Bolton v. La Camas Water-Power Co.

• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: HOYT, J.
• Citation: Bolton v. La Camas Water-Power Co., 38 P. 1043, 10 Wash. 246 (Wash. 1894)
• Decision Date: 03 December 1894
• Parties: BOLTON ET AL. v. LA CAMAS WATER-POWER CO. ET AL.

38 P. 1043

10 Wash. 246

BOLTON ET AL. v. LA CAMAS WATER-POWER CO. ET AL.

Supreme Court of Washington

December 3, 1894

Appeal from superior court, Clarke county, E. A. Wiswall, Judge.

Action by Lewis H. Bolton and others against La Camas Water-Power Company and others to recover land. Judgment for defendants and plaintiffs appeal. Affirmed.

Dunbar C.J., dissenting.

G. H. Funk and N.H. Bloomfield, for appellants.

E. E. Coovert, for respondents.

HOYT J.

This action was brought to recover a one-third interest in certain lands described in the complaint. The plaintiffs claimed as heirs of their mother who, it was alleged, was the owner of an undivided half of the lands at the time of her death. The cause was submitted upon an agreed statement of facts, from which, among other things, it appeared that James H. Bolton and Julia Catherine Bolton, his wife, established a residence upon the land in question in August, 1865, and that they lived thereon, in full compliance with the requirements of the homestead law of the United States, until the 15th day of June, 1871, when the said Julia Catherine Bolton died; that thereafter, on the 14th day of June, 1872, said James H. Bolton made final proof, as required by the statute, and that thereafter, on September 19, 1872, a patent for said land was issued to and in the name of said James H. Bolton; that the plaintiffs were children of the said James H. and Julia Catherine Bolton; and that they were minors until after the issue of said patent. It further appeared from the agreed statement that, after the issue of the patent, said James H. Bolton was married to one Margaret Miller, and that thereafter he and his wife, Margaret, executed and delivered a warranty deed to said premises, and received full value therefor; that, at the time of said conveyance, the grantee therein had full knowledge of all the facts in relation to the acquisition of the land so conveyed; that the defendants were purchasers for value of the title so conveyed, and, at the time of making the purchase, had no knowledge whatever as to the manner in which the title was acquired, further than that disclosed by the records of Clarke county, which upon their face showed a perfect chain of title from the government to their grantors. Other facts were agreed upon, but it is not necessary to state them, as the legal questions which we shall discuss arise upon those above recited.

It will be seen that the record title is perfect in the defendants, and that they and their grantors had no notice of any facts which in any way tended to impugn the validity of such record title, and that they were purchasers for value. It must follow that, if the said James H. Bolton was vested with the legal title by the patent issued by the government, such legal title is now vested in the defendants; and being so vested, and they having no knowledge of any equities which could in any manner affect such legal title, it is perfect in them, whatever may have been the rights of the said Julia Catherine Bolton, as the wife of said James H. Bolton, or of their children.

The important question, therefore, is as to whether or not the entire legal title was vested in James H. Bolton, or in himself jointly with the said Julia Catherine Bolton or her children. The appellants in their brief have elaborately argued in favor of the proposition that the substantial title passes from the government under the homestead law upon the completion of the five-years residence and cultivation, as therein provided. This is an important question, and the authorities in reference thereto cannot be harmonized. But it is not necessary that it should be decided in the case at bar; for, so far as we are advised, none of the cases go to the extent of holding that the legal title passes before proof of such residence and cultivation has been made and filed as required by law, and most of the cases hold that such legal title does not pass until the issuance of the patent. The rulings as to the time when title passes have not been the same under the homestead act as under the donation law. As to the latter, most of the courts have held that, upon the completion of the residence and cultivation required, the title, both legal and equitable, vests in the settler, and that the issuance of the patent thereafter is but evidence of, and not the conveyance of, title; while, under the former, they have held that, though the beneficial title may pass upon the completion of the residence and cultivation, the legal title does not so pass until proof has been regularly made and patent issued. That the legal title does not pass under the homestead law until proof of compliance with the statute seems to us evident from the language of the act. It provides that, at any time within two years after the completion of the five-years residence and cultivation, proof thereof may be made, and that thereafter a patent will issue. It seems to follow, by necessary inference, that, if proof is not made within the two years required after the completion of the residence and cultivation, all rights growing therefrom may be forfeited. And, in case of such forfeiture, no steps are necessary to reinvest the entire title, both legal and equitable, in the government, excepting such acts and declarations as it deems proper for that purpose. But, if the legal title had passed to the settler, it could only be divested by some act of his, or by the adjudication of a court. Hence the acts and declarations of the executive branch of the government could not have that effect. But all the courts hold that the rights of the settler can be terminated upon his default by such acts and declarations at any time before final proof has been made. It must follow that the legal title does not pass until such proof is made, whatever may be the rule as to the equitable title. The general rule in regard to the time when the title becomes perfected in the settler is that it will become so vested when he has performed every act on his part to be performed, from which it would seem to follow that even the equitable title would not pass under the homestead act until proof had been made as required. The right to the equitable title would be established by the residence and cultivation, but it would not vest in the settler as against the government until it was made aware of said fact by the proof required by the statute.

If what we have above stated as to the time when the title vested is true, the legal, if not the equitable, title, remained in the government until proof of compliance with the statute. But such proof was not made until some time after the death of Julia Catherine Bolton, and since, by her death, the community was dissolved, the legal title could not, at the time it passed from the government, vest in it or its members. And, since it must vest somewhere, it must be held to have vested where by the paper title it purported to vest; that was in James H. Bolton. We therefore feel compelled to hold that, wherever may have been the beneficial interest as between the said James H. Bolton and the estate of his wife, the legal title fully vested in him; and, such being the fact, a conveyance by him would pass a perfect legal title, and, as incident to the passing of such perfect legal title, the entire title, both legal and equitable, would pass to one having no knowledge of any equities which could affect the legal title. And since, from the stipulated facts, the defendants were the holders of such legal title, discharged of any such equities, their title was perfect as against the plaintiffs. The judgment will be affirmed.

STILES and SCOTT, JJ., concur.

DUNBAR C.J. (dissenting).

I am unable to agree with the majority opinion in this case. While it is true that the paper title to a homestead does not pass until proof is made, or, for that matter, until patent issues, yet it is equally true that the courts have held, under laws for obtaining title to the public lands, that, where the applicant has done all that the law requires him to do, the proof is only evidenciary matter which establishes or makes known the fact which already existed. This is the doctrine of common sense. It is the actual doing of the things required, and not the proof of the doing, which meets the requirements of the law. When all is done which can be done, the government simply holds the land in trust until the proof is made.

In Stark v. Starrs, 6 Wall. 402, the United States supreme court asserted the rule that the right to a patent once vested is treated by the government, when dealing with the public lands, as equivalent to a patent issued; and further, that when, in fact, the patent does issue, it relates back to the inception of the right of the patentee, so far as may be necessary to cut off intervening claimants. And, in discussing the principles involved in that case, the court said: "These are only applications of the well-established doctrine that, where one party has acquired a legal title to property to which another has the better right, a court of equity will convert him into a trustee of the true owner, and compel him to convey the legal title." And so I say here that the right to a patent vested in Bolton when he had complied with the provisions of the homestead act, which required him to cultivate and reside upon the land in question for the five years immediately succeeding his entry upon the same; and that, when the patent did issue, it...