Bolln v. The Colorado & Southern Railway Co.

• Citation: 152 P. 486,23 Wyo. 395
• Decision Date: 13 November 1915
• Docket Number: 840
• Parties: BOLLN v. THE COLORADO & SOUTHERN RAILWAY CO
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Wyoming

152 P. 486

23 Wyo. 395

BOLLN v. THE COLORADO & SOUTHERN RAILWAY CO

No. 840

Supreme Court of Wyoming

November 13, 1915

ERROR to the District Court, Converse County; HON. CHARLES E WINTER, Judge.

The material facts are stated in the opinion.

Affirmed.

Harvey & Hawley, for plaintiffs in error.

Plaintiffs in error acquired title to the land by adverse possession and all of the elements of adverse possession were proven. (Bryant v. Cadle, Admr., 18 Wyo. 86.) Actual possession was shown. (Ellicott v. Pearl, 10 Pet 442, 9 U.S. (L. Ed.) 488; Erving v. Burnet, 11 Pet 52, 9 U.S. (L. Ed.) 629; Brumagim v. Bradshaw, 39 Cal. 24; Potts v. Magnes, 17 Colo. 364; Mason v Calumet Canal Co., 150 Ind. 699, 50 N.E. 85; Wilbur v. Cedar Rapids E. R. Co., 116 Ia. 65, 89 N.W. 101; Dickinson v. Bales, 62 Kan. 865, 61 P. 403; Bates v. Norcross, 14 Pick. 224; Twohig v Leamer, 48 Neb. 247, 67 N.W. 152.) Each case must depend on its own circumstances. (Polack v. McGrath, 32 Cal. 15; Foulke v. Bond, 41 N. J. 546; Lemon v. Heath, 53 Neb. 707, 74 N.W. 274; Roberts v. Richards, 84 Maine, 10, 24 A. 425.) Acts of ownership required varies according to the character of the land. (Ewing v. Burnet, supra; Simmons Creek Coal Co. v. Doran, 142 U.S. 443; Brumagin v. Bradshaw, supra; Mason v. Calumet Coal Co., supra; Brown v. Rose, 55 Ia. 734; Houghton v. Wilhemy, 157 Mass. 521, 32 N.E. 861; Twohig v. Leamer, supra.) Buildings are proof of actual possession. (2 Corpus Juris, 59.) Notoriety of possession is unnecessary where the owner has actual knowledge of such possession. (Brown v. Cockrell, 33 Ala. 47; Clark v. Gilbert, 39 Conn. 94; McCaughn v. Young, 85 Miss. 277, 37 So. 839; Allen v. Mansfield, 118 Mo. 343, 18 S.W. 901; Dausch v. Crane, 109 Mo. 323, 19 S.W. 61; Sheaffer v. Eakman, 56 Pa. St. 144; McAnliff v. Parker, 10 Wash. 141, 38 P. 744.) Actual or formal notice to the owners is unnecessary to give possession the element of openness and notoriety. (2 C. J. 77; Holtzman v. Douglas, 168 U.S. 278; Florida Southern R. Co. v. Loring, 51 F. 932; Black v. Tennessee Coal Co., 93 Ala. 109, 9 So. 527; School District No. 8 v. Lynch, 33 Conn. 330; Carney v. Hennessy, 74 Conn. 107, 49 A. 910; Paulo v. Malo, 6 Hawaii, 390; St. Louis &c. R. Co. v. Nugent, 152 Ill. 119, 32 N.E. 263; King v. Carmichael, 136 Ind. 20, 35 N.E. 509; Tebaut v. Daniels, 38 Ia. 158; Black v. Cocks, 82 S.W. 278; Alden v. Gilmore, 13 Maine, 178; Abbott v. Abbott, 51 Maine, 575; Cook v. Babcock, 11 Cush. 207; Poingnard v. Smith, 6 Pick. 172; Samuels v. Barrowscale, 104 Mass. 207; Bird v. Starck, 66 Mich. 654, 33 N.W. 754; Howatt v. Greene, 139 Mich. 289, 102 N.W. 734; Wilson v. Williams, 52 Miss. 487; Warfield v. Lindle, 38 Mo. 561; Swope v. Ward, 185 Mo. 316, 84 S.W. 895; National Mining Co. v. Powers, 3 Mont. 344; Williams v. Shepherdson, 95 N.W. 827; Humbert v. Trinity Church, 24 Wend. 587; Green v. Horn, 112 N.Y.S. 993; Pitman v. Weeks, 132 N.C. 81, 43 S.E. 582; Kennedy v. Maness, 138 N.C. 35, 50 S.E. 450; Jones v. Porter, 3 P. & W. 132; Brice v. Cayce, 62 S.C. 546, 4 S.E. 048; Love v. Turner, 71 S.C. 322, 51 S.E. 101; Brownson