Bollenbacher v. Helena Chemical Co.

• Decision Date: 24 June 1996
• Docket Number: No. 1:95-CV-350.,1:95-CV-350.
• Citation: 934 F. Supp. 1015
• Parties: Gary BOLLENBACHER, Plaintiff, v. HELENA CHEMICAL COMPANY, as named Long Term Disability Plan; Helena Chemical Company, as named Plan Administrator; and UNUM Life Insurance Company of America, as de facto Plan Administrator of the Plan, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana

934 F. Supp. 1015

Gary BOLLENBACHER, Plaintiff, v. HELENA CHEMICAL COMPANY, as named Long Term Disability Plan; Helena Chemical Company, as named Plan Administrator; and UNUM Life Insurance Company of America, as de facto Plan Administrator of the Plan, Defendants.

No. 1:95-CV-350.

United States District Court, N.D. Indiana, Fort Wayne Division.

June 24, 1996.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

John C. Theisen, Mark S. Kittaka, Gallucci Hopkins and Theisen PC, Fort Wayne, IN, for Gary Bollenbacher.

Carolyn W. Spengler, Hunt Suedhoff Borror and Eilbacher, Fort Wayne, IN, Philip M. Berkowitz, Kenneth W. DiGia, Epstein, Becker and Green, New York City, for Helena Chemical Company.

Carolyn W. Spengler, Hunt Suedhoff Borror and Eilbacher, Fort Wayne, IN, Douglas D. Powers, Lisa M. Dillman, Baker and Daniels, Fort Wayne, IN, for Unum Life Insurance Company of America.

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER

WILLIAM C. LEE, District Judge.

This matter is before the court for resolution of a variety of motions and issues. Defendant Helena Chemical Company, as named Plan Administrator ("Helena"), filed a Motion to Dismiss on December 13, 1995. During January and February of 1996, the parties filed an array of motions and cross-motions. The court addressed most of those motions in an Order entered February 29, 1996. In that Order, the court determined, among other things, that Helena's Motion to Dismiss was in actuality a Motion for Summary Judgment. As such, the court took the motion under advisement and ordered Helena and plaintiff Bollenbacher ("Bollenbacher" or "plaintiff") to conduct further briefing on the issues raised by Helena. To that end, Helena filed a Supplemental Memorandum of Law in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment on March 29, 1996, and Bollenbacher filed a response on April 23, 1996. Helena then filed a Reply on May 7, 1996. Both parties incorporated into these briefs much of the argument presented in their initial briefs filed in January and February. Consequently, Helena's motion for summary judgment is now ripe for resolution.

In addition, on February 1, 1996, Bollenbacher filed a Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint. On February 12, 1996, having not yet received any response to this motion to amend, Magistrate Judge Cosbey granted plaintiff's motion.¹ (This case is on partial referral to the Magistrate pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and N.D.Ind.L.R. 72.1(c).) The defendants then protested, arguing that they intended to file a response. Thus, on February 14, 1996, Magistrate Judge Cosbey entered an Order granting defendants leave to file their response to the motion to amend. The Magistrate directed that "the Court will consider the response as a motion to reconsider the granting of the motion to amend to which the Plaintiff may file a reply." Helena then filed, on February 20, 1996, Defendant's Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint. Bollenbacher filed a Response to Helena Chemical Company's Motion to Reconsider the Court's Order Granting Plaintiff Leave to Amend His Complaint on March 11, 1996. Helena filed a reply on March 21, 1996. Defendant UNUM Life Insurance Company of America ("UNUM") filed a Motion for Clarification on February 21, 1996, seeking to clarify its obligation to answer or otherwise respond to plaintiff's amended complaint. On that same date, Magistrate Judge Cosbey granted the motion and ordered that UNUM's obligation to answer or otherwise respond to the amended complaint would be stayed pending the resolution of defendant Helena's Motion to Reconsider the order granting plaintiff leave to file his amended complaint. On May 14, 1996, plaintiff filed a Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint. Defendant Helena filed a Response in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion on May 31, 1996, and plaintiff filed a reply on June 14, 1996.

