Boleyn v. Colvin

• Decision Date: 22 September 2014
• Docket Number: Case No. 1:14-CV-3035-JPH
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Washington
• Parties: SUZANNE STRAGA BOLEYN, Plaintiff, v. CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.

SUZANNE STRAGA BOLEYN, Plaintiff, v. CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.

Case No. 1:14-CV-3035-JPH

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

September 22, 2014

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

BEFORE THE COURT are cross-motions for summary judgment. ECF No. 14, 15. Attorney Cory J. Brandt represents plaintiff (Boleyn). Special Assistant United States Attorney Leisa A. Wolf represents defendant (Commissioner). The parties consented to proceed before a magistrate judge. ECF No. 7. After reviewing the administrative record and the briefs filed by the parties, the court grants plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, ECF No. 14, and reverses and remands for further proceedings.

JURISDICTION

Boleyn applied for disability insurance benefits (DIB) September 24, 2009and social security income (SSI) benefits March 17, 2010, alleging disability beginning February 29, 2008 (Tr. 134-38, 139-45). The claims were denied initially and on reconsideration (Tr. 78-81, 84-88).

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Virginia M. Robinson held a hearing August 7, 2012. Boleyn, represented by counsel, a vocational expert and plaintiff's daughter, Vaile Boleyn, testified (Tr. 37-73). The ALJ issued an unfavorable decision November 16, 2012 (Tr. 19-30). The Appeals Council denied review, making the ALJ's decision final (Tr. 1-6). Boleyn filed this appeal pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) on March 27, 2014. ECF No. 1, 4.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The facts have been presented in the administrative hearing transcript, the ALJ's decision and the parties' briefs. They are only briefly summarized here and throughout this order as necessary to explain the Court's decision.

Boleyn graduated from high school and earned a bachelor's degree in criminal justice. She has worked as a sales person, car rental clerk and parts technician. Her last job, as a parts technician, lasted four years. She testified she was fired for calling in late and calling in sick too often. She has been unable to work since February 29, 2008, due to a combination of physical and mental impairments.

At the time of the hearing, Boleyn was 47 years old. She lived with her fifteen year old daughter. Boleyn testified she drives her daughter to and from school.Occasionally she shops for groceries and gasoline. Since 2002 she experiences flare-ups of Crohn's disease about twelve days a month but does not take medication for it. She takes an antidepressant and, for daily headaches, a combination of prescribed drugs. She applied for benefits alleging an inability to work due to Crohn's disease, chronic paroxysmal hemicrania [causing headaches], fibromyalgia and chronic fatigue syndrome (CFS) (Tr. 22, 29, 42-43, 46, 48-50, 52, 54, 67-68, 158-59).

SEQUENTIAL EVALUATION PROCESS

The Social Security Act (the Act) defines disability as the "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months." 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). The Act also provides that a plaintiff shall be determined to be under a disability only if any impairments are of such severity that a plaintiff is not only unable to do previous work but cannot, considering plaintiff's age, education and work experiences, engage in any other substantial work which exists in the national economy. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(B). Thus, the definition of disability consists of both medical and vocational components. Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9^th Cir. 2001).

The Commissioner has established a five-step sequential evaluation process for determining whether a person is disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. Stepone determines if the person is engaged in substantial gainful activities. If so, benefits are denied. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404. 1520(a)(4)(i), 416.920(a)(4)(i). If not, the decision maker proceeds to step two, which determines whether plaintiff has a medially severe impairment or combination of impairments. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). If plaintiff does not have a severe impairment or combination of impairments, the disability claim is denied. If the impairment is severe, the evaluation proceeds to the third step, which compares plaintiff's impairment with a number of listed impairments acknowledged by the Commissioner to be so severe as to preclude substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 416.920(a)(4)(iii); 20 C.F.R. § 404 Subpt. P App. 1. If the impairment meets or equals one of the listed impairments, plaintiff is conclusively presumed to be disabled. If the impairment is not one conclusively presumed to be disabling, the evaluation proceeds to the fourth step, which determines whether the impairment prevents plaintiff from performing work which was performed in the past. If a plaintiff is able to perform previous work that plaintiff is deemed not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 416.920(a)(4)(iv). At this step, plaintiff's residual functional capacity (RFC) is considered. If plaintiff cannot perform past relevant work, the fifth and final step in the process determines whether plaintiff is able to perform other work in the national economy in view of plaintiff's residual l functional capacity, age, education and past work experience. 20 C.F.R. §§404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v); Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137 (1987).

