Bollwitt v. Baptist Mem'l Hosp. - Golden Triangle
| Docket Number | Civil Action 1:20-CV-112-SA-DAS |
| Decision Date | 23 August 2022 |
| Parties | MICHAEL BOLLWITT AND JERI BOLLWITT PLAINTIFFS v. BAPTIST MEMORIAL HOSPITAL-GOLDEN TRIANGLE, INC. D/B/A BAPTIST MEMORIAL HOSPITAL-GOLDEN TRIANGLE, et al. DEFENDANTS |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Mississippi |
Now before the Court is the Plaintiffs, Michael and Jeri Bollwitt's, Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [186]. The Motion [186] has been fully briefed. Having reviewed the filings, as well as the applicable authorities, the Court is prepared to rule.
This civil action arises from medical treatment Michael Bollwitt received at the emergency room of Baptist Memorial Hospital - Golden Triangle (hereinafter “Baptist”) in Columbus, Mississippi. Michael and his wife Jeri assert claims against Baptist; Ulandera Robertson (registered nurse); Bradley Sumrall (physician assistant); Tyrone Rupert (nurse practitioner); United Emergency Services of Mississippi, LLC (hereinafter “United”); and Schumacher Management Services, Inc. (hereinafter “Schumacher”).
On November 20, 2018, Michael and Jeri Bollwitt, who were Iowa residents, travelled to Columbus, Mississippi to visit their son for the Thanksgiving holidays. Two days later on November 22, 2018 at around 9:15 P.M., the Bollwitts presented at Baptist's emergency room with Michael complaining of jaw pain. During that visit, Jeri (on Michael's behalf) signed an admission form, which set forth various terms and conditions related to the medical care to be provided.
During his November 22, 2018 visit, Michael was treated by Bradley Sumrall. The Bollwitts describe the treatment Michael received during that visit as follows:
After a very cursory examination, PA Sumrall noted that Michael's right tympanic membrane (inter-ear) was “injected (centrally)”, i.e., red and inflamed, a clear indication of an ear infection or otitis media. Sumrall accessed a national database (knows as the “Prescription Monitoring Program” or “PMP”) to ensure Michael was not “doctor shopping” for pain medication; noted in the record that “controlled substance prescriptions in the past year were found”; gave him more steroids and pain medication; diagnosed him with TMJ; and discharged him without treating the infection in his right ear.
[185] at p. 2 (emphasis omitted).
Michael was discharged from Baptist less than two hours after his initial arrival. Despite receiving this treatment, Michael alleges that he continued to experience pain which “was unrelenting and worsening.” Id. at p. 3. The Bollwitts went back to Baptist's emergency room the next night. Jeri again signed an admission form during this visit. Tyrone Rupert treated Bollwitt during this visit.[1] The Bollwitts describe the events of that night as follows:
Interestingly, PA Sumrall on this November 23rd evening noticed that his patient of the night before, Michael Bollwitt, had returned to the ER and was assigned to NP Rupert. Sumrall approached Rupert and informed him that he had seen Michael the previous evening in the ER, checking the PMP and he [Bollwitt] was “clear.” He cautioned that he had already given Michael enough pain medication that should have managed pain related to TMJ. . . With this information, NP Rupert did not examine Michael's ear. He did not examine the mastoid. He did no blood tests. No CT scans. He did not assess Michael for dehydration. . . Rupert gave Michael an injection of pain medication, a muscle relaxer, medication for nausea, and discharged him.
Id. at p. 3 (internal citations omitted).
Jeri was apparently frustrated with the decision to discharge Michael so quickly. She called Baptist again that night and while speaking with a nurse, advised that “her husband's condition continued to deteriorate,” and asked if she should bring him back to the emergency room. Id. at p. 5. After being placed on hold, Jeri allegedly became frustrated, hung up the phone, and made the decision that she would drive Michael back to Iowa the following morning so that he could receive the medical treatment she believed he needed.