v. Scanlon, 50 Tex. 222; Thompson v. Wiseman, 98 Tex. 170, 82 S.W. 503; Jangraw v. Mee, 75 Vt. 211, 54 A. 189; Bowers v. Ledgewood, 25 Wash. 14, 64 Pa. 936; Talbot v. Woodford, 48 W.Va. 449, 37 S.E. 580; Rains v. Buxton (Eng.), 14 Ch. D. 537, 49 L. J. Ch. 473; Cowan v. Hatcher, 59 S.W. 689; Parrish v. Williams, 79 S.W. 1097; Bingham Livery &c. Co. v. McDonald, 111 P. 56; Flint v. Long, 41 P. 49, 2 C. J. 79.) Silence on the part of the owner does not establish the fact that the possession was permissive. (2 C. J. 76; Richmond Cedar Works v. Pinix, 208 F. 785, 795.) The case of Roberts v. R. R. Co., 102 N.W. 60, is not in point. Ignorance of the claim of right cannot be urged by an owner to defeat limitations. (Brown v. Scanlan, 59 Tex. 222.) Exclusive possession does not require that all others be excluded. (Point Mountain Coal & Lumber Co. v. Holly Lumber Co., 75 S.E. 197, 201, 71 W.Va. 21.) Plaintiffs in error held exclusive possession for 23 years according to the evidence; such adverse possession was continuous by successive owners. Action for recovery of possession is barred after ten years. (Sec. 4295, Comp. Stats. 1910.) The requisite privity may be created by conveyances, agreements or understandings that transferred possession, when accompanied by transfers in fact. (Alexander v. Pendleton, 8 Cranch. 462, 3 U.S. (L. Ed.) 624; Holt v. Adams, 121 Ala. 664, 25 So. 716; Memphis &c. R. Co. v. Organ, 76 Ark. 84, 55 S.W. 952; Fanning v. Wilcox, 3 Day, 258; Smith v. Chapin, 31 Conn. 530; Kendrick v. Latham, 25 Fla. 819, 6 So. 871; Weber v. Anderson, 73 Ill. 439; Kepley v. Scully, 185 Ill. 52, 57 N.E. 187; Paul v. Conn. Mts. L. Ins. Co., 76 Minn. 401, 79 N.W. 497; Montague v. Marinda, 71 Neb. 805, 99 N.W. 653; Monroe v. Wilson, 68 N.H. 580, 41 A. 240; Clark v. Bundy, 29 Ore. 190, 44 P. 282; Schutz v. Fitzwater, Pa. St. 126; Clithers v. Fenner, 122 Wisc. 356, 99 N.W. 1027; McNeely v. Langan, 22 Ohio St. 32, 2 C. J. 90; Shuffelton v. Nelson, 2 Sawy. 540, 22 Fed. Cas. No. 12822; Naiman v. Burch, 91 Ill.App. 48; Wishart v. McKnight, 178 Mass. 356, 59 N.E. 1028; Vandall v. St. Martin, 42 Minn. 163, 44 N.W. 525; Crispen v. Hannavan, 50 Mo. 536; So. Omaha v. Meehan, 71 Neb. 230; Davoch v. Nealon, 58 N. J. L. 21, 32 A. 675; McNeely v. Langan, supra; Sommer v. Compton, 96 P. 124.) A verbal sale of improvements and right of possession is sufficient. (Houston Oil Co. v. Gore (Tex. Civ. A.), 159 S.W. 924.) Privity denotes a succession of interest. (2 C. J. 85.) Where the statutory period has run and title acquired thereunder subsequent abandonment does not defeat the title acquired. (Jacks v. Chaffin, 34 Ark. 534; Todd v. Kauffman, 19 D. C. 304; Milliken v. Kennedy, 87 Ga. 463, 13 S.E. 635; School District No. 4 v. Benson, 31 Me. 381; Sherman v. Kane, 86 N.Y. 57; Schall v. Williams Valley R. Co., 35 Pa. 191; Erhard v. Hearne, 47 Tex. 469.) "Hostile" possession means possession as owner as distinguished from holding in subordination of the recognized ownership of another. (2 C. J. 122.) Actual, open and exclusive possession for the period of limitation creates the presumption that the possession was hostile. (Tritt v. Roberts, 64 Ga. 156; Anderson v. Dood, 65 Ga. 402; Hammond v. Crosby, 68 Ga. 767; Albertina v. Kapiolani Estate, 14 Hawaii 321; Kapiolani v. Kleghorn, 14 Hawaii 330; Greene v. Anglemire, 77 Mich. 168, 43 N.W. 