Bolt v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ.
| Decision Date | 09 January 2018 |
| Docket Number | No. 52 SSM 35,No. 51 SSM 34,No. 53 SSM 36,51 SSM 34,52 SSM 35,53 SSM 36 |
| Citation | 91 N.E.3d 1234,30 N.Y.3d 1065,69 N.Y.S.3d 255 |
| Parties | In the Matter of Ericka BOLT, Respondent, v. NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, Appellant. In the Matter of Amira Beatty, Respondent, v. City of New York, et al., Appellants. In the Matter of Terrell Williams, Respondent, v. City of New York, et al., Appellants. |
| Court | New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Zachary W. Carter, Corporation Counsel, New York City (Melanie T. West, Richard Dearing and Deborah A. Brenner of counsel), for appellant in the first above-entitled proceeding.
The Law Offices of Richard J. Washington, P.C., New York City (Richard J. Washington of counsel), for respondent in the first above-entitled proceeding.
Zachary W. Carter, Corporation Counsel, New York City (Kathy Chang Park and Richard Dearing of counsel), for appellants in the second and third above-entitled proceedings.
Glass Krakower LLP, New York City (Bryan D. Glass of counsel), for respondent in the second and third above-entitled proceedings.
In Matter of Bolt v. New York City Dept. of Education and Matter of Beatty v. City of New York, the order of the Appellate Division should be reversed, with costs, respondents' cross motion to dismiss the petition granted, and the certified question answered in the negative; in Matter of Williams v. City of New York, the arbitral award appealed from and the Appellate Division order brought up for review should be reversed, with costs, and the judgment of Supreme Court, New York County, dismissing the proceeding reinstated.
"That reasonable minds might disagree over what the proper penalty should have been does not provide a basis for vacating the arbitral award or refashioning the penalty" ( City School Dist. of the City of N.Y. v. McGraham, 17 NY3d 917, 920, 934 N.Y.S.2d 768, 958 N.E.2d 897 [2011] ). Here, the penalties imposed are not irrational and do not shock the conscience (see Matter of Russo v. New York City Dept. of Educ., 25 NY3d 946, 948, 29 N.E.3d 896 [2015], cert denied 577 U.S. ––––, 136 S.Ct. 416, 193 L.Ed.2d 317 [2015] ; Matter of Kelly v. Safir, 96 N.Y.2d 32, 38, 724 N.Y.S.2d 680, 747 N.E.2d 1280 [2001] ; Matter of Featherstone v. Franco, 95 N.Y.2d 550, 554, 720 N.Y.S.2d 93, 742 N.E.2d 607 [2000] ; Matter of Pell v. Board of Educ. of Union Free School Dist. No. 1 of Towns of Scarsdale & Mamaroneck, Westchester County, 34 N.Y.2d 222, 233, 356 N.Y.S.2d 833, 313 N.E.2d 321 [1974] ). The Appellate Division exceeded its authority by reweighing the evidence and substituting its judgment for that of the hearing officer.
I agree with my colleagues that the Appellate Division orders should be reversed because in all three appeals the court exceeded its authority and substituted its own judgment for that of the hearing officer (majority op. at 1068, 69 N.Y.S.3d at 256-57, 91 N.E.3d at 1235-36 ). There is no dispute that these appeals require the application of settled law to the facts of each case. There is no doctrinal complexity or novel issue presented in these appeals that cannot be resolved by reference to existing precedent. The Court is unanimous in its conclusion that under our well-established standards, the administrative sanctions are not irrational and do not "shock the conscience," and therefore the court may not disturb the penalties imposed (see Matter of Pell v. Board of Educ. of Union Free School Dist. No. 1 of Towns of Scarsdale & Mamaroneck, Westchester County, 34 N.Y.2d 222, 240, 356 N.Y.S.2d 833, 313 N.E.2d 321 [1974] ).
Under other circumstances I would have no cause to write separately. Certainly, there is an argument to be made that brevity of analysis coupled with a solid reversal is sufficient comment on an obvious misapplication of the law. Nevertheless, because the Appellate Division analyses in these appeals are so clearly at odds with uncontroversial, established legal standards, and because respondent Department of Education compellingly argues this Court should clarify the scope of review to avoid judicial overreach in school disciplinary cases, it appears that full articulation of applicable standards is in order. Rearticulating our jurisprudence should eliminate any possible misunderstanding as to the Appellate Division's review of administrative sanctions, and reaffirm the high degree of impropriety and affront to our sense of fairness required to "shock the conscience."
