Bolling v. Jones, Case No. 3:13cv473/MCR/CJK

CourtUnited States District Courts. 11th Circuit. United States District Courts. 11th Circuit. Northern District of Florida
Decision Date16 October 2015
Docket NumberCase No. 3:13cv473/MCR/CJK
PartiesTROMONDO TOBIAS BOLLING, Petitioner, v. JULIE L. JONES, Respondent.

TROMONDO TOBIAS BOLLING, Petitioner,
v.
JULIE L. JONES,1 Respondent.

Case No. 3:13cv473/MCR/CJK

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA PENSACOLA DIVISION

October 16, 2015


ORDER and REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Before the court is a petition for writ of habeas corpus filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. 1). Respondent filed an answer, submitting relevant portions of the state court record. (Doc. 25). Petitioner replied. (Doc. 30). The matter is referred to the undersigned magistrate judge for report and recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 and N.D. Fla. Loc. R. 72.2(B). After careful consideration of all issues raised by petitioner, the undersigned concludes that no evidentiary hearing is required for the disposition of this matter. Rule 8(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts. The undersigned further concludes that

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the pleadings and attachments before the court show that petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief, and that the petition should be denied.

BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On November 14, 2008, petitioner was charged in Escambia County Circuit Court Case No. 08-CF-5285, with burglary of a conveyance with assault or battery (Count 1) and robbery without a weapon (Count 2). (Doc. 25, Ex. A).2 Petitioner went to trial, and the jury found him guilty of both counts as charged. (Ex. B). By judgment rendered July 24, 2009, petitioner was adjudicated guilty and sentenced on Count 1 to 20 years imprisonment followed by 5 years on probation, and a concurrent term of 15 years imprisonment on Count 2. (Ex. G.). The Florida First District Court of Appeal (First DCA) affirmed the judgment on April 14, 2011. Bolling v. State, 61 So. 3d 419 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) (copy at Ex. H). Petitioner's notice to invoke the discretionary jurisdiction of the Florida Supreme Court was dismissed as untimely on June 20, 2011. Bolling v. State, 67 So. 3d 198 (Fla. 2011) (Table) (unpublished opinion).

On April 5, 2012, petitioner filed a pro so motion for postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. (Ex. J). The motion was stricken as facially insufficient with leave to amend within thirty days. (Ex. K). Petitioner timely filed an amended Rule 3.850 motion. (Ex. L). The state circuit court summarily denied relief without an evidentiary hearing. (Ex. M). Petitioner appealed, and filed an initial brief. (Ex. N). The First DCA affirmed, per curiam and

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without a written opinion. Bolling v. State, 116 So. 3d 1265 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) (Table) (copy at Ex. O). The mandate issued August 6, 2013. (Ex. P).

Petitioner filed his federal habeas petition in this court on August 22, 2013. (Doc. 1). The petition raises three claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. (Id.). Respondent asserts that petitioner's claims fail for one or both of the following reasons: (1) the state courts' rejection of the claim was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, and did not involve an unreasonable determination of the facts; (2) the claim is procedurally defaulted. (Doc. 25). Petitioner filed a reply indicating that he rests on the arguments made in his petition. (Doc. 30, p. 1 ("Petitioner avers that it would be useless to issue a reply in this matter and therefore firmly stands on his initial pleadings that was previously filed.")).

LEGAL STANDARDS

Exhaustion and Procedural Default

Before bringing a § 2254 habeas action in federal court, a petitioner must exhaust all available state court remedies for challenging his conviction, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1),3 thereby giving the state the "'opportunity to pass upon and correct'