772; Neel v. McElhenny, 69 Pa. St. 300; Satcher v. Grice, 53 S.C. 126, 31 S.E. 3; Toltic Ranch Co. v. Babcock, 24 Utah 183, 66 P. 876; Morse v. Churchill, 41 Vt. 649; Illinois Steel Co. v. Budzisz, 106 Wis. 499, 81 N.W. 1027, 82 N.W. 534; Illinois Steel Co. v. Paczocha, 119 N.W. 550; Hammachek v. Donvall, 139 Wis. 108, 115 N.W. 634; Pioneer Investment &c. Co. v. Board of Education, 35 Utah 99, Pac. 150; Whitaker v. Erir Shooting Club, 102 Mich. 454, 60 N.W. 983; Dean v. Goddard, 55 Minn. 290, 56 N.W. 1060; McGee v. McGee, 37 Miss. 138; Davis v. Bowman, 55 Miss. 671; Pharis v. Jones, 122 Mo. 125, 26 S.W. 1032; Benne v. Miller, 149 Mo. 228, 50 S.W. 824; Dikeman v. Parrish, 6 Pa. St., 210; Bradshaw v. Mayfield, 18 Tex. 21; Brock v. Bear, 100 Va. 562, 42 S.E. 307; Pioneer Wood Pulp Co. v. Chandos, 78 Wis. 526, 47 N.W. 661.) Claim of right means acts showing an intention to appropriate and use the land to the exclusion of all others. (1 R. C. L. 706-707.) An expression of intention is unnecessary. (1 R. C. L. 796.) Occupation, use and improvement of the premises without payment of rent or recognition of title in another raises a presumption that the occupant is holding as absolute owner. (1 R. C. L. 796.) Lands of a railroad company may be acquired by adverse possession. (2 C. J. 225.) Lands of a railroad company outside of the right of way are not impressed with a public use. (2 C. J. 225.) Even if the lands were a part of the railroad right of way or necessary for railway purposes, that fact would not defeat the claim of plaintiffs in error. The constitutional provision (Sec. 2, Art. 10) merely affirms the rule of the common law. A railroad line is not a public highway in the same sense that roads and streets are such. The statute (Section 3833, Comp. Stats.) permitting the acquisition of 200 feet in width for right of way purposes raises merely a naked presumption that such land is necessary for railroad purposes, which presumption may be rebutted. (Alcott v. Supervisors, 16 Wall. 678.) In England title may be acquired against a railroad company by adverse possession, even as to lands required for the company's undertakings. (Bobbett v. South Eastern R. Co., 9 Q. B. D. 424; Norton v. London &c. R. Co., 9 Ch. D. 623.) In the United States this rule has been announced by the great weight of authority and title to land constituting the right of way of a railroad company may be acquired as against the company by adverse possession. (2 C. J. 225; 1 R. C. L. 737, Sec. 56; George &c. R. Co. v. Gardner, 113 Ga. 897, 39 S.E. 299; Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Houghton, 126 Ill. 233, 18 N.E. 301; Ill. Cent. R. Co. v. O'Connor, 154 Ill. 150, 39 N.E. 563; Ill. Cent. R. Co. v. Moore, 160 Ill. 9, 43 N.E. 364; Donahue v. Ill. Cent. R. Co., 165 Ill. 640, 46 N.E. 714; Ill. Cent. R. Co. v. Wakefield, 173 Ill. 564, 50 N.E. 1002; Chic. &c. R. Co. v. Abbott, 215 Ill. 416, 74 N.E. 412; Pittsburg &c. R. Co. v. Jellison, 86 N.E. 501; Maysville &c. R. Co. v. Holton, 100 Ky. 65, 39 S.W. 207; Pollock v. Maysville &c. R. Co., 103 Ky. 84, 44 S.W. 359; Louisville &c. R. Co. v. Smith, 125 Ky. 336, 101 S.W. 317; Mathews v. Lake Shore &c. R. Co., 110 Mich. 170, 67 N.W. 1111; Northern Pac. R. Co. v. Townsend, 84 Minn. 152, 86 N.W. 1007; Paxton v. Yazoo &c. R. Co., 76 Miss. 536, 24 So. 536; Welch v. Chic. &c. R. Co., 19 Mo.App....