The initial burden of proof rests upon plaintiff to establish a prima facie case of entitlement to disability benefits. Rhinehart v. Finch, 438 F.2d 920, 921 (9^th Cir. 1971); Meanel v. Apfel, 172 F.3d 1111, 1113 (9^th Cir. 1999). The initial burden is met once plaintiff establishes that a mental or physical impairment prevents the performance of previous work. The burden then shifts, at step five, to the Commissioner to show that (1) plaintiff can perform other substantial gainful activity and (2) a "significant number of jobs exist in the national economy" which plaintiff can perform. Kail v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 1496, 1498 (9^th Cir. 1984).

Plaintiff has the burden of showing that drug and alcohol addiction (DAA) is not a contributing factor material to disability. Ball v. Massanari, 254 F.2d 817, 823 (9^th Cir. 2001). The Social Security Act bars payment of benefits when drug addiction and/or alcoholism is a contributing factor material to a disability claim. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423 (d)(2)(C) and 1382(a)(3)(J); Bustamante v. Massanari, 262 F.3d 949 (9^th Cir. 2001); Sousa v. Callahan, 143 F.3d 1240, 1245 (9^th Cir. 1988). If there is evidence of DAA and the individual succeeds in proving disability, the Commissioner must determine whether DAA is material to the determination of disability. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404. 1535 and 416.935. If an ALJ finds that the claimant is not disabled, then the claimant is not entitled to benefits and there is no need to proceed with the analysis to determine whether substance abuse is a contributingfactor. However, if the ALJ finds that the claimant is disabled, then the ALJ must proceed to determine if the claimant would be disabled if he or she stopped using alcohol or drugs.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Congress has provided a limited scope of judicial review of a Commissioner's decision. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). A Court must uphold a Commissioner's decision, made through an ALJ, when the determination is not based on legal error and is supported by substantial evidence. See Jones v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 993, 995 (9^th Cir. 1985); Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9^th Cir. 1999). "The [Commissioner's] determination that a plaintiff is not disabled will be upheld if the findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence." Delgado v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 570, 572 (9^th Cir. 1983)(citing 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)). Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla, Sorenson v. Weinberger, 514 F.2d 1112, 1119 n 10 (9^th Cir. 1975), but less than a preponderance. McAllister v. Sullivan, 888 F.2d 599, 601-02 (9^th Cir. 1989). Substantial evidence "means such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)(citations omitted). "[S]uch inferences and conclusions as the [Commissioner] may reasonably draw from the evidence" will also be upheld. Mark v. Celebreeze, 348 F.2d 289, 293 (9^th Cir. 1965). On review, the Court considers the record as a whole, not just the evidence supporting the decision of the Commissioner. Weetmanv. Sullivan, 877 F.2d 20, 22 (9^th Cir. 1989)(quoting Kornock v. Harris, 648 F.2d 525, 526 (9^th Cir. 1980)).

It is the role of the trier of fact, not this Court, to resolve conflicts in evidence. Richardson, 402 U.S. at 400. If evidence supports more than one rational interpretation, the Court may not substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner. Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1097; Allen v. Heckler, 749 F.2d 577, 579 (9^th Cir. 1984). Nevertheless, a decision supported by substantial evidence will still be set aside if the proper legal standards were not applied in weighing the evidence and making the decision. Brawner v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 839 F.2d 432, 433 (9^th Cir. 1987). Thus, if there is substantial evidence to support the administrative findings, or if there is conflicting evidence that will support a finding of either disability or nondisability, the finding of the Commissioner is conclusive. Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 1229-30 (9^th Cir. 1987).

ALJ'S FINDINGS

ALJ Robinson found Boleyn insured through September 30, 2013. At step one, she found Boleyn did not work at SGA levels after onset (Tr. 19, 21). At steps two and three, she found Boleyn suffers from chronic headaches, Crohn's disease, fibromyalgia and chronic fatigue syndrome (CFS), impairments that are severe but do not meet or medically equal a Listed impairment (Tr. 21, 23). The ALJ...