For the following reasons, defendant Helena Chemical Company's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED; defendant Helena's Motion for Reconsideration of this court's order granting plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint is GRANTED as to Counts II, III and IV of the amended complaint and DENIED as to Count I²; Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint is DENIED; and UNUM is hereby granted permission to file a Motion for Reconsideration of the court's previous Order granting plaintiff's request to file an amended complaint, as to Count V of that amended complaint only, to which plaintiff may file a response. UNUM's motion shall be filed within thirty (30) days of the date of this Order; plaintiff's response shall be filed within fifteen (15) days after service of UNUM's motion; and UNUM's reply, if any, shall be filed within fifteen (15) days after receipt of plaintiff's response.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Gary Bollenbacher was employed by Helena Chemical Company as a chemical applicator. He worked for Helena, and its predecessor, Riverside Warehouse Company, for nearly seven years. In early May of 1991, Bollenbacher sustained an injury while driving a chemical applicator truck. The incident allegedly resulted in spinal injuries which later led to degenerative disc disease. In October of 1992, Bollenbacher could no longer perform his job as a chemical applicator, and so Helena transferred him to a less physically demanding clerical position and continued to pay him his applicator's salary. Bollenbacher's health allegedly continued to deteriorate over the next eleven months, forcing him to miss many days of work. Bollenbacher claims that Helena offered him a position in one of the company's other facilities, but that he refused because it would entail a longer drive to and from work each day, only adding to his daily pain and suffering. On September 28, 1993, approximately three to four weeks after they offered him a transfer, Helena representatives informed Bollenbacher that he was being laid off from his clerical position.

The parties concede that at all times relevant to this controversy, Helena offered a long term disability plan to its employees, said plan having been purchased by the company from UNUM Life Insurance Company of America ("UNUM"). The policy, number 311769, had an effective date of December 1, 1983. Bollenbacher contends that he was wrongfully denied long term disability benefits under the plan, and he brought this action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"). The court will first address defendant Helena's Motion for Summary Judgment.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). However, Rule 56(c) is not a requirement that the moving party negate his opponent's claim. Fitzpatrick v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 916 F.2d 1254, 1256 (7th Cir. 1990). Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery, against a party "who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and in which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552-53, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The standard for granting summary judgment mirrors the directed verdict standard under Rule 50(a), which requires the court to grant a directed verdict where there can be but one reasonable conclusion. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A scintilla of evidence in support of the non-moving party's position is not sufficient to successfully oppose summary judgment; "there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff." Id. at 252, 106 S.Ct. at 2512; In Matter of Wildman, 859 F.2d 553, 557 (7th Cir. 1988); Klein v. Ryan, 847 F.2d 368, 374 (7th Cir.1988); Valentine v. Joliet Township High Sch. Dist. No. 204, 802 F.2d 981, 986 (7th Cir.1986). No genuine issue for trial exists "where the record as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party." Juarez v. Ameritech Mobile Communications, Inc., 957 F.2d 317, 322 (7th Cir.1992) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986)).

Initially, Rule 56 requires the moving party to inform the court of the basis for the motion, and to identify those portions of the "pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. at 2553. The non-moving party may oppose the motion with any of the evidentiary materials listed in Rule 56(c), but reliance on the pleadings alone is not sufficient to withstand summary judgment. Goka v. Bobbitt, 862 F.2d 646, 649 (7th Cir.1988); Guenin v. Sendra Corp., 700 F.Supp. 973, 974 (N.D.Ind.1988); Posey v. Skyline Corp., 702 F.2d 102, 105 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 960, 104 S.Ct. 392, 78 L.Ed.2d 336 (1983). In ruling on a summary judgment motion the court accepts as true the non-moving party's evidence, draws all legitimate inferences in favor of the non-moving party, and does not weigh the evidence or the credibility of witnesses. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-51, 106 S.Ct. at 2511. However, "it is a gratuitous cruelty to parties and their witnesses to put them through the emotional ordeal of a trial when the outcome is foreordained" and in such cases summary judgment is appropriate. Mason v. Continental Illinois Nat'l Bank, 704 F.2d 361, 367 (7th Cir.1983).

Substantive law determines which facts are material; that is, which facts might affect...