However when the next morning arrived, Jeri determined that Michael's condition was so bad that he would not survive the drive to Iowa. Jeri took Michael back to Baptist. When the Bollwitts arrived on the morning of the 24th, Dr. McCoy “immediately recognized that [Michael] was in an emergent condition; diagnosed otitis media, mastoiditis acute osteomyelitis of the temporal bone, and overwhelming sepsis.” Id. at p. 5. Michael was airlifted to Memphis, where he stayed in ICU for approximately two months.
Michael suffered a stroke, had two brain surgeries, and “is now totally disabled, neurologically and physically.” Id. at p. 6. The Bollwitts contend that Michael's injuries and his subsequent condition could “have been avoided with timely and appropriate assessment and antibiotic therapy.” Id.
Summary judgment is warranted when the evidence reveals no genuine dispute regarding any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). Rule 56 “mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Nabors v. Malone, 2019 WL 2617240, at *1 (N.D. Miss. June 26, 2019) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)).
“The moving party ‘bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the record which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.'” Id. (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323). “The nonmoving party must then ‘go beyond the pleadings' and ‘designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'” Id. (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324). Importantly, “the inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts contained in the affidavits, depositions, and exhibits of record must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.” Waste Mgmt. of La., LLC v. River Birch, Inc., 920 F.3d 958, 964 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting Reingold v. Swiftships, Inc., 126 F.3d 645, 646 (5th Cir. 1997)). However, “[c]onclusory allegations, speculation, unsubstantiated assertions, and legalist arguments are not an adequate substitute for specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial.” Nabors, 2019 WL 2617240 at *1 (citing TIG Ins. Co. v. Sedgewick James of Wash., 276 F.3d 754, 759 (5th Cir. 2002)) (additional citations omitted).
The Bollwitts' Second Amended Complaint [93] includes a myriad of claims. However, the issue presented in the present Motion [186] is a narrow one-specifically, whether Baptist is vicariously liable for the purported negligence of Bradley Sumrall and Tyrone Rupert.
To provide further context, neither Sumrall nor Rupert were Baptist employees when they treated Michael in the emergency room. Baptist had in place a contract with United, pursuant to which United provided staffing for Baptist's emergency room. Both Sumrall and Rupert were employees of Schumacher. Sumrall and Rupert were then leased to United via a separate contract between Schumacher and United. And they then fulfilled United's contractual obligation to staff Baptist's emergency room.
At this juncture, the Bollwitts seek a pre-trial ruling that, despite these contractual arrangements, Baptist is nevertheless liable as a matter of law for Sumrall and Rupert's negligent conduct, if any. The Bollwitts seek such a ruling pursuant to the apparent authority principle of agency under Mississippi law.
The seminal Mississippi case on this issue is the Mississippi Supreme Court's 1985 decision in Hardy v. Brantley, 471 So.2d 358 (Miss. 1985). In Hardy, the decedent was treated at the Hinds General Hospital Emergency Room in Jackson, Mississippi. Id. at 360. Unbeknownst to the decedent, the medical providers who treated him were not employed by Hinds General but, rather, were independent contractors. Id. After the decedent passed away, the administratrix of his estate brought a medical negligence action. Id. at 362.
In analyzing whether the hospital could be held vicariously liable, the Mississippi Supreme Court framed the issue as follows: “We regard the question whether a hospital operating an emergency [room] may be held liable vicariously or under the theory of respondeat superior for the conduct of emergency room physicians retained by the hospital as one of first impression in this state.” Id. at 369. The Supreme Court noted that while the hospital argued that its contracts with the physicians included certain disclaimer language, “our concern . . . regards the rights and duties of the hospital vis-a-vis the patient, not the emergency room physician.” Id. After surveying decisions issued on this topic by various courts across other states, the Supreme Court concluded:
Having in mind the considerations and premises set forth in the above authorities, we have concluded that the better rule to be followed in this state henceforth is this: Where a hospital holds itself out to the public as providing a given service, in this instance, emergency services, and where the patient engages the services of the hospital without regard to the identity of a particular physician and where as a matter of fact the patient is relying upon the hospital to deliver the desired heath care and treatment, the doctrine of respondeat superior applies and the hospital is vicariously liable for damages proximately...
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