Judicial review of an administrative disciplinary determination is statutorily and constitutionally defined (see CPLR 7803, 7511 ; NY Const, art VI, § 3 ). We have repeatedly explained in article 78 proceedings that contrary to the Appellate Division's general broad jurisdiction, its review of administrative sanctions is circumscribed and no greater than our own. Thus, "the Appellate Division lacks any discretionary authority or interest of justice jurisdiction in reviewing the penalty imposed" by an administrative entity (Matter of Featherstone v. Franco, 95 N.Y.2d 550, 554, 720 N.Y.S.2d 93, 742 N.E.2d 607 [2000] ). Instead, like this Court, the Appellate Division's "review of an administrative penalty is limited to whether the measure or mode of penalty or discipline imposed constitutes an abuse of discretion as a matter of law" (Matter of Kelly v. Safir, 96 N.Y.2d 32, 38, 724 N.Y.S.2d 680, 747 N.E.2d 1280 [2001] ; Featherstone, 95 N.Y.2d at 554, 720 N.Y.S.2d 93, 742 N.E.2d 607 ; CPLR 7803[3] ). Further, " Education Law § 3020–a (5) limits judicial review of a hearing officer's determination to the grounds set forth in CPLR 7511," and "[w]here, as here, parties are subject to compulsory arbitration, the award ... ‘must have evidentiary support and cannot be arbitrary and capricious' " ( City Sch. Dist. of City of New York v. McGraham, 17 NY3d 917, 919, 934 N.Y.S.2d 768, 958 N.E.2d 897 [2011] [citation omitted] ). Significantly, an award is not arbitrary and capricious or irrational simply because there are differing views as to the appropriate sanction. "That reasonable minds might disagree over what the proper penalty should have been does not provide a basis for vacating the arbitral award or refashioning the penalty" (id. at 920, 934 N.Y.S.2d 768, 958 N.E.2d 897).
Against this backdrop, the Court and the Appellate Division have uniformly reviewed administrative penalties under the standard set forth in Pell, which provides that "[u]nless an irrationality appears or the punishment shocks one's conscience, sanctions imposed by an administrative agency should be upheld" ( Pell, 34 N.Y.2d at 240, 356 N.Y.S.2d 833, 313 N.E.2d 321 ). The Court has characterized the standard as "rigorous" ( Featherstone, 95 N.Y.2d at 554, 720 N.Y.S.2d 93, 742 N.E.2d 607 ). "[T]he test is whether such punishment is so disproportionate to the offense, in the light of all the circumstances, as to be shocking to one's sense of fairness" (id. at 233, 356 N.Y.S.2d 833, 313 N.E.2d 321 [internal quotation marks omitted] ). This "calculus involves consideration of whether the impact of the penalty on the individual is so severe that it is disproportionate to the misconduct, or to the harm to the agency or the public in general" ( Kelly, 96 N.Y.2d at 38, 724 N.Y.S.2d 680, 747 N.E.2d 1280 ).
The phrase "shocking to one's sense of fairness," must by its nature "reflect [ ] a purely subjective response to the situation presented" ( Pell, 34 N.Y.2d at 234, 356 N.Y.S.2d 833, 313 N.E.2d 321 ). While "such language reflects difficulty in articulating an objective standard ..., by the impact of sufficient instances, a more analytical and articulated standard evolves" (id. ). In light of this developing standard, the Court has adopted normative measures to guide judicial review in determining whether a sanction is an affront to our sense of fairness. At a minimum:
(id. at 234–235, 356 N.Y.S.2d 833, 313 N.E.2d 321).
This Court's recognition of societal standards as a factor in determining whether a sanction exceeds the bounds of acceptable punishment for misconduct in the administrative context should not be misread. It was never meant as an invitation to a reviewing court to supplant the hearing officer's determination as to the sanction appropriate to the misconduct based on the factual record and considered in light of the duties charged to the agency and its administrative goals (id. at 232, 356 N.Y.S.2d 833, 313 N.E.2d 321, citing Matter of Diocese of Rochester v. Planning Bd. of Town of Brighton, 1 N.Y.2d 508, 520, 154 N.Y.S.2d 849, 136 N.E.2d 827 [1956] ).
Thus, under Pell, the mere fact that a penalty is harsh, and imposes severe consequences on an individual, does not so affront our sense of fairness that it shocks the conscience, unless it is obviously disproportionate to the misconduct and in contravention of the public interest and policy reflected by the agency's mission. For example, in Matter of Ward v. City of New...
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