless of its denomination and treatment by the trial court. Sims v. Lewis, 374 So.2d 298 (Ala.1979); Papastefan v. B & L Construction Co., 356 So.2d 158 (Ala.1978); Thorne v. Odom, 349 So.2d 1126 (Ala.1977). Once matters outside the pleadings are considered, the requirements of Rule 56, A.R.Civ.P., become operable and the "moving party's burden changes and he is obliged to demonstrate that there exists no genuine issue as to any material fact and that he is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure, Civil, § 1366 at 681 (1969).

In the present case, the trial court did not draft a separate order granting the defendants' motion to dismiss; rather, the motion itself was stamped "Granted" and was signed and dated by the trial court. Thus, there is nothing in the record that expressly indicates which material the trial court considered in ruling on the motion. Nevertheless, the plaintiffs' amendment to their complaint was accompanied by their own affidavits, and the amendment itself makes reference to the "Release dated January 18, 1984," a copy of which was attached to defendant Blackstock's motion for summary judgment that had been previously filed. Thus, it would appear that, in ruling on the defendants' motion to dismiss, the trial court necessarily considered matters outside the pleadings, thereby converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for judgment on the pleadings or for summary judgment. See Green v. Bradley Construction Co., 431 So.2d 1226 (Ala.1983); Rhett v. Southland Broilers, Inc., 421 So.2d 126 (Ala.Civ.App.1982); cf. Sims v. Lewis, supra. Furthermore, plaintiffs have included the previously filed material in the record on appeal, and specifically refer to and quote from this material in their brief on appeal (e.g., "In addition to the release in the case now before the Court being limited to ' ... all claims, ... which have resulted or may in the future develop from [the] accident' "). (Emphasis added.) Therefore, we must determine on review whether there existed a genuine issue as to any material fact and whether defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In so doing, we must view the record before us in the light most favorable to the parties opposing the motion. Papastefan v. B & L Construction Co., supra.

I.

Were defendants entitled to judgment as a matter of law on plaintiffs' claim for rescission on the grounds of mutual mistake?

The facts alleged to have constituted the mutual mistake are set forth in pertinent part in paragraphs 12 through 15 of Count IV of plaintiffs' amended complaint:

"12. Part of said settlement sum was payment to Plaintiff Mary Boles calculated at One Hundred Dollars ($100.00) per week for five (5) months for her claim for nursing Plaintiff Earl Boles during the five (5) month period Plaintiff Earl Boles was supposed to be incapacitated. Therefore, when James Kyzer persuaded Plaintiffs to execute the Release dated January 18, 1984, he relied on Plaintiff

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Earl Boles' statement that his doctor had said he would be back to normal within five (5) months of the date of said accident.

"13. Plaintiffs relied on the statement made by Plaintiff Earl Boles' doctor that he would be back to normal within five (5) months from the date of said accident.

"14. As of this date, Plaintiff Earl Boles' health has not returned to its state prior to the date of said accident and Plaintiff Earl Boles continues to suffer permanent injuries and pain and suffering as a result of the injuries he received in said accident. Plaintiffs did not discover that Plaintiff Earl Boles' health would not return to normal until sometime after April 16, 1984, the time at which Plaintiff Earl Boles' doctor had said his health would be back to normal. Further, Plaintiffs should not have [discovered] and did not discover the fraud perpetrated on them by State Farm through its Adjuster, James Kyzer, until after April 16, 1984.

"15. Plaintiffs and James Kyzer were mutually mistaken about the facts and extent of Plaintiff Earl Boles' physical injuries and said Release dated January 18, 1984, was executed and accepted based upon said mutual mistake."

These allegations were further...