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alleged violations of its prisoners' federal rights." Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365, 115 S. Ct. 887, 130 L. Ed. 2d 865 (1995) (quoting Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275, 92 S. Ct. 509, 30 L. Ed. 2d 438 (1971) (citation omitted)). The petitioner "must give the state courts one full opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of the State's established appellate review process." O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845, 119 S. Ct. 1728, 144 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1999); Picard, 404 U.S. at 277-78. A claim that was not properly presented to the state court and which can no longer be litigated under state procedural rules is considered procedurally defaulted, i.e., procedurally barred from federal review. O'Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 839-40, 848, 119 S. Ct. 1728; Hittson v. GDCP Warden, 759 F.3d 1210, 1260 n.56 (11th Cir. 2014) ("Where a return to state court would be futile - because the petitioner's claims would clearly be barred by state procedural rules - a federal court can 'forego the needless judicial ping-pong' and treat unexhausted claims as procedurally defaulted." (quoting Snowden v. Singletary, 135 F.3d 732, 736 (11th Cir. 1998))); Chambers v. Thompson, 150 F.3d 1324, 1326-27 (11th Cir. 1998) (holding that federal habeas courts should enforce applicable state procedural bars even as to claims that were never presented to the state courts).

A petitioner seeking to overcome a procedural default must show cause and prejudice, or a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Tower v. Phillips, 7 F.3d 206, 210 (11th Cir. 1993). "For cause to exist, an external impediment, whether it be governmental interference or the reasonable unavailability of the factual basis for the

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claim, must have prevented petitioner from raising the claim." McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 497, 111 S. Ct. 1454, 113 L. Ed. 2d 517 (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488, 106 S. Ct. 2639, 91 L. Ed. 2d 397 (1986)). The miscarriage of justice exception requires the petitioner to show that "a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent." Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327, 115 S. Ct. 85, 130 L. Ed. 2d 808 (1995). "To establish the requisite probability, the petitioner must show that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him." Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327. Further:

a substantial claim that constitutional error has caused the conviction of an innocent person is extremely rare. To be credible, such a claim requires [a] petitioner to support his allegations of constitutional error with new reliable evidence - whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence - that was not presented at trial.

Id.

Section 2254 Standard of Review

Federal courts may issue habeas corpus relief for persons in state custody pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, as amended by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). Pub. L. 104-132, § 104, 110 Stat. 1214, 1218-19. Section 2254(d) provides, in relevant part:

(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim-

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

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(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2011).

The United States Supreme Court explained the framework for § 2254 review in Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 146 L. Ed. 2d 389 (2000).4 The appropriate test was described by Justice O'Connor as follows:

Under the "contrary to" clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by this court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than this Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Under the "unreasonable application" clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from this Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.

Id., 529 U.S. at 412-13 (O'Connor, J., concurring).

Employing the Williams framework, on any issue raised in a federal habeas petition upon which there has been an adjudication on the merits in a state court proceeding, the federal court must first ascertain the "clearly established Federal law," namely, "the governing legal principle or principles set forth by the Supreme Court at the time the state court render[ed] its decision." Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71-72, 123 S. Ct. 1166, 155 L. Ed. 2d 144 (2003). The law is "clearly established" only when a Supreme Court holding at the time of the state court

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decision embodies the legal principle at issue. Thaler v. Haynes, 559 U.S. 43, 47, 130 S. Ct. 1171, 175 L. Ed. 2d 1003 (2010); Bowles v. Sec'y for Dep't of Corr., 608 F.3d 1313, 1315 (11th Cir. 2010).

After identifying the governing legal principle(s), the federal court determines whether the state court adjudication is contrary to the clearly established Supreme Court case law. The adjudication is not contrary to Supreme Court precedent merely because it fails to cite to that precedent. Rather, the adjudication is "contrary" only if either the reasoning or the result contradicts the relevant Supreme Court cases. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8, 123 S. Ct. 362, 154 L. Ed. 2d 263 (2002) ("Avoiding th[e] pitfalls [of § 2254(d)(1)] does not require citation to our cases - indeed, it does not even require awareness of our cases, so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision contradicts them."). If the state court decision is contrary to clearly established federal law, the federal habeas court must independently consider the merits of the petitioner's claim. See Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 954, 127...

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