Bolt v. Life & Cas. Ins. Co. Of Tenn., No. 12880.

• Court: United States State Supreme Court of South Carolina
• Writing for the Court: WATTS
• Citation: 152 S.E. 766
• Parties: BOLT . v. LIFE & CASUALTY INS. CO. OF TENNESSEE.
• Decision Date: 03 April 1930
• Docket Number: No. 12880.

152 S.E. 766

BOLT .
v.
LIFE & CASUALTY INS. CO. OF TENNESSEE.

No. 12880.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

April 3, 1930.

COTHRAN, J., dissenting.

Appeal from Common Pleas Circuit Court of Anderson County; E. C. Dennis, Judge.

Action by Wile D. Bolt against the Life & Casualty Insurance Company of Tennessee. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.

Affirmed.

The action was to recover the sum of $1,000 alleged to be due the plaintiff as beneficiary under a certain policy of accident insurance

[152 S.E. 767]

issued by the defendant company to Charlie II. Bolt, a son of plaintiff, on the 8th day of March, 1926, said Charlie II. Bolt having been killed on September 29, 1928, in a collision between a motorcycle on which he was riding and an automobile on a public highway in South Carolina. The defendant answered denying liability on the ground that the policy did not cover accidents happening to the insured while riding on a motorcycle. The case resulted in a directed verdict in favor of the plaintiff for $1,000.

The order of Judge Dennis, directing the verdict, was as follows:

The facts in this case are practically agreed upon, and the only real question between the parties is whether or not the accident which caused the death of Charlie H. Bolt is covered by the policy in suit. A jury was drawn, and when the question came up before me for the direction of a verdict, I desired to study the question more, and counsel on each side agreed that the jury might be discharged and that any verdict rendered by me would have the same effect as if signed by a jury.

The contention of the defendant is that the deceased having been killed while riding a motorcycle, is not covered by this policy which insures against collision of or by any accident to any private horse-drawn vehicle or motor-driven car; the contention of the defendant being that a motorcycle is not a motor-driven car.

No case from this State can be found construing a provision of a policy similar to this, but cases from other states have been cited. From Louisiana and Massachusetts, especially, cases are cited holding that the clause referring to a motor-driven car does not include a motorcycle. I am unable to agree with the reasoning in those cases. It seems to me that the insurance company in writing its insurance policy could have specifically stated therein that a motorcycle was not included. A casual reading of the policy seems to me to include a motorcycle, and I think nine people out of ten in reading it would so conclude. It may have been the intention of the insurance company to exclude a motorcycle, but if such was its intention, it used language more calculated to conceal its meaning than to express it. I hold that motor car includes motorcycle.

I, therefore, direct a verdict for the plaintiff for the sum of One Thousand Dollars.

Watkins & Prince, of Anderson, for appellant.

Samuel M. Wolfe, of Anderson, for respondent.

WATTS, C. J.

The order of Judge Dennis is satisfactory to this court. Let it be reported. The excep tions are overruled, and the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.

BLEASE, STABLER, and CARTER, JJ., concur.

BLEASE, J. (concurring).

I do not think "the sole point in the case is whether a motorcycle is a motor-driven car within the terms of the policy, " as suggested by Mr. Justice COTHRAN. That question, however, is an important one, and it seems to be entirely new in this state. In considering it, however, there are some principles of law, well recognized by our court, which we must keep in mind.

In Rawl v. Insurance Co., 94 S. C. 299, 77 S. E. 1013, 1014, 44 L. R. A. (N. S.) 463, Ann. Cas. 1915A, 1231, Mr. Justice Woods, referring to the construction of an insurance policy, cited several of our cases to sustain this proposition:

"If the meaning is doubtful, or the language is calculated to mislead, the courts will adopt the meaning most favorable to the maintaining of the liability."

This court has also decided, "where insurer writes a policy of life insurance, it should be read most strongly against it." (Syllabus) McKendree v. Life Insurance Co., 112 S. C. 335, 99 S. E. 806.

Undoubtedly, many of the authorities cited by Mr. Justice COTHRAN sustain very strongly his position that a motorcycle is not included in the term "motor-driven car." The authorities are from courts that are highly respected for their wisdom and learning. They are not in accord with my view, however, and this court is not bound by them. I think, perhaps, the courts that decided the cases, cited in the dissenting opinion, have not been as strong as our own court has been in resolving doubtful matters regarding insurance policies in favor of the insured persons and the beneficiaries of such policies. An examination of many of our decisions, too numerous to even refer to here, will disclose that our court has made it the almost universal rule to construe any clause of an insurance policy against the insurer, when there existed the least doubt as to the meaning of the language employed. The two South Carolina cases, above referred to, are indications of the holdings of this court.

Some authorities I have found in my investigation of this case strengthen my view of the incorrectness of the holdings in the decisions cited in the dissenting opinion.

The term "motor-driven car" is made up of two words, motor-driven and car. In Webster's New International Dictionary, the meaning of "motor-driven" is given as, "Driven or actuated by a motor." The important word in the expression "motor-driven car" is

[152 S.E. 768]

"car." In the same dictionary, that word is given numerous definitions. The very first of these, however, is this, "A vehicle moved on wheels." Since the definition named was first given, I suppose the author deemed it to be the most appropriate. As I understand it, then, according to Webster, a "motor-driven car" is, " a vehicle moved on wheels by a motor." It is not said in Webster how many wheels the vehicle must have to constitute it a car, but it must have wheels, —more than just one wheel. Two wheels will meet the requirement. A motorcycle has two wheels; so that machine or vehicle comes within the definition laid down by Webster of the word "car."

Since a motorcycle, as per Webster, is a "car, " and it is driven by a motor, it follows, necessarily, that a motorcycle is a "motor-driven car."

I find also, in the same dictionary, the word "motor-car" defined as follows: "An automobile, locomobile, or locomotive designed to run and be steered on a street or roadway; esp., an automobile specially designed for passengers. See automobile. In British statutory classification a motor car is included under the term light locomotive (which see). In the Motor Car Act (3 Ed. VII, c. 36) the term motor car includes also motor cycle except where the contrary intention appears. See motor cycle."

Webster defines motorcycle thus: "A bicycle having a motor attached so as to be self-propelled. In Great Britain the term motor cycle is treated by statute (3 Ed. VII, c. 36) as limited to motor cars (self-propelled vehicles) designed to travel on not more than three wheels, and weighing unladen (that is, without water, fuel, or accumulators necessary for propulsion) not more than three hundredweight (336 lbs.) see motor car."

It will be observed that in the definitions above quoted, in defining motorcar, Webster says, "see motor cycle." In defining motorcycle, he says "See motor car." Evidently, the authors of that great dictionary regarded motorcycle and motorcar as practically synonymous.

It is to be noted also that in the statutory enactments of England, according to Webster, motorcycle has been held to be included in the term motorcar.

Webster is corroborated in this by a note in 21 L. R. A. (N. S.) 41, where we find the following:

"And, in R. v. Divisional Justices (1904) 2 Ir. K. B. 698, the conviction of the rider of a motor cycle was sustained as a violation of an act punishing the driving of 'a motor ear on a public highway, recklessly or negligently, ' at a prohibited speed."

The holding in the case last mentioned was questioned in Laporte v. Insurance Co., 161 La. 933, 109 So. 767, 48 A. L. R. 1086, cited by Mr. Justice COTHRAN, but the author of the annotation in 48 A. L. R. 1090, says that the court in Rex v. Divisional Justices assumed that a motorcycle was a "motor car" within the meaning of the act.

According to the author of the same annotation in 48 A. L. R. in the English case of Webster v. Terry, 1 K. B. 51, it was held that a motorcycle was included in the provisions of an act containing conditions to be observed by persons using motor cars on the highways.

The decisions of the English courts, like those of other jurisdictions in this country, are not binding upon this court, but they are entitled to great respect. There, it will be observed that even in the construction of a penal statute, where the rule is that the language of a statute must be construed in favor of one charged with crime, when there is doubt as to the meaning of the language used, it was held that motorcycle was included in the term motorcar.

I fear that the courts of some our American states, whose decisions have been cited in the dissenting opinion, have fallen into error in not following the decisions of the English court, and that they have paid entirely too little attention to that good old American authority as to the meaning of English words, Webster's Dictionary.

Now turning to American legal authorities, we find in Ruling Case Law this statement:

"The courts without making clear distinctions, have generally used the terms automobile, motor vehicle, motor car, and in the earlier cases, horseless carriage, as being synonymous with each other. Except where special provision is made to the contrary, a motor cycle is considered as falling within statutes which use such terms. * * *" (Emphasis added.) 2 R. C. L. 1167.

According to that authority, when there is...